GOL SUPPORTS USG POLICY ON BELARUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VILNIUS 001161

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NB AND EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2015
TAGS: KDEM PREL PHUM EAID PGOV BO UP LH
SUBJECT: GOL SUPPORTS USG POLICY ON BELARUS

REF: A. SECSTATE 188900


B. VILNIUS 1076

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Alexander Titolo for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The GOL is refocusing its efforts to promote
democracy in Belarus after fielding criticism from the USG
and EU for overstepping the bounds of the agreed
non-engagement policy. GOL foreign policy decision-makers
admit that the Prime Minister's October 4 meeting with
Belarusian PM Sergey Sidorski was ill advised. Insisting on
the utility of maintaining a line of communication with
Lukashenko, MFA Undersecretary Albinas Januska told the
Ambassador that neither Lithuania nor any other EU member is
positioned to do so. Januska pointed to Ukrainian President
Yushchenko as best suited to be the West's messenger to
Lukashenko. The GOL believes that signs of increasing
paranoia from the Minsk regime argue in favor of engaging
Belarusian Minister-level officials who may be able to play a
role in pushing Lukashenko from power. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador delivered ref A points on USG policy
on Belarus to MFA Undersecretary Albinas Januska, October 26.
Januska, the MFA's leading voice and likely author of the
GOL's Belarus policy, agreed with the outlines of the
U.S.-proposed strategy. Januska said that he expects the EU
to approve the idea of a one-time outreach to Lukashenko,
provided the right interlocutor delivers the message. He
suggested Yushchenko as an appropriate messenger, remarking
that a Yushchenko-Lukashenko meeting would not violate the EU
policy barring high-level contacts.


3. (C) Januska pushed for the USG to consider approaching
high-level Belarusian officials in a "quiet, well controlled
manner that had the approval of allies." Januska said that
the GOL sees signs of increasing paranoia in the Minsk
regime, pointing as an example to Lukashenko's refusal to
allow Belarusian officials to meet in Vilnius with EU
representatives. He suggested that this paranoia reflects
Lukashenko's weakening control, or at least indicates an
opportunity to further isolate him by influencing those
closest to him. Januska conceded that PM Brazauskas's
meeting with Belarusian PM Sidorski (ref B) was not an
example of a best practice, and might put Sidorski, whom some
here think a viable alternative to Lukashenko, at risk. As
in previous conversations with us (ref B),Januska cited
Belarusian Foreign Minister Martynov as someone the
Lithuanians might reasonably approach.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked Januska about the utility of
military-to-military contacts. Januska said that Lithuania
had avoided mil-mil cooperation while Vladimir Uschopcik was
the Belarusian Vice Minister of Defense. (Uschopcik is under
indictment in Lithuania for his role in the 1991 Soviet
crackdown on independence advocates.) With Uschopcik out of
government, mil-mil cooperation now seems a very good idea.
He suggested, however, that Poland may be better positioned
to carry out this type of cooperation. Januska also noted
that Lithuania's embassy in Minsk has received few requests
for information in its role as NATO Contact Embassy.


5. (C) Januska asked that the USG consider including in the
message to the GOR (ref A) a statement to the effect that
Russian interference in Belarus is unacceptable. He also
raised Lithuanian concerns that the long-discussed potential
merger of Belarus with Russia is moving forward, asserting
that the joint commission established to prepare for this was
close to finalizing several agreements. Januska stated that
the GOL would view such a merger as a Russian annexation of
Belarus, coming as it would by fiat rather than as a result
of a democratic process.


6. (C) Januska told the Ambassador that the GOL will support
daily TV broadcasts on the Lithuanian state satellite channel
of 30-minutes of news programming focused on Belarus (in
Russian with Belarusian subtitles). He raised the need to
identify approximately five journalists to contribute
material, and said the GOL may need some technical support in
implementing this project. He asked the Ambassador to
consider possible USG assistance for this project.


7. (C) Comment: Chastened GOL policymakers indicate they
will cease to propose their own meetings with Lukashenko or
his PM. They will, nonetheless, still actively seek
opportunities to promote democracy in Belarus. Some among
Lithuania's leaders hope that Adamkus or Brazauskas will
someday mediate a potential crisis in Belarus, the way
Adamkus played a role during Ukraine's ORANGE Revolution, if
elections or other events shake Lukashenko's hold. While
they entertain many dire scenarios, including the realization
of the seemingly unlikely merger of Belarus and Russia, we
expect the Lithuanians will be better team players in the
future. They will urge the USG and EU to push the limits on
engagement with Belarus, but likely not stray (too far) over
the line on their own.
MULL