GBAGBO USES ARTICLE 48 POWERS TO EXTEND NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000112

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV
SUBJECT: GBAGBO USES ARTICLE 48 POWERS TO EXTEND NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY'S MANDATE

REF: ABIDJAN 02078

ABIDJAN 00000112 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4(a) and (b)


1. (SBU) Summary: The January 27 extension by Presidential
decree of the Mandate of the National Assembly (NA) has
further weakened Prime Minister Banny, and continued
President Gbagbo's challenge to the International
Community. The New Forces, who do not have any deputies in
the assembly, have declared for their part that there is no
NA. On January 31, on the heels of Prime Minister Banny's
mission to South Africa, President Mbeki dispatched a
"mediation" delegation to Cote d'Ivoire. The press is
reporting that the South African delegation considers the
matter of the National Assembly to be a settled question.
The New Forces have firmly rebuffed the delegation,
refusing to meet with its members, it is unclear whether
the South African visit will have any positive effect on
the peace process. End Summary


2. (SBU) On January 28, Desire Tagro, President Gbagbo's
spokesperson, announced on the government-owned television
station, (RTI),that Gbagbo had invoked emergency powers
under Article 48 of the Ivoirian constitution to extend the
mandate of the National Assembly (NA). In support of
Gbagbo's action, Tagro cited the December 15 ruling by the
Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which recommended
extension of the NA's mandate to preserve the separation of
powers enshrined in the Ivoirian Constitution. The
Constitutional Council also cited language in UNSC
Resolution 1633, paragraph 11, which calls for the normal
functioning of Ivoirian institutions until elections are
held as an additional reason for the extension. Tagro also
stated that Gbagbo took this action based on the
"understanding" he reached with Nigerian President Obasanjo
and Prime Minister Banny during Obasanjo's visit to Abidjan
on January 18.


3. (SBU) (Note: To our knowledge, Gbagbo did not consult
with Mbeki prior to invoking Article 48 as required by the
Pretoria II Agreement. SRSG Pierre Schori disagreed with
the Constitutional Council's interpretation and publicly
supported the IWG's subsequent recommendation on January 15
to recommend that the Ivoirian government not renew the NA'
s mandate in accordance with the IWG's interpretation of
the Ivoirian constitution. It was the January 15 decision
of the IWG that sparked the mass demonstrations, and
attacks on the UN Forces and UN Humanitarian sites.)


4. (SBU) Prime Minister Banny, who was in South Africa the
day Tagro announced Gbagbo's decision, has not yet released
a statement commenting on the extension. However,
according to the French Ambassador, Banny has stated that
he was neither consulted nor would he protest the extension
of the NA mandate. This information from the French
confirms the interpretation of the situation shared with us
by the Secretary General of the UDPCI. According to the
UDPCI, Banny has stated that the question of the NA's
mandate is a political question, and he is not here to
resolve political questions.


5. (C) Based on Banny's visit to Pretoria, on January 31
President Mbeki sent a delegation to Cote d'Ivoire. The
delegation described as part of the "mediation," which was
under Mbeki's direction until the AU took back control in
November 2005, seems to be a unilateral effort by the
South African President. Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota
and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad,
will lead the delegation. The delegation's stated reason
for its visit is to assess the "global situation in Cote d'
Ivoire," which includes looking at progress toward
elections. The delegation will meet with President Gbagbo,
Prime Minister Banny, the ruling FPI party and the main
opposition parties. It has also expressed an interest in
traveling to Bouake to meet with the New Forces.


6. (C) However, the New Forces, which declared that it
"will not join a process in which the National Assembly
continues its obstructionist role," have decided to be
equally as obstructionist by refusing to receive the South
African delegation in Bouake. A New Forces communiquQ
released January 31, referred to the restructuring of the
international community's involvement in the peace process
based on UNSC Resolution 1633 and invited South Africa to
rejoin the IWG and AU efforts.


7. (C) Opposition newspapers have been uncharacteristically
understated in their denouncement of Gbagbo's decision. If
the NA were dissolved, opposition party deputies would also
lose their salaries and benefits and the lack of vocal

ABIDJAN 00000112 002 OF 002


protest over the decree to extend the mandate reflects
dissent among the rank and file of the opposition parties
who want to keep their Assemblymen privileges. The
strongest protest against Gbagbo's decree has come from UN
Sec. General Koffi Annan, who called the decree
"surprising" and not in conformity with the report he
received from Obasanjo and the UN SRSG on the outcome of
Obasanjo's January 18 visit.


8. (C) On January 30, the French Ambassador told Ambassador
Hooks of his government's pique at Gbagbo's recent gambit.
However, given that the International Working Group (IWG)
will not meet again until February 17 and given the
inaction of the IWG's Mediation Group, which is charged
with daily monitoring of the peace process, Gbagbo is
likely to get away with his move to reestablish the
NA.


9. (C) Comment: Gbagbo's extension of the NA has once
again undermined Banny's authority. Banny seems neither
willing nor able to acknowledge his reduced stature, and he
seems unable to focus his government on the critical work
of unifying the country, commencing DDR, and organizing
elections. Banny's decision to travel to South Africa
immediately after the Jan 16-20 crisis instead of pushing
his team to work with an increased sense of urgency only
further increases the perception of drift. End Comment

Hooks