ARMENIA: LACK OF SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN RELIEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002022

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN
DEFENSE FOR OSD EURASIA AMER LATIF AND DSCA DIANE LAMB
USMISSION OSCE FOR KIT TRAUB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2015
TAGS: AEMR ASEC EAID PGOV PREF MASS AM IN PK NATO
SUBJECT: ARMENIA: LACK OF SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN RELIEF
EFFORT DISAPPOINTING

REF: A) STATE 196411 B) YEREVAN 1911 C) YEREVAN 1885
D) YEREVAN 1811

Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) On multiple occasions since October 21, Armenian
Defense and Foreign Affairs officials have not responded to
our calls for military and other assistance -- which we think
they are capable of rendering -- to the Pakistan relief
effort. Early promises to answer requests for assistance
(reftels) have faded into ambivalent denials of
responsibility, likely tied to a GOAM perception that
assistance to Pakistan is not in Armenia's self-interest. As
a result, Armenia has missed an opportunity to contribute to
international relief efforts and departed, at least in this
case, from the commitment GOAM leaders say they have made to
increasing Armenian military interaction with the West and
Euro-Atlantic institutions like NATO. We appreciate the
GOAM's generous assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
and we will continue to encourage our Armenian interlocutors
to extend that generosity to other international relief
efforts. End Summary.

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STRIKE 1: MFA STILL "DISCUSSING" ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
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2. (C) On October 21 (ref A) and again on October 27 (ref B),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs NATO Section Head Hrach Tashchyan
told us the GOAM would be willing "to work through the NATO
Response Force to render assistance" to Pakistan, but that he
could not comment on specific, concrete steps Armenia might
take, including operational assistance for MI-17 helicopters,
until the GOAM had a better idea about NATO's operational
requirements. On November 2 and again on November 9, Marta
Ayvazyan, who replaced Tashchyan as MFA NATO Section Head,
told us the MFA was still "discussing a response." On
November 11 and on November 16, Ayvazyan told us she would
contact us "if there is anything new on the subject."

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STRIKE 2: PARTS IN INVENTORY, JUST NOT "AVAILABLE"
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3. (C) On October 27 and November 2, Deputy Minister of
Defense General-Lieutenant Artur Aghabekyan told us the
Armenian military had compatible hardware and maintenance
crews he could deliver to assist Pakistani MI-17 helicopter
operations, but that the decision to engage in the relief
effort could only come from "political leaders," with whom
Aghabekyan told us he would follow-up. (Note: In his
initial response to reftel demarche, Aghabekyan told us that
Armenia does not/not have MI-17 helicopters but failed to
acknowledge that spares from its MI-8 inventory should be
compatible. End Note).

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STRIKE 3: DON'T CALL US, WE'LL CALL YOU
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4. (C) On November 2, we passed a copy of the NATO-produced
MI-17 combined parts list, which details specific helicopter
parts the Pakistan relief effort critically needs, to
Aghabekyan. Aghabekyan told us he would review the list and
work with Armenia's political leadership "to determine what
we might be able to do." On November 17, however,
General-Major Mikael Melkonyan, the Head of the Foreign
Relations and Military Cooperation Department who, despite
working closely with Aghabekyan, told us he had never heard
of our requests for Pakistan relief operation assistance.

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COMMENT: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
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5. (C) Whether a political or military decision, the GOAM's
failure to coordinate a substantial response to our request
for assistance in the Pakistan relief effort falls well short
of Armenian generosity in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
This is disappointing. Aghabekyan, who consistently appears
to be more forward looking than many of his defense
establishment peers, has both the political cache and the
military authority to produce at least a symbolic, if not
substantial, GOAM contribution. His failure to do so, and
the MFA's apparent refusal to pursue alternative assistance
measures, is a departure from the enthusiasm the government
has recently indicated for increased Armenian interaction and
interoperablity with the West and Euro-Atlantic institutions
like NATO (ref D).
GODFREY