GBAGBO AND SUPPORTERS ADOPT A TOUGHER LINE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 001105

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KINSHASA PASS TO BRAZZAVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC IV
SUBJECT: GBAGBO AND SUPPORTERS ADOPT A TOUGHER LINE IN
RUN-UP TO ECOWAS CONFERENCE ON COTE D'IVOIRE

REF: 06 ABIDJAN 1070

Classified By: Charge Vicente Valle, Reasons 1.5 (d)


1. (C) Summary. Tensions are running higher in Abidjan as
President Gbagbo's mandate nears its end and in the run-up to
the October 6 ECOWAS meeting on Cote d'Ivoire. President
Gbagbo and his supporters, particularly FPI President
N'Guessan, have adopted a tougher, uncompromising stance, and
the opposition in turn is calling for a post-October
transition without, or with a reduced role for, Gbagbo.
While there is some concern over the possibility of renewed
unrest if the ECOWAS result is unfavorable to Gbagbo, we do
not expect trouble. Moreover, the ECOWAS meeting will not by
itself be decisive as it will be followed closely by one of
the AU's Peace and Security Council in Addis and the UNSC in
New York. End summary.


2. (C) President Gbagbo and his supporters have hardened
their stance on the Ivoirian peace process in the run-up to
the ECOWAS conference in Abuja on October 6, in which we
understand AU chairman Sassou and Gabonese president Bongo
will also participate. (Gbagbo has not indicated whether he
intends to go to Abuja nor is it clear to us whether
President Mbeki has been invited.) Gbagbo has said he will
not negotiate further, and Affi N'Guessan, former Prime
Minister and current president of Gbagbo's FPI party, has
been making strongly critical statements about the French and
the current state of the peace process in public and in
visits to various Embassies.


3. (C) In a meeting with Charge and PolCouns on September
29, N'Guessan and the head of the FPI's youth wing hewed
closely to the position the former has taken in his public
pronouncements. Basically, N'Guessan is calling for French
troops (both Licorne and the long-standing BIMA Marine
battalion) to leave Cote d'Ivoire. According to N'Guessan,
the French are protecting the New Forces and blocking
resolution of Cote d'Ivoire's crisis. He calls for
replacement of the French troops by an African force and
dissolution of the International Working Group (IWG),which
he claims is controlled by the French. For N'Guessan, the
key to ending the crisis is disarming the New Forces and
reuniting the country under civil administration. N'Guessan
averred unrealistically that, if necessary, the rebels must
be disarmed by force by the UN or the FANCI. He added that
there was general agreement on the need to proceed with
identification/nationality of unregistered residents, but
that the key issue was disarmament. N'Guessan said he was
expressing his own views as FPI president but claimed that
President Gbagbo's views were close to his own.


4. (C) For the NF, the core issues are
identification/nationality and disarmament. The NF are
calling for a post-October government without Gbagbo, run by
a transitional President (apolitical, who would not be a
candidate in the next election) with two Vice Presidents, one
from the FPI and one from the NF. This would leave the main
unarmed opposition parties, the PDCI and RDR, out in the
cold. Interestingly, this proposal resonates to some extent
with President Gbagbo's professed intention to deal only with
the NF from now on and not the unarmed opposition. Of
course, in the NF scheme, President Gbagbo would not be part
of a post-October transition government. For their part, the
PDCI and RDR are calling for a post-October transition
government involving the participation of all the main
Ivoirian parties on an equal basis, with a reduced role for
Gbagbo.


5. (C) The hardening of positions in the run-up to the key
meetings on Cote d'Ivoire is not unexpected. That and the
end of the mandate of the transitional government on October
31 have raised tensions. Many here are concerned that
decisions unfavorable to Gbagbo would result in street
demonstrations by the Young Patriots which, in turn, could be
met by a response from opposition youth. However, the Abuja
meeting is only the next step in the process and will not by
itself be decisive as the African Union will have to act on
any ECOWAS recommendations and the AU's decisions in turn
will have to be blessed by the UNSC. The next meeting of the
International Working Group (IWG),originally scheduled for
October 6, has been postponed until at least after the ECOWAS
meeting and possibly until after the AU meeting.
Valle