Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05YEREVAN1717
2005-09-23 11:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

DETAILS OF SHOOTING INCIDENT ON LINE OF CONTACT

Tags:  PREL PGOV MASS AJ AM OSCE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 001717 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN, AND EUR FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS AJ AM OSCE
SUBJECT: DETAILS OF SHOOTING INCIDENT ON LINE OF CONTACT

REF: BAKU 1415

Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4(b,d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 YEREVAN 001717

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/SNEC, EUR/CACEN, AND EUR FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS AJ AM OSCE
SUBJECT: DETAILS OF SHOOTING INCIDENT ON LINE OF CONTACT

REF: BAKU 1415

Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4(b,d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The September 20 shooting incident on the line of
contact seemed clearly directed to disrupt N-K negotiations
and will certainly be raised at the OSCE Permanent Council.
While there is no way to determine which side fired, the
round -- which impacted about 20 meters from an international
monitor -- came from the direction of Azeri lines. This was
the message delivered by OSCE Monitor Peter Keay in a meeting
with CDA on September 23. A confidential report signed by
OSCE Special Rep Andrzej Kasprzyk of the shooting (text
below) will be delivered in the coming days to the OSCE
Permanent Council. Monitoring is suspended until Kasprzyk
has an opportunity to raise the incident with both sides
together with Minsk Group co-chairs. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
OSCE MONITOR CONFIRMS SEPTEMBER 20 SMALL ARMS FIRE
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Peter Keay, a UK national member of the OSCE group
led by Special Rep Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, met with the
CDA at the Embassy on September 23 and described events in
detail. Keay took part in the monitoring of the Line of
Contact (LOC) between N-K Armenian and Azerbaijani forces on
September 20 and was the first monitor out of the trench on
the N-K side. Amb. Kasprzyk was leading the party from the
Azerbaijan side of the LOC. The trench lines were about 1300
meters apart at the point of monitoring.


3. (C) The monitoring event had been proceeding according to
standard procedure. Positive contact had been made with
commanders of both sides and both sides provided assurances
that there would be no incidents. Monitoring groups were in
contact with hand-held radios. Keay emerged from the trench
on the N-K side of the LOC with the local N-K forces
commander. He could see Amb. Kasprzyk's monitoring party on
the Azerbaijan side of the LOC and made positive contact as

usual, by waving an OSCE flag. He was in discussion with the
local N-K commander, who was directing his attention to new
trenches extending toward the N-K lines from the Azerbaijan
side when he saw a round impact the dust about 20 - 30 meters
away from his position. He then heard the sound of a weapon
discharge which he described as the distinctive sound of a
7.62 mm Kalashnikov rifle.


4. (C) Keay said that although the round came from the
direction of the Azerbaijan side, the trenches at that point
of the LOC are so serpentine that it would be impossible to
determine with certainty which side fired. He immediately
returned to the trench on the N-K side and contacted Amb.
Kasprzyk, who discontinued the monitoring event and issued a
statement. (See para 6 below.)


5. (C) Keay said Amb Kasprzyk intends to raise the issue
with both sides at an upcoming meeting of the Foreign
Ministers together with the Minsk Group co-chairs. Keay
passed us a copy of a confidential report prepared by the
group which would be distributed in Vienna next week (see
para 7 below). Keay speculated that while it is remotely
possible that the round was fired by accident, it was most
likely an attempt to "throw a spanner in the works of
negotiations" just at a point where they appear most
promising. He asserted that tension along the LoC seemed to
be growing as the negotiators became more optimistic. "It's
very, very tense right now," he said.

-------------- ---
OSCE PRESS STATEMENT FOLLOWING SHOOTING INCIDENT
-------------- ---


6. (U) Begin text of Kasprzyk statement issued immediately
after shooting incident:

At approximately 1157 hrs during the course of the
Monitoring, following security guarantees issued by both
sides, after both monitoring teams were out of their trenches
on the open ground and visual contact between them had been
established, a single shot was heard by both teams. A field
assistant participating on the territory controlled by
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) armed forces confirmed what appeared to
be a bullet strike the ground 20-30 meters in front and
slightly to the left of his position approximately one second
prior to the report. The Monitoring party immediately took
cover in the trenches.

