Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05YEREVAN2157
2005-12-13 13:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

SQUEEZING THE ARMENIANS ON DEMOCRACY ISSUES

Tags:  AM PGOV PHUM AID 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 002157 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2015
TAGS: AM PGOV PHUM AID
SUBJECT: SQUEEZING THE ARMENIANS ON DEMOCRACY ISSUES

REF: 12/09/05 DANILOVICH-EVANS SECURE TELCON

Classified By: Ambassador Evans for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 002157

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2015
TAGS: AM PGOV PHUM AID
SUBJECT: SQUEEZING THE ARMENIANS ON DEMOCRACY ISSUES

REF: 12/09/05 DANILOVICH-EVANS SECURE TELCON

Classified By: Ambassador Evans for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Post has been talking to various Armenians
in and out of government in an effort to advance our
democracy agenda despite the tactical set-back represented by
the flawed November 27 referendum on the constitutional
amendments. While it is too early to say whether the
Armenians "get it," one thing is clear: the fact of deep U.S.
involvement through our assistance programs, particularly the
special program aimed at democracy building in advance of the
2007-08 elections and, prospectively, the Millennium
Challenge Account Compact, mean that the Armenians are
listening to us carefully. END SUMMARY

Heated Discussions
--------------


2. (C) Last week the Ambassador hosted two lunches, one for
media people (editors and media outlet managers) and another
for a cross-section of politicians and civil society actors.
The subject for discussion, at times heated, was inevitably
the November 27 referendum and the prospects for building a
genuine democratic society in Armenia. Discussion revealed,
if anything, increased polarization since the referendum
within the politically conscious Yerevan-based elite along
familiar lines. There is a sense that the opposition is
badly fragmented and commands less support than ever among
the rank and file of Armenian citizens, who are basically
turned off by the opposition's shenanigans, but also not
inspired either by the governing elite, especially the
shamefully derelict National Assembly, and are deeply cynical
about politics in general.


3. (C) What is perhaps most interesting about the
post-referendum situation is the degree to which people on
both sides of the political divide seem at a loss as to what
represents the best way forward. Armenians we talk to
universally express a desire to see Armenia become a leading
democracy in the region. They often blame their own national
characteristics and peculiarities, especially their
well-known extreme individualism, and sometimes the
continuing Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate, for their seeming
inability to step smartly forward toward a more clearly
democratic future.



4. (C) Another interesting phenomenon is the degree to which
personal and family ties persist despite serious political
differences. We were struck by the familiarity of the
language used by political opponents over our lunch table
despite scathing accusations and vilifications that
threatened to turn into a near-brawl. We are constantly
amazed by the degree to which people on either side of the
political divide remain in social contact with one another.

Yerevan School of Political Science: Not Surprised
-------------- --------------


5. (C) At a seminar last weekend of the Yerevan School of
Political Science, a mixture of youngish scholars,
bureaucrats and media people earnestly discussed the
prospects for the growth of Armenia's democracy. There was
no apparent doubt among this group that ballot-stuffing and
serious fraud had taken place during the November 27
referendum, but also little surprise at that fact, and less
openly expressed despair about the situation than one might
have anticipated. In fact, the group as a whole seemed to
take it for granted that democracy would eventually come to
Armenia; they just were not certain how this might happen.
In a side conversation with the Central Bank Governor and
Shavarsh Kocharian, an opposition leader, the Ambassador
discussed the prospects for lessening the current
polarization through the efforts of some political actors who
maintain contacts across the political divide and can be
considered relative "moderates."

