VILNIUS UNATTENDED OPERATIONS WAIVER REQUEST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 VILNIUS 001202

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR IRM/CST/LD
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/ACD/SSB
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CMP/ECB: WEBBER, MR. PATRICK
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CS/SSD: WALKER, JAN
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CMP/ECB: GERST, TENA
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/C: STARR, GREG
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/EX/IM: COTE, JAN A
DEPARTMENT FOR IRM/BPC/CST/LD/OB: TIANG-CHU, ELAINE
DEPARTMENT FOR THE OFFICE OF THE CIO
FRANKFURT FOR RIMC
FRANKFURT FOR RCSO: CALVIN REIMER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2014
TAGS: AADP ABLD AMGT ACOA ASEC KRIM LH
SUBJECT: VILNIUS UNATTENDED OPERATIONS WAIVER REQUEST

REF: A. MCCRANE-TIANG-CHU EMAIL 9/23/2005

B. 2003 STATE 84156

C. WAIVER DECISION MEMORANDUM 8/25/92

D. STATE 190564

E. STATE 198066

F. OIG REPORT OSO/1-95-28

G. "SECURITY INSPECTION OF EMBASSY VILNIUS LITHUANIA," OIG
NOVEMBER 1999

H. 2004 VILNIUS 1319

I. 2004 STATE 249854

J. 2005 VILNIUS 69

K. 5 FAH-6 H550

L. 12 FAH-6 H-536.5-1

Classified By: McCrane, David J

SUMMARY
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1. (S) Post requests a temporary waiver to begin 24-hour
unattended operations for classified communications. Post
needs to have all message traffic available at the beginning
of the business day in order to operate efficiently in
response to Washington taskings. We cannot do that now
without incurring significant overtime costs. A temporary
waiver until planned OBO renovations bring the Embassy up to
standards will empower post to respond to Washington
requirements without jeopardizing classified information in
this low security-threat post. Failure to provide the waiver
would jeopardize our ability to maintain workflow and risk
damaging hardware not designed to be dismantled and locked up
on a daily basis. RSO, IM and EXEC concur with this waiver
request and seek a decision soonest. End summary.

THE PROBLEM
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2. (S) Vilnius is an active mission with a heavy
multilateral and bilateral agenda that reflects our excellent
relationship with Lithuania. To respond to Washington
requirements in a timely manner, post needs to have all
incoming traffic in our inboxes by 0830 in time to arrange
priorities for the day (Ref A). Post cannot do that now
without incurring substantial overtime costs. Ref B
authorized 24-hour unattended operations for all posts
meeting certain criteria. Post has everything needed to go
to unattended ops as required in Ref B except a vault door.
Ref C memo recognizes this deficiency and provides a waiver
for routine operations. We now want to extend the Ref C
waiver to include unattended ops for the temporary period
until renovations planned by OBO will eliminate the physical
security deficiency. Without the waiver, IMO will be
compelled to remove 30 hard drives and lock them in a safe.
This would add additional demands on his time, and would
jeopardize this sensitive equipment, which is not designed to
be moved routinely.


3. (S) Post tried to solve this problem on our own by
submitting a plan to provide physical security as prescribed
by DS guidelines. Our plan, which focused on the purchase of
two safes, was approved in October 2005, but we now find that
the waiting time to order and ship the required safes is
about one year. Although we attempted to find a solution,
the net effect has been that our operations will still be
hamstrung. Moreover, this stopgap measure will require us to
spend approximately 100,000 USD on two safes that would not
arrive until shortly before our Chancery renovation is
scheduled to begin in 2007.


4. (S) No security threats that would jeopardize 24-hour
unattended operations have arisen in the years since DS
granted the Ref C waiver. Additionally, OBO has plans for a
chancery renovation that, when completed, would eliminate the
need for a waiver. The track record of the past thirteen
years supports the extension of the Ref C waiver to cover
unattended operations as well as standard operations.

SOLUTION
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5. (SBU) All interested Mission elements, including the
RSO, MGT, IM, and the Front Office, support a waiver for
Post to move to 24-hour unattended operations for the
following reasons:

-- OBO's planned chancery renovation project will
solve the physical security issues;
-- the physical threat level is low (Ref E);
-- DS waived the physical security requirements for
Post (Ref C);
-- the PCC has operated for 13 years without a physical
security incident; and
-- post's technical protections conform to standards.


6. (S) Post requests that DS grant a waiver allowing the
Vilnius PCC to go to 24-hour unattended operations until
chancery renovations eliminate the need for the waiver.
MULL