DEMARCHE ON TURKISH EU ACCESSION: AUSTRIA SUPPORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 002827

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, EUR/SE, EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015

TAGS: PREL ECIN TU CY AU EUN
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON TURKISH EU ACCESSION: AUSTRIA SUPPORTS


OCTOBER 3 START DATE

REF: A) STATE 150087 B) VIENNA 2752 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a. i. Carol van Voorst

Reasons: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The Austrian Foreign Ministry's Southern

Europe head and its director for Common Foreign and Security

Policy told us August 22 that Austria considers the October 3

start date for Turkey's EU accession talks absolute. Austria

is seeking language in the negotiating framework that

"clarifies" alternatives to membership, although, in view of

Turkish objections, Austria will not use the phrase

"privileged partnership." In any event, Austria has no

support for its position, and will likely follow a consensus

to leave the negotiating framework as is. Austria opposes

links to Turkish recognition of Cyprus, and does not/not seek

a linkage between the Turkish and Croatian talks. By

proposing language for the negotiating framework, Austrian

Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel wants to show his constituents

that he has represented the views of up to 80 percent of the

electorate who oppose Turkish membership in the EU. He does

not have to win this fight, and does not necessarily expect

to do so -- but he has to show that he has made the effort.

End summary.

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No Question: Talks Start October 3

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2. (C) Economic-Political Counselor and Pol Unit Chief

discussed ref (a) points with MFA A/S-equivalent for Southern

Europe Clemens Koja on August 22. Koja confirmed Embassy's

analysis (ref b). He stated categorically that Austria would

not support a delay of the start of Turkish EU accession

negotiations from October 3. Neither would Austria support a

link between the start of the accession negotiations and

Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. The

resolution of Cyprus issue would have to be the result of the

UN-sponsored peace process, Koja said, and links to Turkey's

EU accession talks could disturb that process.

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No Link to Croatia

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3. (C) Koja emphasized that Austria did not seek a linkage

between the candidacies of Turkey and Croatia. Austria

remained convinced that Croatia belonged in the EU. However,

Austria would address Croatia separately.

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Wants "Clearer" Language on Alternatives to Membership

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4. (C) Koja said Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel continues

personally to determine Austria's policy on Turkish EU

accession. Koja noted that Schuessel thought the EU had

headed down the wrong road by offering eventual membership to

Turkey. However, Koja said, Schuessel had worked to bring

about the European Council decision of December 17, 2004, and

stood by the terms of that decision. Still, Schussel would

seek "clearer" language in the negotiating framework about

possible alternatives for Turkey in case the negotiations

failed to culminate in membership. Koja rejected the phrase

"privileged partnership" out-of-hand, calling it a "non-word"

since the Turks had ruled out the formulation. That said,

Austria recognizes that the goal of accession talks is full

membership in the EU. The question of alternative outcomes

would arise only if accession talks failed.


5. (C) Koja noted that Schuessel faced a tough election in


2006. Only "ten percent" of the Austrian public supported

Turkish EU membership, he said. This made it imperative for

Schuessel and Foreign Minister Plassnik to show that they had

fought hard to press the views of the Austrian public

majority in EU councils dealing with Turkish accession.

Schuessel could not afford to let the other Austrian parties

portray him as weak on Turkey. On the other hand, Schuessel

was under no illusions about the extent of Austria's clout.

In fact, Koja acknowledged, no other EU member state

currently supports the Austrian position. When we asked what

Austria would do if it failed to win support for its proposal

on language in the negotiating framework, Koja admitted that

Austria would probably fall in line with a consensus of the

major EU states.

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Tight Timing Leaves Little Room for Maneuver

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6. (C) Koja and (separately) MFA Common Foreign and Security

Policy Director Andreas Riecken pointed to the August 31

COREPER and the September 1-2 "Gymnich" ministerial as the

next venues for discussions on the EU Commission's draft

negotiating framework. The next regular GAERC, on October

3, would allow no time for recovery if the Turks found the

language objectionable. Koja alluded to a conversation in

which Turkish MFA Under Secretary Tuygan specifically asked

Schuessel to refrain from pushing for the "privileged

partnership" formulation. Tuygan had also asked that the EU

Council not delay action until October 3, saying that might

force Turkish officials literally to walk away from talks.


7. (C) Our contacts noted that any EU Ministerial, including

"technical" ones, could approve the negotiating framework as

an "A-point" (without debate). However, they thought this a

poor option, because the "optics would be bad." They

believed the UK Presidency would try to organize a meeting of

the 25 EU Foreign Ministers on the margins of the UNGA in New

York in September. If the necessary consensus emerged, the

FMs could then "put on their GAERC hats" to pass the

negotiating mandate.

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Comment: Domestic Considerations Impel Effort

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8. (C) It would not be accurate to say that Austria is

seeking new conditions for starting accession talks with

Turkey. Schuessel considers the start of talks on October 3

to be a done deal. However, he wants to show his

constituents that he has done something to represent their

skeptical view of Turkey -- especially since they "blamed"

him for helping to seal the December 17 agreement to set the

date for the Turkish talks. Schuessel has settled on the

issue of additional language in the negotiating framework as

a battle he must fight -- and probably lose -- to maintain

his domestic political standing.

van Voorst