NEW POLISH DEFMIN SIKORSKI HOPES TO VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 003794

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2010
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS PL
SUBJECT: NEW POLISH DEFMIN SIKORSKI HOPES TO VISIT
WASHINGTON LATE NOVEMBER 2005

REF: (A) WARSAW 3734 (B) WARSAW 3694

Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In his introductory meeting with Ambassador
Ashe, new Defense Minister Radek Sikorski expressed his
desire to visit Washington during the week of November 28 for
official meetings with Secretary Rumsfeld and other senior
officials. In a focused half-hour discussion, Sikorski also
addressed plans for a post-inaugural visit to Washington by
President-elect Lech Kaczynski in early 2006, the prospects
for continued Polish deployments in Iraq, U.S. assistance for
Polish defense transformation, and Poland's expected takeover
of the ISAF lead in 2007. While not discounting the
possibility of Polish troops' staying in Iraq, Sikorski
stressed the difficult political decisions that the new
government faced and the need for continued U.S. assistance.
END SUMMARY.


Polish Senior Visits to the U.S.
--------------

2. (C) Ambassador Ashe paid an introductory call November 8
on Radoslaw "Radek" Sikorski, who was named Defense Minister
in the Marcinkiewicz government on October 31 (Ref A).
Following Ambassador's presentation of key U.S. priorities,
including Iraq deployment, the U.S.-Polish strategic
partnership, cooperative engagement in Ukraine, the
discussion turned to the invitation President Bush had
extended to Poland's future Foreign and Defense Ministers to
visit Washington. Ambassador expressed his hope that
Sikorski and newly named Foreign Minister Stefan Meller would
visit their counterparts in Washington soon, in order to
prepare for a meaningful visit post-inaugural visit to the
U.S. by President-elect Kaczynski January/February 2006.


3. (C) Sikorski suggested two possible windows for his own
visit, taking into account the projected Strategic Dialogue
discussions in Poland in mid-December and the need to prepare
his own substantive agenda. He preferred to visit November
30-December 2, as that would allow the discussions in
Washington to feed into the new Polish government's decisions
on Iraq deployment. However, December 19-21 would also be
possible. Ambassador stressed that it would be very
important for Sikorski to meet with Congressional leaders,
who would already be out of session during the later time
frame. Sikorski suggested that it might be possible for him
to travel together with FM Meller, which might be "more
effective in emphasizing certain themes and generating
momentum for new policies," and undertook to consult with
Meller on the timing of their travel.

Iraq Deployments in 2006
--------------

4. (C) Noting that Secretary Rumsfeld had praised the Polish
contribution in Iraq in his November 7 congratulatory
telephone call to Sikorski, Ambassador stressed the important
role that Polish forces continued to play in Iraq and the
U.S. hope that the GOP would at least maintain the current
Polish troop level of 1400 through the end of 2006. Sikorski
replied that the timing of the ongoing November 8-9
Multinational Division Center-South (MND-CS) Force
Regeneration Conference (FRC) in Warsaw was unfortunate,
since the new GOP had not yet been confirmed and the Cabinet
would have to conduct a complete review of Poland's Iraq
policy before making any commitments on future deployments.
Absent the requisite political decision, any recommendations
by the Polish military at the PRC could only be considered
"provisional." Poland wanted to be a dependable and
supportive ally that fulfills its commitments, but the Iraq
deployment was nonetheless an issue of great concern to the
Polish public and therefore warranted careful consideration.
Ambassador expressed the hope that the GOP would consult with
the U.S. privately and informally on any Iraq-related
decisions before they were discussed publicly.


5. (C) Sikorski characterized the Iraq situation as a
dilemma. On the one hand, the Polish military regards the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in MND-CS,s sector as "almost
ready" and is in the process of certifying brigades of the
Iraqi Army's Eighth Division. Should the Iraqi military be
able to take over security tasks in the sector, MND-CS,s
mission could be considered a success and the Polish
contingent could "hand off and say goodbye." On the other
hand Polish forces could stay on the ground even after the
handover to ISF, at their current level but in a different
capacity, serving as a training element and a "last resort"
intervention contingent.


6. (C) Sikorski speculated that "more ambitious scenarios"
might exist, but stressed that Poland could only consider
them in the context of U.S. military assistance to Poland and
"the broader bilateral relationship." According to Sikorski,
Poland,s military could only increase its support of the
U.S. in Iraq if the costs of the additional deployment were
offset. When Ambassador noted that the U.S. budgetary
outlook was extremely tight in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina
and Wilma, Sikorski replied that it wasn't "necessarily about
more cash for next year" (2006). He said that the new
government aimed to create a fully modern Polish
Expeditionary Brigade by the end of its four-year term (2009)
and U.S. assistance would be critical in achieving that goal.


7. (C) Sikorski commented briefly on his upcoming visit to
Polish troops in Iraq (November 11-12, commemorating Polish
Independence Day),saying that the Polish contingent's morale
was high, having seen no Polish casualties in the past year
and very few Iraqi civilian casualties in the MND-CS sector.
He expressed concern about al-Sadr,s increasing closeness to
the Revolutionary Council, and mentioned that he fully relies
on the advice of Amb. Ryszard Krystosik, the "Polish civilian
adviser in Iraq."

Afghanistan, Ukraine
--------------

8. (C) Sikorski said that the GOP was prepared to assume
command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2007 as
scheduled, but stressed that Poland would need airlift
support to deploy and sustain its force. He had told the
German Ambassador earlier the same day that Poland would
expect Germany to upgrade its staffing level at the NATO
Multinational Corps, North-East (MNC-NE). Sikorski added
that Denmark would also need to maintain its MNC-NE staffing
level. (N.B. The Danish-German-Polish MNC-NE is projected to
command the eleventh ISAF rotation, starting in August 2007,
at which time Poland is scheduled to hold the rotating MNC-NE
command). Sikorski said that Poland would seriously consider
taking over a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) in
Afghanistan, but only after its ISAF command (i.e., Feb
2008). Sikorski briefly reminisced about his personal
experiences in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, noting that he
regards the current situation in Afghanistan on the whole as
a success.


9. (C) Turning briefly to Ukraine, Sikorski said that
Secretary Rumsfeld had asked for Polish support on NATO

SIPDIS
membership. He stated that "you don't have to push us, we'll
push you" in helping move Ukraine toward European and
Euro-Atlantic integration. He suggested one avenue might be
to simultaneously assist both the Ukrainian and Polish
militaries by upgrading the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion
currently serving in Kosovo. Sikorski mentioned that he
would like to visit Ukraine for his first official travel
abroad (Ref B),but that he'd first have to decide whether
the signal such a visit would send would be too strong (i.e.,
for Poland,s eastern neighbors).

COMMENT
--------------

10. (C) Sikorski was clearly comfortable in the role of
Defense Minister, and he took a markedly softer line than he
had several weeks earlier with EUR DAS Mark Pekala on the
link between continued Iraq deployment and desired increases
in U.S. military assistance. Perhaps not surprisingly given
his recent time living in Washington, Sikorski in his first
days as DefMin has taken a more pragmatic view of U.S.
relations than one might expect from other members of the
newly formed government.
ASHE