Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05VIENNA1224
2005-04-14 09:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Vienna
Cable title:  

GWOT ASSESSMENT: POST FEEDBACK: VIENNA

Tags:  PTER PREL AU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 001224 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/PGI - BUCKNEBERG AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL AU
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: POST FEEDBACK: VIENNA

REF: STATE 60796

Classified By: Ambassador W.L. Lyons Brown. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 001224

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/PGI - BUCKNEBERG AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL AU
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: POST FEEDBACK: VIENNA

REF: STATE 60796

Classified By: Ambassador W.L. Lyons Brown. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Austria contributes constructively to the
fight against terrorism. Austria is training and equipping
Iraqi police, it has been an ally against terrorist
financing, and it leads major programs to strengthen border
policing in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Austria is
currently considering a military deployment to support Afghan
elections. Nevertheless, the situation in Austria presents
significant challenges. The most important is a propensity
to pursue what Austrians call "constructive engagement" with
countries of concern to the U.S. We can meet these
challenges on four levels: first, we should base our
inititives on as broad an international consensus as
possible. Practically speaking, a UN mandate is the minimum
necessary to obtain Austrian participation in military
operations. Second, we must provide precise information to
support policy requests to Austria. Third, we should engage
Austria in the process of strategy development. Finally, an
investment of time -- in meetings with Austrian officials and
high-level visits to Austria -- can win practical
cooperation. End Summary.

--------------
AUSTRIA AS A CONTRIBUTOR
--------------


2. (SBU) Austria has made important contributions to the
fight against terrorism. Some notable successes:

-- (SBU) Support to Iraq: Four Austrian trainers have served
at the Iraqi Police Academy in Jordan since November 2003.
The Austrians were the third contingent (after the American
and British) to arrive. Their numbers are small, but they
are comparable to contingents from similarly-sized countries.
In addition, the Austrians provided in-kind assistance of
police uniforms, helmets and shields with a value of
approximately $10 million. More broadly, Austria pleged a
total of 16.4 million Euros in credit guarantees (some 10.2
million Euros) and humanitarian assistance at the October
2003 Madrid Donors Conference for Iraq. Austria has also
written off approximately $1.8 billion in Iraqi debt.

-- (C) Military Support in Afghanistan: Austria has
maintained an almost continuous participation in ISAF. It

was among the first ISAF contributors, with approximately 70
troops in Afghanistan for the initial deployment period.
Since the summer of 2003, it has kept limited numbers of
specialists in the country. There are now three Austrian
staff officers at ISAF headquarters in Kabul under a
parliamentary authorization for up to 10 such officers. In
addition, parliament has authorized up to three Austrian
officers to participate in the UN Assistance Missions
Afghanistan (UNAMA). The Austrian government is currently
considering a military deployment to support the elections in
Afghanistan in the Fall of 2005 with approximately 70 troops
for three months.

-- (SBU) Military Support to Peacekeeping Missions: With
more peacekeepers deployed now than ever, Austria plays an
important role in maintaining stability. Some 850 Austrian
soldiers are in Kosovo and Bosnia, and approximately 370 are
in the Golan Heights. In addition, Austria maintains
military missions of one to five soldiers in UN, OSCE and EU
operations in Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia,
Albania, Georgia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Western
Sahara. Austria plans a small deployment to support
peacekeeping efforts in Sudan.

-- (SBU) Support to U.S. Military Movements: Since
mid-2003, Austria has approved all requests for U.S. military
ground transits and overflights. These total some 10,000
each year, and the operations tempo continues at that rate.

-- (SBU) Regional Security in Central Asia: Austria is the
lead country in two programs providing training and equipment
to Central Asian countries: the Central Asian Border
Security Initiative (CABSI) and the Vienna Central Asia
Initiative (VICA). These multi-year, multi-million dollar
programs coordinate EU, UN and other international programs
to provide planning, training, equipment and funding for
border security in Central Asia.

-- (SBU) Regional Security in Europe: Austria initiated and
manages a cooperative arrangement among Interior Ministries
of the new EU countries to its east. This group, the
"Salzburg Forum," meets at ministerial level each year and at
expert levels throughout the year. This has the important
effect of laying the groundwork for the extension of the EU's
external ("Schengen") border to the frontiers of the new
members.

-- (C) Terrorist Financing: Austria has firmly supported
listing Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist
organization. Domestically, Austria passed and implemented
new legislation in the past year to intensify controls over
the movement of funds from illegal sources. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has reported that Austria's
legal and institutional framework against money laundering
and terrorist financing is comprehensive.