End Text

-------------- --------------
OSCE REPORT NO. 147 ON MONITORING THE LINE OF CONTACT
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Begin text of Text of "official incident report."
(Note internal paragraph markings and OSCE classification.)

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
The Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on
the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

Report No. 147 on Monitoring on the Line of Contact 20
September 2005

1 Basic Data on the Monitoring

1.1 Introductory remarks

The Monitoring on the Line of Contact (LoC) was initiated by
the Personal Representative (PR) of the Cia. The PR requested
the Monitoring to be held in the southern part of the LoC on
20 September 2005, in the vicinity of the village of
Karakhanbeyli in Fizuli Region. The last Monitoring in this
area took place on 01 June 2005 (MR 141) and on this exact
spot on 23 November 2004 (MR 130). The aim of the Monitoring
was to verify the current situation along this part of the
LoC.

1.2 Monitoring Requests and Security Guarantees

On 12 September 2005, a Field Assistant, on behalf of the PR,
presented a Monitoring Request to the Azerbaijani MFA. The
Azerbaijani side responded positively on 19 September and
offered security guarantees in their response. A
corresponding request was presented to the Nagorno-Karabakh
(NK) authorities on 13 September 2005. The NK side responded
positively on 19 September and also offered security
guarantees in their response.

1.3 Place of the Monitoring

The site of the Monitoring on the LOC was approximately 5 km
north-east of the village of Karakhanbeyli.

The positions of the Teams at the Monitoring site in the LOC
were:

Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side)
Lat. N 39 degrees 38 minutes, Long. E 47 degrees 18 minutes
(from map)

Team No.2 (NK side)
Lat. N 39 degrees 38 minutes, Long. E 47 degrees 17 minutes

The Teams were approximately 1300m apart.

1.4 Personnel

Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side)

OSCE Monitoring Team
Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland),Personal Representative
of the CiO
Miroslav Vymetal, Field Assistant (Czech Republic)
Maj Konstantinos Theodoropoulos HLPG, (Greece)

Escort Personnel

O. Ismayil-Zade, MFA
Capt R. Kerimov, MoD
Lt Col A. Seyidov, regional commander Lt Col A. Aslamov,
local commander

Team No.2 (NK side)
OSCE Monitoring Team
Lt Col Imre Palatinus, Office Coordinator (Hungary)
Peter Keay, Field Assistant (UK)


2. Detailed account of the Monitoring

2.1 Course of the Monitoring

The two Teams traveled in a total of five clearly marked OSCE
vehicles, three on the NK and two on the Azerbaijani side.
General visibility was good, up to 15 kilometres and weather
conditions were good. After security guarantees for crossing
open ground were given, the Teams moved to their covered
positions. After further security guarantees for the
Monitoring were exchanged, the Teams moved forward on foot to
the Observation sites. Once both were in position they
climbed out of the trenches with raised OSCE flags and
established visual contact. The distance between Teams was
1300m. Approximately four minutes after visual contact was
established a single shot was heard on both sides (at a
distance of 600-800 meters slightly to the left of the
Observation site on the NK front lines). The Monitoring
party immediately took cover in the trenches. A Field
Assistant from Team 2 confirmed what appeared to be a bullet
strike the ground 20-30 metres in front and slightly to the
left of his position approximately one second prior to the
report. Following VHF radio communication between the
Teams, the decision to halt the Monitoring was taken. All
personnel returned to their vehicles and left the area.

