Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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05VIENNA2752 | 2005-08-17 15:06:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Vienna |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002752 |
1. (C) The Austrian position on Turkey's EU accession (as reported ref b) has been fairly consistent over the past several months and is not likely to change prior to October 3. Austria does not and will not want to reopen the December 2004 decision to begin talks this autumn. Austria will also not seek to impose additional conditions before accession negotiations can begin. Austria recognizes that a Cyprus settlement will have to occur in a UN-sponsored process. Austria will therefore not demand that Turkey formally recognize the Republic of Cyprus as a prerequisite for discussions with the Commission on adopting the voluminous EU regulations. 2. (C) On the other hand, Austria was less than satisfied with the outcome of the December 2004 EU Summit, when it pushed hard for a reference to outcomes other than full membership. Recent statements by ForMin Plassnik and Chancellor Schuessel (ref b) make it clear that Austria will seek to insert a mention of "open-endedness" or of a "privileged partnership" for Turkey in the negotiating mandate EU leaders give to the EU Commission. Austria is particularly likely to pursue this goal if Chancellor Schuessel judges that the political consensus on Turkish membership in other important EU member states (e.g. Germany, France, the Netherlands) has moved in this direction. 3. (C) Chancellor Schuessel has personally determined Austria's position. Arguments about Turkey's progress to date, and the role the incentive of EU membership has played in Turkey's reform process, are important to him. Still, they do not address Austrian reservations about the impact of Turkish accession on the EU's cohesiveness and, especially, on EU finances. Schuessel will already have taken into account our assessment that Turkey might react negatively to a negotiating mandate that includes language about alternatives to full membership. However, recent, highly publicized polls show seventy to eighty percent of Austrians are either deeply skeptical or strongly opposed to Turkish entry. All of Schuessel's political competitors - even the Greens - have read these tea leaves and have tilted away from support for Turkey in recent weeks. Public misgivings about admitting Turkey could have a significant impact on Schuessel's chances for victory in the 2006 general election. He will need to be able to tell the Austrian public, credibly, that he understands their concerns and fought for them "in Brussels." 4. (C) Embassy Vienna will report septel Austrian MFA reaction to talking points contained in ref (a). van Voorst |