-- (SBU) Judicial Cooperation: The U.S. and Austria have
signed follow-up protocols to the bilateral extradition and
mutual legal assistance treaties to reflect developments in
U.S.-EU cooperation. The EU-wide arrest warrant is effective
in Austria. Austria has ratified all 12 international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

-- (SBU) Law Enforcement and Intelligence Cooperation:
Austria regularly exchanges information with, and supports
the law enforcement efforts of, the U.S. and European
countries. This takes place both through bilateral exchanges
and through groups such as the Club of Bern and Europol, and
via use of the Capriccio network. Austria monitors suspected
Islamic extremists attempting to enter Austria as asylum
seekers, documenting the finger prints of asylum seekers in
EURODAC for sharing with its EU partners. In response to
requests from other European countries for investigations of
individuals in Austria suspected of participating in an
Islamic extremist cell, in 2004, the Austrian Federal Agency
for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT) undertook a
broad, nine-month investigation of 65 individuals. In the
past year, Austria passed legislation which allows police
video surveillance of public spaces and establishes the
parameters for law enforcement use of this surveillance.

--------------
CHALLENGES
--------------


3. (S) Despite this record of action against terrorism,
Austrian policy presents real challenges. Most
significantly, Austria continues to maintain close political
and commercial ties to countries of concern to the U.S.,
including some which we have designated as state sponsors of
terrorism. Politically, many Austrians seek a "bridge
building" role as a continuing legacy of Austria's Cold War
neutrality. This provides a context in which commercial
deals -- which the lack of American and other competitors
facilitates -- form part of a policy of "constructive
engagement." While the search for business does not
necessarily cause Austrians to turn soft on terrorism,
Austria's approach makes it prone to take a benign view of
activities which give us pause. Examples of this include
contacts with Iranian entities seeking technological
cooperation, especially in the biological sciences field, and
approval of the sale of high-powered sniper rifles to Iran.
(We convinced the Austrian government not to proceed with a
formal agreement on technological cooperation, to block a
continuation of rifle shipments, and to support the arrest of
Iranians seeking to procure night vision goggles. In such
cases, Austrian officials demand hard data supporting our
contention that these activities are problematical.


4. (S) There have been media charges that Austrian
authorities turn a blind eye toward the presence of
terrorists in the country, as long as the terrorists
undertake no activity in the country. Austrian authorities
have countered publicly that they keep all suspected
terrorists under close watch, and that they will take action
against anyone for whom there is an arrest warrant.
Privately, Austrian authorities assure us that their
surveillance activities are helping to develop information on
the activities of suspected terrorists, that they are fully
aware of who is in the country, and that they are able to
foil any operational plot before it reaches fruition.
Budgetary, staffing and political constraints on Austrian
authorities make these assertions suspect. Austrian federal
deficits have resulted in restricted budgets for law
enforcement authorities, staffing shortages have limited
surveillance of suspected extremists, and ongoing
reorganizations of the BVT have had some detrimental
consequences on the BVT's effectiveness. In addition, many
Austrian politicians appear to believe that in the absence of
clear evidence of terrorist activity, Austria serves its best
interests by not undertaking actions which could result in
Austria becoming a target for terrorists.


5. (C) In the field of terrorist financing, Austria, like
many EU member countries, has not been able to respond
quickly to our requests to list front organizations posing as
charities. Austria cites a need for information with which
it could defend such actions in court.

--------------
A WAY FORWARD
--------------

6. (S) Austria has contributed to common anti-terrorism
efforts, but it has not delivered as much as it could. For
one thing, although Austria's policy of "constructive
engagement" with countries of concern could offer real levers
for influencing those countries, Austria does not use them.
More broadly, we find ourselves reacting to policy directions
which are often incongruent with ours. While we have had
some success in persuading the Austrians to back off or limit
bad policy choices, we would prefer that those choices were
never made.


7. (S) We see four levels on which to address the
challenges we face.

-- (S) First, we have the best chance of gaining Austria's
military capabilities and using its geostrategic location in
support of military activities if there is a broad
international consensus for those activities. Practically,
the Austrians are unlikely to engage in military operations
which do not have a formal UN mandate. Such a mandate is not
a guarantee of Austrian participation. At the same time, we
need to make realistic requests on the basis of thorough
consultations involving the Austrians.

-- (S) Second, if we want the Austrians to stop activities
with countries of concern to us, or to undertake positive
initiatives, we must be prepared to provide precise
information. Austrian officials will not block a commercial
deal, freeze a front charity's assets, or support a
diplomatic initiative on our say-so alone. They need to be
convinced, and it takes timely, clear information to do this.

-- (S) Third, more broadly, if we want the Austrians to
think like we do and work along similar policy lines, we
should make the effort to build our strategies in fora which
include the Austrians. Such fora include consultations with
partners in the NATO context and discussions at the EU level
on ESDP. However, they must also include bilateral
discussions with Austrian officials, staff-level military
talks, and engagement with Austrian think-tanks. These
bilateral discussions will help shape the opinions of those
who contribute to the decision-making process. The Austrians
are far more likely to buy into a policy direction in whose
formulation they played a role.

-- (S) Finally, with the Austrians, as with many Europeans,
we need to offer deliverables in order to generate practical
cooperation. The type of deliverables necessary are often
intangible, coming at the level of show and protocol.
High-level attention in Washington, and especially high-level
participation in Austrian events, can have significant
returns. As Austria takes over the EU presidency in January,
our opportunities for this kind of positive reinforcement
will increase. We should use them.
Brown