Team 1

Team 1 was given a briefing in Goradiz by the Head of the
Local Executive and the regional and local military
commanders. After the briefing, the two vehicles of Team 1,
escorted by two vehicles from the Azerbaijani side, moved to
a point approximately 3 km east of the Monitoring Site where
they stopped to exchange security guarantees before crossing
open ground and to confirm the exact locations for the
Observation sites. Team 1 then traveled to a covered position
at the Monitoring Site where further security guarantees for
the Monitoring were exchanged. After this, Team 1 moved
approximately 250 metres on foot to its Observation site, and
with an OSCE flag raised climbed above ground out of the
trenches, from where visual contact was established with Team

2. After a single shot was heard the Team moved back into the
trenches.

Team 2

Team 2 met with the local military commanders on the road
north of Fizuli and was given a briefing on the situation on
the LOC. After the briefing, the three vehicles of Team 2,
escorted by two vehicles from the NK side moved to a point
approximately 2 km north of Karakhanbey Ii where they stopped
to exchange security guarantees before crossing open ground
and to confirm the exact locations for the Observation sites.
Team 2 then traveled to a covered position at the Monitoring
Site where further security guarantees for the Monitoring
were exchanged. After this, Team 2 moved approximately 50
metres on foot to its Observation site, and with an OSCE flag
raised climbed above ground out of the trenches, from where
visual contact was immediately established with Team 1. After
a single shot was heard the Team moved back into the
trenches. All members of the Team 2 were able to agree on
the direction and approximate distance of the shot.

2.2 Information obtained during Monitoring as stated by the
respective Parties

Team No.1 (Azerbaijani side)

Cease-fire violations

The regional commander confirmed information given by Head of
the Local Executive that cease-fire violations are common and
the local population close to the LOC lives under the
permanent threat of shooting. He reported that 26 cease-fire
violations, took place on this part of the LOC since the
Monitoring on 1 June 2005. In some cases the Azerbaijani side
opened returned fire. As a result of sniper fire one
Azerbaijani soldier was reported to have been killed on 28
July 2005. Another incident was reported to have taken place
on 13 August when one soldier was killed while fetching water
and another injured when trying to remove the body.

Other Military Information

The regional commander stated that the NK side is constantly
improving its positions by building fortified positions at
intervals of 300-350 metres. He stated that this is in order
to improve control over the adjacent territory. Such
positions were pointed out to the Team while moving to the
Observation site. He also added that tracer rounds are used
to set fire to dry grass in no-man's land and as a result the
harvest close to the LOC is under threat.

Mines

No mine related incidents were reported in this sector. The
regional commander stated that 12 mine explosions were heard
during the fire in no-man's land on 1-2 September.

Team No.2 (NK side):

Cease-fire violations

Team 2 was given a list of three cease-fire violations on the
whole of the LOC since the last Monitoring on 08 September

2005. Two of the violations were said to have taken place in
the Hadrut Sector and one in the Mardakert Agdere Sector. No
injuries were reported.

The local commander informed the Team that the situation on
the LOC is relatively calm and stable, with a reduced number
of reported cease-fire violations.

Mines

No mine incidents were reported on the NK side, but Maj M.
Arushunyan mentioned that on five occasions since the last
Monitoring, mine explosions had been heard on the Azerbaijani
side.


3. Conclusions

- The fact that the Monitoring was halted due to a shot being
fired towards OSCE monitoring Team brings into question the
security of the Teams. The exchange of guarantees prior to
Monitorings is meant to ensure the safety of OSCE personnel.
It is of paramount importance that escort personnel,
including local and regional commanders, should ensure that
every measure possible is taken to guarantee the safety and
security of OSCE personnel also by strengthening the
discipline among troops.

- It was not possible for the Teams to determine the side
from which the shot came due to the terrain and the nature of
the front lines.

- Parties should promptly investigate the incident and submit
relevant reports.

- The tension on the LOC observed at the last Monitoring
remains high. The increased number of casualties is a cause
for concern and should be addressed.

ANDRZEJ KASPRZYK
Personal Representative of the CiO

End text.
GODFREY