Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05YEREVAN611
2005-04-07 05:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

CHR-61: US-EU DEMARCHE ON BELARUS, BUT ARMENIA

Tags:  PHUM PREL AM BO CHR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 000611 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2006
TAGS: PHUM PREL AM BO CHR
SUBJECT: CHR-61: US-EU DEMARCHE ON BELARUS, BUT ARMENIA
STILL NOT READY TO SUPPORT

REF: A. STATE 56093


B. YEREVAN 521

Classified By: DCM A.F.Godfrey for reason 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L YEREVAN 000611

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2006
TAGS: PHUM PREL AM BO CHR
SUBJECT: CHR-61: US-EU DEMARCHE ON BELARUS, BUT ARMENIA
STILL NOT READY TO SUPPORT

REF: A. STATE 56093


B. YEREVAN 521

Classified By: DCM A.F.Godfrey for reason 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On April 6, together with the EU Presidency rep, we
urged Armenia to vote against a no-action motion on the
Belarus resolution at the UNCHR. MFA reps said they
appreciated the joint approach and also the substance of the
demarche, but said that no decision had yet been taken on how
Armenia would vote. Any decision to vote against Belarus,
which has a consistent track record of supporting Armenia,
would have to be approved by President Kocharian End
Summary.


2. (C) On April 6, DCM and British DHM Richard Hyde met with
Deputy Foreign Minister Armen Baiburtian to deliver ref a
points and to urge that Armenia vote against a no-action
motion on the Belarus resolution and subsequently vote to
support passage. As Luxembourg has no representation in
Armenia, the UK is acting as the representative of the EU
presidency. Delivery of these points was delayed because the
UK Embassy had not received instructions. According to Hyde,
Luxembourg had failed to inform London and with
communications links slow from Brussels, the only way he was
able to get the go-ahead to join us was to ask a member of
the UK delegation in Geneva to make a direct approach to the
Luxembourg delegation.


3. (C) We pressed Baiburtian hard, but he refused to make a
commitment, citing reasons similar to those FM Oskanian gave
to the Ambassador on March 24 (ref b). Baiburtian said that
he recognized the importance we attached to the issue; all of
Armenia's senior foreign policy actors knew of the
Ambassador's repeated approaches and of DAS Kennedy's
intervention with FM Oskanian. This new, joint approach with
the EU would also be carefully considered.


4. (C) Baiburtian said that any decision to vote against
Belarus would have to be approved personally by President
Kocharian. With the Putin visit now in the past, perhaps the
issue could be seen in a different light, he speculated. He
agreed to inform us as soon as a decision is reached on how
Armenia would cast its vote.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) While it remains unlikely that Armenia will join us
to allow an open debate on Belarus, this joint approach with
the EU ratcheted up the pressure and will prompt a new
discussion of how the Armenian delegation will vote.
EVANS