Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05YEREVAN846
2005-05-13 12:43:00
SECRET
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON ARMENIAN BORDER

Tags:  KFRD PGOV ASEC TU AM RU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000846 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/CR/VF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015
TAGS: KFRD PGOV ASEC TU AM RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON ARMENIAN BORDER
SECURITY

Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000846

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/CR/VF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015
TAGS: KFRD PGOV ASEC TU AM RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON ARMENIAN BORDER
SECURITY

Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) A Russian Border Guard (RBG) official posted in
Armenia contends that the border with Turkey is porous and
that locals easily cross at will. On the margins of a
routine meeting to discuss consular fraud prevention, he told
us he was concerned about the possibility of corruption at
the airport and emerging fraud trends among Iranian
travelers. End Summary.

--------------
POROUS BORDER WITH TURKEY
--------------


2. (C) The RBG monitors Armenia,s 268 km land border with
Turkey as well as Armenia's international border with Iran.
On the Turkish border, RBG and Armenian Border Security
personnel jointly occupy guard towers that are located
approximately every 2 kilometers along the border. As of
mid-March 2005, RBG Major Vitali Borodkin (please protect)
asserted that, despite RBG efforts, the Armenian/Turkish
border was porous and that ethnic Kurdish farmers were able
to transport livestock back and forth across the border. He
believes that while it is probable that RBG personnel are
being bribed to allow passage, he thinks that it is also
possible to cross the Armenian/Turkish border undetected.


3. (S) Borodkin stated that in the early 1990s, he heard
rumors that the Kongra Gel (KGK) had sent people across the
Armenian/Turkish border. He stated that while he had no
specific information that this was still continuing, he
believed that KGK personnel may still covertly cross the
border to seek temporary refuge from Turkish authorities.

--------------
CORRUPTION AT THE AIRPORT
--------------


4. (SBU) Borodkin stated that travelers offer RBG personnel
bribes daily at Zvartnots Armenian National Airport to
overlook photo-substituted or fraudulently issued travel
documents. He stated that one common service for petty
bribery is to backdate entry stamps for travelers who have
overstayed on U.S. visas and were returning to Yerevan.
Borodkin candidly admitted that while he does his best to
monitor and prevent passport control personnel from taking
bribes, it was most likely a common practice. (Comment: The

number of backdated stamps among visa applicants at CONS
Yerevan has dropped since 2002. We continue, however, to
identify this fraud on a routine basis. End Comment.)


5. (SBU) Borodkin said that the flight from Yerevan to Moscow
to Los Angeles is notorious for Armenian nationals offering
bribes to RBG personnel. According to Borodkin, travelers
believe that if they can successfully board this flight, even
if US immigration officials eventually stopped them, they
could still apply for asylum and enter the US.


6. (SBU) Borodkin stated that the RBG arrested approximately
100 individuals who used fake, stolen or borrowed travel
documents in 2004. The majority of the individuals were
arrested at the Zvartnots Airport. He could only speculate
how many evaded arrest by using legitimate "borrowed" travel
documents, fraudulent documents, or by bribing RBG personnel.


--------------
IRANIAN CONNECTION
--------------


7. (C) Borodkin suspects that Iranian nationals may be using
photo-substituted U.S. and European travel documents as a way
to travel to the U.S. and/or Europe. He believes that one
common technique would be for the U.S.-based Iranian Diaspora
to send legitimate asylum documents to Armenia. Travelers in
Armenia either photo-substitute these documents or use
unaltered versions while traveling as imposters. Borodkin
added that members of the Iranian Diaspora in Germany might
be active in sending legitimate travel documents to Armenia
for Iranians to travel and/or immigrate to Germany.


8. (C) Borodkin noted that at the Armenian town of Meghri,
the major point of entry on the Armenian/Iranian border, RBG
personnel have noticed many suspicious travel documents used
by Iranian nationals to enter into Armenia. While he had no
specifics, Borodkin observed that many of these documents
appear to be issued in the same office, or printed by using
similar techniques.


9. (C) Borodkin stated that he has reliable contacts within
the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He stated that
the FSB notifies the RBG in Armenia about madrases or
equivalent religious schools in the region, and, when
students graduate, their travel destinations. While Borodkin
was not worried about Muslim radicals traveling to Armenia,
he is concerned about the possibility of Armenia becoming a
corridor to the North Caucasus or Europe in the future.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) Borodkin,s comments are likely exaggerated in order
to convince us that Armenia would not be able to manage its
border without the RBG. However, his insights show that the
RBG is aware of Armenia,s problematic border control issues
and their implications for the region. While some of our
security assistance programs preclude participation by
Russian officials, we see cooperation with the RBG on fraud
prevention as very much in the USG's interest and will
continue our practice of including them in appropriate events.
EVANS