IRAQ: POLES SIGNAL READINESS TO STAY, BUT PRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 004037

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS MARR IZ PL
SUBJECT: IRAQ: POLES SIGNAL READINESS TO STAY, BUT PRESS
FOR AID

REF: A. WARSAW 051427ZDEC05


B. WARSAW 03044

Classified By: Polcouns Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Polish officials and parliamentarians who met
with Robert Deutsch, Deputy Senior Advisor for Iraq, on
December 8 in Warsaw suggested that Poland will likely remain
in Iraq past January 2006, but in reduced numbers, and with
an eye to withdrawing by the end of 2006. Because Polish
public support for the war in Iraq has shifted from 60
percent pro in 2003 to 84 percent con today, these officials
said, the GOP must demonstrate some measurable benefit from
its presence in Iraq or "face reality." Most interlocutors
expected the GOP to make a decision on the Polish presence in
Iraq in late December, after the visits to Washington of
their Defense Minister (December 4-6, ref A) and Foreign
Minister (December 19). No one expected Polish troops to
withdraw completely, but their exact number and the nature of
their mission were yet to be determined. Several suggested
that the CIA prison issue could make things more difficult.
END SUMMARY


2. (C) Robert Deutsch visited Warsaw December 8 to discuss
continued US-Polish cooperation in Iraq. During his
meetings, Deutsch briefed Polish officials and opposition
leaders on the current political, economic and security
situation in Iraq, listened to Polish concerns and provided
information on plans for Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) in Iraq. He stressed the global security benefits of
defeating terrorism in Iraq and acknowledged that as Iraq,s
security forces stand up, we will be able to stand down.
However, he cautioned against arbitrary timetables. Deutsch
underscored the success of Iraq's electoral process and noted
the need to move from "identity" to "issue" politics.

--------------
GOP: High Costs, Falling Public Support
--------------


3. (C) In a meeting at the MFA, senior officials asked for
commercial assistance, hinted at a drawdown and described
growing frustration with what they see as a lack of tangible
results from Poland's Iraq engagement. Jacek Stepinski,
Deputy Director for Middle East and Africa and Head of the
Iraq Task Force, stressed that Poland wanted to realize the
economic and commercial benefits of a relationship with Iraq.
He asked for US help in entering Iraq's oil and gas market
and noted Poland's desire to subcontract to US firms there.
He said that Poland had spent $270 million on equipment and
$220 on personnel in Iraq and therefore needed financial help
with defense modernization at home. His colleague Slawomir
Smolen
reported that the Polish contingent in Iraq would shrink from
1400 to 1000 in 2006. MFA Americas Department Director
Henryk Szlajfer noted some stress in US-Polish relations over
the BUMAR scandal - a commercial dispute between Poland's
biggest defense firm and the government of Iraq.


4. (C) At MOD, Under Secretary for Defense Policy Stanislaw
Koziej described falling public support, over-extended
budgets and a need for a military exit. Koziej's staff noted
the dramatic shift in public support for Polish deployment in
Iraq, from 60 percent in favor in mid-2003 to 84 percent
against today. Koziej asserted that the GOP had spent almost
$600 million in Iraq to date, and had sacrificed its air
force modernization plan to stay there. He observed that the
military had won the war and could now leave, while other
agencies stayed behind to win the peace. While expressing
hope that the government would decide to extend Poland's
presence in Iraq past January 2006, Koziej's team warned that
Poland could not maintain its current posture in Iraq and
simultaneously prepare for the planned takeover of the
rotating ISAF command in Afghanistan in August 2007.


5. (C) In a meeting with Ryszard Schnepf, Secretary of State
for International Affairs in the PM's Chancellery, explained
the GOP's desire to change Poland's role in Iraq while still
honoring its commitment to complete the mission. Schnepf
reported that although the US covers 60 percent of Poland's
expenses in Iraq, the GOP had spent nearly $600 million there
to date, a severe strain on the defense budget. He noted the
GOP's need to find tangible benefit from the mission to gain
public support for a continued Polish presence in Iraq.
Schnepf also suggested that media reports about alleged CIA
prisons in Poland might further undercut this public support.
--------------
Opposition: Ready to Exit NOW
--------------


6. (C) Deutsch met separately with Former Defense Minister
Bronislaw Komorowski of the Civic Platform (PO),currently
Deputy Speaker of Parliament. Komorowski suggested that it
was time to consider handing over security responsibilities
in the Polish zones in Babil, Wasit and Diwaniya provinces to
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Although he acknowledged
that the Iraqi Government had to participate in the
assessment of ISF readiness before accepting the handover,
Komorowski warned that Coalition Forces had
to be a key element in such deliberations because "the Iraqis
would naturally want to extend the presence of foreign troops
for security." Komorowski noted that the previous Polish
Government had led its people to believe that a handover was
near and that the newly elected government had only to
negotiate terms and conditions. He suggested that a
timetable for withdrawal, taking into account conditions on
the ground as necessary, would alleviate some of the growing
Polish public's anxiety over Iraq. He lamented that the US
had only a "tactical" view of US-polish relations because it
focused on getting Polish assistance in Iraq at the expense
of the larger "strategic" relationship. He complained, for
example, that Iraq deployment was consuming Polish funds
intended for defense transformation.


7. (C) Deutsch also met with Jerzy Szmajdzinski,
parliamentary floor leader of the Democratic Left Alliance
(SLD) and Defense Minister until last month. It was
Szmajdzinski who implemented the original GOP decision in
2003 to join the Coalition and deploy to Iraq, but then in
2003 began speaking regularly in public about a Polish
withdrawal by the end of 2005. He stated bluntly that he
wanted Iraq's 8th Division to take over security
responsibility for the Polish sector as soon as possible, and
that this was the time to declare victory and transfer
control. Szmajdzinski saw the Multinational Division
Center-South (MND-CS) unraveling, citing the imminent
departure of the Ukrainians and Bulgarians. In his view, a
handover shortly after Iraq's December 15th elections would
legitimize the new Iraqi government and bolster Polish public
opinion. He warned that the GOP needed some sort of tangible
benefit now to stop the erosion of public support for Iraq
deployment, or it would have to "face reality." He felt the
CIA prisons scandal had dented the GOP's credibility at home.
As if to sum up Polish frustration over the perceived lack
of US gratitude, Szmajdzinski asked how many Mexicans are in
Iraq, an allusion to US support for the Mexican candidate for
OECD Secretary General over former Polish PM Marek Belka, who
had previously served in a senior capacity in the CPA.


8. (C) COMMENT: Both officials and opposition figures
indicated readiness for Polish troops to stay in Iraq past
January 2006, albeit in reduced numbers and with a different
mission, but expressed serious concerns over the costs, both
material and political, of Poland's continued presence in
Iraq. However, in the end it appears that the GOP is
prepared to maintain a contingent of at least 1000 troops on
the ground at least through the 6th rotation of MND-CS ending
roughly in August 2006. It may well be difficult for the
Poles to remain beyond that time, as they will have only one
year to prepare for the significantly greater organizational
challenge of commanding the entire ISAF operation in
Afghanistan. END COMMENT.


9. (U) Deputy Senior Advisor Deutsch cleared this cable.
ASHE