Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05YEREVAN615
2005-04-07 13:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

OSCE SPECIAL REP ON N-K POW ISSUE, CEASE-FIRE

Tags:  PREL PARM AM AJ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000615 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SNEC (AMB MANN) AND EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PARM AM AJ
SUBJECT: OSCE SPECIAL REP ON N-K POW ISSUE, CEASE-FIRE
VIOLATIONS


Classified By: Ambassador John Evans for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000615

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SNEC (AMB MANN) AND EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PARM AM AJ
SUBJECT: OSCE SPECIAL REP ON N-K POW ISSUE, CEASE-FIRE
VIOLATIONS


Classified By: Ambassador John Evans for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) OSCE Special Rep Andrzej Kasprzyk told the Ambassador
on April 7 that although OSCE CiO Rupel had secured agreement
during his March 31 visit from "N-K" authorities for three
Azerbaijani POWs to be returned, this action was complicated
by the April 1 capture of an Armenian soldier by Azerbaijan.
Kasprzyk readily admitted that his group's efforts to monitor
the Line of Contact were limited. He said that Azerbaijani
forces' efforts to improve tactical positions had brought the
lines very close together, leading to an increase in
cease-fire violations. Kasprzyk also described efforts by
the co-chairs and his office to arrange meetings of
Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders on the margins of upcoming
multilateral events. End Summary.

Prisoners of War
--------------


2. (C) Kasprzyk said that CiO Rupel had talked to N-K
"President" Ghukasyan, and that the latter had said "consider
it done" (the release of the three Azeris being held by N-K
authorities). The next day, an Armenian had strayed over the
border (not the line of contact) and been captured by the
Azeris, so the N-K authorities (working closely with the
Armenians, of course) put a hold on the return of the three,
figuring that the Armenian POW would face a long wait without
their maintaining a bargaining chip. On Wednesday, (April 6)
Kasprzyk got involved by placing a call to Azeri Defense
Minister, but the latter did not take his call; rather, an
officer at the MoD wrote down the Armenian offer, which was
that both sides should release their prisoners (three Azeris,
one Armenian) simultaneously on the Armenian-Azeri border
near the point of tangency with Georgia. Azeris had not yet
responded to this offer as of noon April 7, according to
Kasprzyk.


3. (C) Kasprzyk confirmed that there had been an agreement
reached between the two sides in Tbilisi on March 18, the
essence of which was that all POWs should be handed back in
short order, without the long (and lengthening) delays that
have characterized recent cases. He also added that
President Aliyev, in Warsaw, had expressed irritation to one

of his accompanying defense officials over the long delays
that characterized recent exchanges, suggesting that this
practice was not one of his design, or one that he approved
of.


4. (C) Kasprzyk said there was a problem in that the ICRC
had, for quite some time, not been given proper access to
prisoners taken by the Azeri side. The ICRC had made some
missteps in the past, and was viewed by some in Baku as an
intelligence-gathering organization partial to Christian
countries. Apparently an ICRC rep had once asked for
information about a POW's unit, and this was misconstrued.
There was also an incident at a conference in Geneva in which
an Azeri official had had his microphone cut off when he
exceeded the allotted time; this too was misconstrued.
Kasprzyk was ruminating about how best to get the ICRC
function in these cases repaired, noting that, in addition to
being contrary to the Geneva conventions, not to allow ICRC
access to POWs was definitely dangerous for the mental health
of prisoners. He said that the Armenians did not impede ICRC
access to Azeri prisoners, some of whom did not wish to
return to Azerbaijan. One such prisoner had been resettled
in Norway, and the Azeris were sore about that.

Monitoring the Line of Contact
--------------


5. (C) Kasprzyk said another monitoring mission would
commence this Monday (April 11). Asked what more he could
do to monitor the LoC, Kasprzyk said that, first, his mandate
had never actually included monitoring; he had just started
doing it because he thought it would be helpful. Second, he
had only five people to conduct monitoring missions, and
thought it unlikely that the OSCE would provide either more
people or more resources (for example, vehicles). He said
Azerbaijan had been searching for some time for evidence of
Kasprzyk's authority to monitor the LoC, so far without
success. The Azeris were strongly opposed to any form of
permanent monitoring, and were so sensitive about the issue
that they would not permit him (Kasprzyk) to carry his GPS
locator with him near the front lines. In the main, he was
certain, the Azeris were attempting to improve their
positions and de-mine some of the Armenian mine-fields. This
put the two sides as close as fifty meters apart, and,
especially at night, shooting naturally occurred. N-K
authorities told Kasprzyk that three Armenians had been
killed, and that the number of Azeris killed might be as high
as twenty in the recent skirmishes. Kasprzyk said there was
a definite danger that one of these incidents might spiral
out of control, but he agreed with the Ambassador that the
tensions of recent weeks appeared to have abated somewhat in
the last few days. Kasprzyk said that the agreement between
the sides that had been signed in 1995 to regulate incidents
on the Line of Contact could not be said to be in effect
today; it was in abeyance.

Russian Flight over the Caucasus?
--------------


6. (C) During the lunch, Kasprzyk received a cellular call
from Russian co-chair Merzlyakov, who was enquiring about
flight clearances in the Caucasus. In particular, he wanted
to know whether Azerbaijan had the possibility of flying over
Armenian territory to Nakhchivan. Kasprzyk opined, without
saying he was sure, that he imagined the Azeris had obtained
this right in exchange for Armenia's right to fly to
Istanbul. (Note: here in Yerevan, we have the impression
that Azeri aircraft use Iranian airspace to access
Nakhchivan). The Ambassador mentioned to Kasprzyk the report
we had seen that a Russian "AWACS" had been prevented from
flying south through Georgia two days ago. (Note:We can
think of no reason Co-Chair Merzlyakov would be involved in
learning about flight clearances unless the flight had
something to do with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. End Note)

Future N-K Negotiating Activity
--------------


7. (C) Kasprzyk discussed with Merzlyakov the arrangements to
meet at the U.S. Embassy in London on April 15, and noted
that although there would be proximity talks, there might
well be a dinner at which both Foreign Ministers would be
present. Looking further ahead to the Moscow and Warsaw
meetings, Kasprzyk said he had advised the Russians to find
just twenty minutes in Moscow to bring the Armenian and Azeri
leaders together, just to keep their imprimatur on the
process. As for the Warsaw meeting, Kasprzyk floated the
idea that President Saakashvili might be persuaded to play
host, on the fringes of the May 16 Warsaw CoE summit, to a
side-meeting of Aliyev and Kocharian, possibly outside Warsaw
in a village called Konstantin where there was a lodge
suitable to a very private meeting. As a neighbor in good
standing of both, Saakashvili could be the one to do this,
Amb. Kasprzyk thought. Kasprzyk noted that he would be
seeing Amb. Mann in Tbilisi this Sunday.
EVANS