IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000: DEMARCHE ON

S E C R E T VIENNA 003912

SIPDIS

FOR ISN/CWTR, ISN/MTR, EUR/AGS, AND EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC ETTC AU MTCRE
SUBJECT: IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000: DEMARCHE ON
STEYR-MANNLICHER SANCTIONS DELIVERED

REF: A) STATE 226158 B) VIENNA 3679 C) VIENNA 3737

Classified By: Acting Economic-Political Counselor Michael R. DeTar for
reasons 1.5(b) and (d).

Demarche Delivered
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1. (S) On December 19, Econ Unit Chief delivered ref A
talking points to Helmut Krehlik, Head of the Ministry of
Economy's Export Control Division, notifying the GoA of
impending sanctions against Steyr-Mannlicher under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Krehlik thanked the USG for
advance notice of the sanctions and promised to inform
Minister of Economy Martin Bartenstein and other relevant GoA
officials.


Concerns Remain About Weapons Technology Transfers
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2. (S/NF) Krehlik said he was "certain" that
Steyr-Mannlicher CEO Wolfgang Fuerlinger intends to sell
weapons technology via his Malaysian joint venture to the
highest bidder (refs B and C). According to Krehlik, French
Government officials have recently raised similar concerns
with the GoA. Krehlik noted that Fuerlinger had specifically
asked him 6-8 months ago whether or not Steyr-Mannlicher
would need an export license to transfer technology via
"intangible media," i.e., via computer. Krehlik explained
that prior to October 1, 2005, when Austria' new Foreign
Trade Act (FTA) came into effect, only physical transfers
required an MoE license. Krehlik opined that Fuerlinger has
probably already transferred the weapons technology
electronically. The GoA could not prosecute him for such an
action prior to October 1, based on the loophole in the old
FTA.


3. (S) Krehlik reiterated that the GoA could prosecute
Steyr-Mannlicher for arms brokering under the amended FTA
(ref C),if Steyr-Mannlicher transfers weapons technology
outside of Austria from one non-EU state to another non-EU
country. Krehlik said, however, it would be very difficult
to prove such a transfer, absent access to Steyr's accounting
books. Even if the police did obtain a warrant to search
Steyr-Mannlicher's offices, Krehlik doubted the company would
keep detailed records of weapons technology transfers, which
would expose it to prosecution.
MCCAW