Pressing in Private...
--------------


6. (C) Taking advantage of the fact that the Board of the
Millennium Challenge Corporation had not yet reached the
point of approving the proposed compact with Armenia, after
reftelcon, the Ambassador sought meetings December 12 with
high-ranking officials in the Presidential Administration and
the Government, namely the President's Chief of Staff,
Artashes Tumanian, and the Minister of Territorial
Administration, Hovik Abrahamian. In both cases the goal was
to make it clear that, although the United States had
supported the constitutional amendments on substance, we were
disappointed by the way in which the referendum had been
carried out, with strong suspicions of vote-rigging and
fraud, undue pressure on opposition members and inadequate
follow-up to the allegations of fraud that had come even from
the Speaker of the National Assembly. The Ambassador avoided
suggesting that the MCC decision might be affected by
perceptions of back-sliding on democracy issues in Armenia,
but did state that, as a matter of simple fact, the MCC Board
had not reached its expected decision on December 6th, and
that the Embassy was still waiting to hear what the decision
would be. In the context of the conversations, there is no
doubt that the Armenian interlocutors made the proper
connections.

...On the President's Man
--------------

7. (C) Presidential Chief of Staff Tumanian, who is setting
up his own political party to contest the 2007 parliamentary
elections, did not dispute the perception that the referendum
was less than perfect, but he argued in a rather detached way
that the opposition was largely to blame because of their
boycott of the proceedings and withdrawal of their members of
the electoral commissions shortly before the day of the vote.
He seemed surprised when the Ambassador told him that the
decision not to invite international election observers had
been taken in the Presidential Administration. He was also
surprised to learn that an MCC compact could be called off
even after having been approved, if the beneficiary country
failed to maintain the requisite standard of performance as
judged against independent criteria. He took the
Ambassador's point that it would behoove the President and
others in power to think carefully about the world's
perceptions of Armenia after the referendum, but did not make
any specific commitment. He asked to have details of the US.
program of intensified measures designed to help Armenia
achieve free and fair elections in 2007 and 2008, and seemed
particularly interested in the possibility of obtaining
training for people in the political party that he is
planning to establish.

...And on the Probable Vote-Rigger
--------------


8. (C) Minister of Territorial Administration Hovik
Abrahamian, by contrast, was much more personally engaged in
the immediate issue of the referendum and gave a detailed and
rousing defense of its conduct, repeatedly stressing that
there was no proof that violations occurred and boasting
about the organizational and administrative efforts that had
been made in the provinces (his beat) to educate the voters,
induce them to turn out, and ensure the measure's victory.
He was scathing in his criticism of the opposition for
choosing to boycott the vote and withdraw their election
commission members. At the same time, he took aboard the
Ambassador's message that the referendum "stank" and that it
would be wise for the Prime Minister (his direct boss) and
others in the Government to consider what to do to signal
that Armenia remains on a democratic course. Abrahamian
seemed taken aback to learn that no decision had yet been
made by the MCC Board on the Armenia Compact. Abrahamian
insisted toward the end of the conversation that the
elections of 2007 and 2008 would be free and fair, arguing
that when opposing political parties had a direct interest in
the voting, the natural tension between them would ensure
that they would referee each other.


9. (C) COMMENT: In the wake of the referendum, a somewhat
altered political situation exists in Armenia. The
opposition is weakened and demoralized, although key leaders
remained determined to press on in their fierce rejection of
Kocharian and all his works. Former FM (and former AMCIT)
Raffi Hovhanessian this week addressed twenty-one possibly
libelous questions to President Kocharian in a letter that
suggests the depth of passion still attaching to issues in
the recent history of Armenia, especially the 1999 shoot-out
in the National Assembly that has never been adequately
explained. The Administration also has not covered itself in
glory, and some of its members realize this. Divisions
within the ruling three-party coalition are also more visible
after the referendum than they were, and, as Armenia
approaches its next regularly-scheduled elections in 2007
(legislative) and 2008 (presidential),the political
infighting and maneuvering for position will undoubtedly
intensify. We are convinced that our program of measures
intended to help Armenia attain free and fair elections is
timely and highly relevant to the fate of democratization in
Armenia. We also have learned that the MCC compact, even
when evoked in only a passing way, has the power to compel
rapt attention; this leverage needs to be wielded carefully
in the months ahead in order to produce optimal results for
the United States. END COMMENT
EVANS