Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05VILNIUS1240
2005-11-23 15:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vilnius
Cable title:  

GOL SEEKS TO PLAY THE RUSSIAN CARD WITH LUKASHENKO

Tags:  PREL PGOV BO RS LH 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 001240 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NB AND EURUMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV BO RS LH
SUBJECT: GOL SEEKS TO PLAY THE RUSSIAN CARD WITH LUKASHENKO

REF: A. SECSTATE 188900


B. VILNIUS 1161

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Alexander Titolo for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 001240

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NB AND EURUMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV BO RS LH
SUBJECT: GOL SEEKS TO PLAY THE RUSSIAN CARD WITH LUKASHENKO

REF: A. SECSTATE 188900


B. VILNIUS 1161

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Alexander Titolo for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The GOL believes that a joint USG-EU mission
to Belarus to deliver a strong message to the regime is
doomed to fail if the Government of Russia does not also
participate. The MFA argues that any trip to Minsk by a
high-level USG official should include a stop in Moscow aimed
at enlisting Russian support in pressuring Lukashenko. GOL
officials acknowledge that Moscow could take advantage of
such an overture to draw Belarus closer. They argue,
however, that we should redouble our efforts to swing Russia
to the USG/EU position because this is the only measure
likely to sway Lukashenko. End Summary.


2. (C) MFA European Union Division Director Zygimantas
Pavilionis, who doubles as Political Director, requested a
meeting with the Ambassador November 22 to detail GOL
concerns about the one-time outreach to the Minsk regime that
the USG has proposed (ref A). Pavilionis said that while the
GOL agrees in principle with the idea of sending a high-level
messenger or messengers to deliver a strong message to
Lukashenko, he doubts that such a mission will achieve its
desired result. He stated that the "missing link" in the
USG/EU Belarus strategy is Russia. Pavilionis said that
without Russia's involvement, Lukashenko would feel free to
ignore any USG/EU entreaties to sit out next year's
presidential elections and/or to allow OSCE election
observers.


3. (C) Pavilionis said that any mission by a high-ranking
USG official to deliver a message to Lukashenko should
include a stop in Moscow before any meeting with the regime
in Minsk. Such a trip, Pavilionis suggested, could
successfully open a meaningful dialogue with Russia on
Belarus. He opined that the mere perception that Russia
would not support the regime if it initiated further
anti-democratic measures would do more to shake Lukashenko's
confidence that any other measure.


4. (C) Ambassador Mull questioned whether the Government of
Russia would not reject any overture out of hand, and use the
opportunity to draw Belarus even closer -- precisely the
outcome the GOL would like to avoid. Pavilionis conceded
that this was a risk, but said that Russia is moving in that
direction anyway, including a systematic push for full union
with Belarus. He said that the USG and EU should also
attempt to enlist Moscow to help pressure Lukashenko into
allowing OSCE observers to enter Belarus far enough in
advance of elections to adequately perform their mission. If
persuasion does not work, he continued, the USG, as "the only
superpower," should threaten (unspecified) actions to compel
Russia to cooperate.


5. (SBU) Pavilionis offered to host a working dinner for
EUR/DAS David Kramer on Sunday, December 4 while he is in
Vilnius for the USG/GOL-organized donors coordination meeting
on Belarus. If travel schedules do not permit a dinner,
Pavilionis suggested a meeting on the margins of the
conference.


6. (C) Comment: Pavilionis and others are eager to draw USG
and EU attention to Russia's role in Belarus, reflecting
growing -- and understandable -- Lithuanian anxiety about the
possibility of a Russia-Belarus union (ref b). However, his
alarming remark about the utility of U.S. threats to Moscow
suggests the need for a reality check about the policy tools
that we are prepared to employ. We believe a meeting next
month between DAS Kramer and Lithuanian policymakers would be
a great way to realign the GOL with our approach.
KELLY