Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05VIENNA3402
2005-10-19 12:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vienna
Cable title:
AUSTRIA EAGER FOR CLOSE COORDINATION ON BELARUS,
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 003402
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UMB AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM EAID PGOV BO AU EUN
SUBJECT: AUSTRIA EAGER FOR CLOSE COORDINATION ON BELARUS,
LOOKS TOWARD EU PRESIDENCY
REF: STATE 188900
Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Gregory E. Phillips. Reaso
ns: 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 003402
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UMB AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM EAID PGOV BO AU EUN
SUBJECT: AUSTRIA EAGER FOR CLOSE COORDINATION ON BELARUS,
LOOKS TOWARD EU PRESIDENCY
REF: STATE 188900
Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Gregory E. Phillips. Reaso
ns: 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Austria welcomes the U.S. approach to
promote democracy in Belarus, and looks forward to close
coordination during its EU Presidency in the first half of
2006. It will be necessary to identify the targets for
outreach, with a focus on opinion-leading elites. An
approach to the economy could take account of the impact of
Russian WTO accession. The views of Russia and of Belarus'
neighbors would be important to the implementation of our
strategy. Continued dialogue with Belarus in certain fora
would help, but pressure would be key. End summary.
2. (U) EconPolCouns delivered reftel points on October 19 to
Hanns Porias, the Austrian MFA's Assistant Secretary-level
Director for East and Southeast Europe.
3. (C) Porias strongly welcomed the U.S. initiative. He
said Belarus has been a point of focus in Brussels, and the
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) would
likely address Belarus soon. Porias said he had participated
in a troika meeting in London on Belarus, a meeting in which
Ukraine also participated. Belarus would be a very important
issue during Austria's EU Presidency during the first half of
2006.
4. (C) Porias applauded the strategy of expanding outreach
to Belarusian society. He noted that a key question would be
whom to target. Now, for the first time, there was a single
candidate to symbolize the opposition, in the person of
Aleksandr Milinkevich. But the issue remained of how to
reach the right circles in Belarus. Porias argued that it
was important to reach influential elites in Belarusian
society -- not the top layer, but those just below them, who
were important opinion leaders. Porias expressed skepticism
about the degree to which Belarusian NGOs could contribute to
the process of outreach. The fact that NGO leaders could
travel freely was a cause of suspicion -- "either they're
coopted or they're infiltrated," he said.
5. (C) The economy was another area of focus. Porias said
that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko had been
relatively successful in buying a certain level of popular
support by propping up the economy. In this connection,
Porias said he was interested in discussing the consequences
of Russian membership in the World Trade Organization for the
Belarusian economic situation.
6. (C) The views of Belarus' neighbors was important, and
Porias agreed with the U.S. approach in this regard. He said
Russia's interest was primarily in stability, and he was
starting to hear talk among Russian policy makers that
Lukashenko may not, after all, be the only hope for stability
in Belarus. It would be important to maintain a close
dialogue with the Russians, he said. Porias noted that the
personal relationship between Lukashenko and Russian
President Vladimir Putin was not terribly good -- in fact,
Lukashenko had a much better personal relationship with
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. Porias agreed with
our view of the need to engage with countries which neighbor
Belarus and which have gone through a transition to
democracy, such as Ukraine and Poland.
7. (C) Porias argued for the Austrian position that it is
important not to isolate Belarus, which would only give
Lukashenko free rein to continue his anti-democratic policies
inside the country. Instead, if was important to maintain a
process of dialogue. Porias pointed to the Central European
Initiative, of which Belarus is a member, as a possible forum
for such dialogue. That said, Porias was no Pollyanna on
Lukashenko -- he agreed that the main thrust of a Belarus
strategy had to be pressure for a democratic transition.
van Voorst
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UMB AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM EAID PGOV BO AU EUN
SUBJECT: AUSTRIA EAGER FOR CLOSE COORDINATION ON BELARUS,
LOOKS TOWARD EU PRESIDENCY
REF: STATE 188900
Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Gregory E. Phillips. Reaso
ns: 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Austria welcomes the U.S. approach to
promote democracy in Belarus, and looks forward to close
coordination during its EU Presidency in the first half of
2006. It will be necessary to identify the targets for
outreach, with a focus on opinion-leading elites. An
approach to the economy could take account of the impact of
Russian WTO accession. The views of Russia and of Belarus'
neighbors would be important to the implementation of our
strategy. Continued dialogue with Belarus in certain fora
would help, but pressure would be key. End summary.
2. (U) EconPolCouns delivered reftel points on October 19 to
Hanns Porias, the Austrian MFA's Assistant Secretary-level
Director for East and Southeast Europe.
3. (C) Porias strongly welcomed the U.S. initiative. He
said Belarus has been a point of focus in Brussels, and the
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) would
likely address Belarus soon. Porias said he had participated
in a troika meeting in London on Belarus, a meeting in which
Ukraine also participated. Belarus would be a very important
issue during Austria's EU Presidency during the first half of
2006.
4. (C) Porias applauded the strategy of expanding outreach
to Belarusian society. He noted that a key question would be
whom to target. Now, for the first time, there was a single
candidate to symbolize the opposition, in the person of
Aleksandr Milinkevich. But the issue remained of how to
reach the right circles in Belarus. Porias argued that it
was important to reach influential elites in Belarusian
society -- not the top layer, but those just below them, who
were important opinion leaders. Porias expressed skepticism
about the degree to which Belarusian NGOs could contribute to
the process of outreach. The fact that NGO leaders could
travel freely was a cause of suspicion -- "either they're
coopted or they're infiltrated," he said.
5. (C) The economy was another area of focus. Porias said
that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko had been
relatively successful in buying a certain level of popular
support by propping up the economy. In this connection,
Porias said he was interested in discussing the consequences
of Russian membership in the World Trade Organization for the
Belarusian economic situation.
6. (C) The views of Belarus' neighbors was important, and
Porias agreed with the U.S. approach in this regard. He said
Russia's interest was primarily in stability, and he was
starting to hear talk among Russian policy makers that
Lukashenko may not, after all, be the only hope for stability
in Belarus. It would be important to maintain a close
dialogue with the Russians, he said. Porias noted that the
personal relationship between Lukashenko and Russian
President Vladimir Putin was not terribly good -- in fact,
Lukashenko had a much better personal relationship with
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. Porias agreed with
our view of the need to engage with countries which neighbor
Belarus and which have gone through a transition to
democracy, such as Ukraine and Poland.
7. (C) Porias argued for the Austrian position that it is
important not to isolate Belarus, which would only give
Lukashenko free rein to continue his anti-democratic policies
inside the country. Instead, if was important to maintain a
process of dialogue. Porias pointed to the Central European
Initiative, of which Belarus is a member, as a possible forum
for such dialogue. That said, Porias was no Pollyanna on
Lukashenko -- he agreed that the main thrust of a Belarus
strategy had to be pressure for a democratic transition.
van Voorst