Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05VILNIUS596
2005-06-10 05:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vilnius
Cable title:  

GERMAN AND LITHUANIAN AUTHORITIES SCRUTINIZE MONEY

Tags:  MCAP KSTC PARM PTER PINR EFIN KNNP ASEC IR LH 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000596 

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NB, DS/IP/EUR, AND DS/ITA/EUR

TALLINN FOR FBI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015
TAGS: MCAP KSTC PARM PTER PINR EFIN KNNP ASEC IR LH
SUBJECT: GERMAN AND LITHUANIAN AUTHORITIES SCRUTINIZE MONEY
TRAIL FOR IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM EQUIPMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000596

SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NB, DS/IP/EUR, AND DS/ITA/EUR

TALLINN FOR FBI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015
TAGS: MCAP KSTC PARM PTER PINR EFIN KNNP ASEC IR LH
SUBJECT: GERMAN AND LITHUANIAN AUTHORITIES SCRUTINIZE MONEY
TRAIL FOR IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM EQUIPMENT


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY RSO BRENT A. BARKER. REASON 1.5 (D).


2. (C) Summary. The Lithuanian Financial Crime
Investigative Service recently disclosed to us that in 2004
it received an informal request from a German government
agency regarding a financial transaction used to "purchase
equipment in Germany for a nuclear station in Iran." The
German request stated that the purchase was legal, but
questioned why the payment was effected through Lithuania.
End Summary.


3. (C) The International Relations Division of the
Financial Crimes Investigative Service (FCIS) provided RSO
with information regarding an informal request from its
German counterpart, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).
In June 2004, the FCIS received an informal request from
the FIU asking for confirmation that a banking transaction
had taken place in Lithuania. The money transfer was
allegedly linked to equipment purchased for the Iranian
Nuclear Program.


4. (C) German authorities asked the Lithuanian FCIS to
confirm that on May 14, 2004 the British company Priory
Trading LTD had transferred 200,000 Euros from their
account in the Snoras Bank of Lithuania (Account #
840370477) to the Commercial Bank of Berlin account of the
German company, Solo Handels Gmbh (Account # 238828800).
The FCIS confirmed to Germany that the transaction had
taken place.


5. (C) According to the FCIS, the German FIU informal
request stated that the transaction was to "purchase
equipment in Germany for a nuclear station in Iran." The
German FIU stated that the purchase was legal, but sought
insights about why the payment originated in Lithuania.
Lithuania confirmed that the transaction did occur, and
stated that it did not violate any Lithuanian laws. By the
time of the German request, the account was closed. The
Lithuanian FCIS told the German FIU to submit a formal
request through official channels if it required any
further information. Germany submitted no official request
related to this transaction.


6. (C) Comment. The FCIS official stated that he could
provide the information reported above because it was part
of an informal request and not a formal request. RSO asked
for additional information, such who transferred the
200,000 Euros into the Snoras Bank. The official replied
that information was protected by Lithuanian banking laws
and could not be disclosed informally. But he did say that
the Untied States could obtain additional information by
making a formal request through the MLAT process or through
a FINCEN request.

MULL