LIBYANS PLEASED WITH SAUDI DECISION

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000209


COMMERCE FOR DAVID ROTH, USTR FOR DOUG BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LY SA
SUBJECT: LIBYANS PLEASED WITH SAUDI DECISION

REF: RIYADH 5509

CLASSIFIED BY: GREGORY L. BERRY, CHIEF OF MISSION, U.S. LIAISON
OFFICE TRIPOLI, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) August 10 COM spoke at some length with Ambassador to
the UK Mohammad al-Zway and his colleagues about the Saudi
decision to pardon and expel three Libyans accused of an
assassination plot again then-Crown Prince Abdullah (reftel).
Zway had just returned from Sirte; he flew there August 8 to
talk with Qadhafi immediately after learning of the Saudi
decision. At our urging and that of the British, the Libyans'
official reaction on August 9 had been restrained (they refused
official comment to the press, though someone on background
pointed out that a pardon implied a conviction, which had not
taken place -- probably on balance the best we could hope for).



2. (C) In the August 10 meeting, which included External
Security Organizations Chief Musa Kusa, Internal Security
Organizations Chief Abdullah Sanussi, MFA America's Director
Ibrahim Dridi and Qadhafi's personal interpreter Fuad Zlitni,
Zway described the Saudi announcment as a positve and good step.
Giving a uniquely Libyan spin to the statement, Zway said that
it was positive news, even though there had never been a real
problem between the two countries; "at most it was a personal
misunderstanding." According to Zway, the personal matter only
escalated because the Saudis withdrew their Ambassador from
Tripoli. In the Libyan version of events, they did not respond
to this petty action, and didn't withdraw their Ambassador from
Riyadh until they were forced to do so under Saudi pressure.


3. (C) "Qadhafi never supported the Libyan opposition," said
Zway. He believed that the Saudis have now acknowleged that
truth and responded appropriately to the Libyan overtures, so
that the situation will now move forward. Referring to U.S.
requests for guarantees, Zway said that the Libyans are the ones
who were justified in asking for guarantees. From the Libyan
point of view, the Saudis are a wealthier nation with more
resources at their disposal, and therefore the Saudis are
obliged to take the initiative in improving relations from now
on. Zway pointed out that in his analysis, the Saudi
opposition is self-generated as a result of Wahabi fanaticism.
Since Libya stands firmly against Wahabi extremism, it can't
align with the Saudis. He also said that the Libyan opposition
derives from radical Islam, implying that the Saudis were to
blame for inciting trouble in Libya. Zway asked for the U.S.
to intervene with the Saudis and ask them to rein in the
Islamists and cut out "the root of terrorism."


4. (S/NF) Abdullah Sanussi urged that we specify a timeline
for moving foward now that "the Saudi issue is out of the way"
(in his view). He also took the opportunity to point out that
the U.S. is the party responsible for the pause in progress in
the bilateral relationship, since Musa Kusa is waiting for a
coordinated list of intelligence questions from the Washington
interagency community. (In passing, he suggested that any
meeting with A/S Welch take place in Tripoli rather than Europe,
since that, "would allow for higher-level participation.")


5. (C) Musa Kusa expressed appreciation for the efforts of the
U.S. and UK, but emphasized that Libya had put forth the most
effort in making the Saudi decision possible and deserved
recognition for its initiative. He highlighted the three day
mourning period and telegram of condolences as "extraordinary"
steps (see para. 8 for text of condolences). Kusa repeated
again that Libya had never had a problem with the Saudis -- any
misunderstandings were created when the Saudis withdrew their
Ambassador from Tripoli. Looking forward, Kusa warned that the
Saudis must pay close attention to their relations with Libyans
abroad at the risk of creating new difficulties that, "would
involve more than three or four countries."


6. (C) All of the Libyans emphasized that, "the file should be
closed forever; we anticipate a new chapter." In answer to
this repeated point, COM agreed that the Saudi announcement
should make it easier for us to find appropriate language for
the assurances that the U.S. will need from Libya. That should
be a topic for discussion in preparation for the next meeting
between the Libyans and A/S Welch. Zway closed the meeting by
reiterating Libya's common interest in working with the U.S. on
counter terrorism efforts, saying, "we are working toward a
common goal."


7. (C) COMMENT: Qadhafi's condolence message on the death of
King Fahd and his dispatch of his son Saif al-Islam to represent
Libya at the funeral were clearly intended as positive gestures.
It is interesting, however, that the Libyan press has said
nothing about Saif's role. There is a limit to how conciliatory
Qadhafi is prepared to appear.


8. (U) NOTE. After King Fahd's death, the secretaries of the
General People's Committee declared a three day mourning period
and Qadhafi issued the following condolence message:

To the family of the late Fahd Bin-Abd-al-Aziz,

We have learned with great sadness of the death of our brother
King Fahd, and we would like to extend our sincere condolences
and our sympathy to your fraternal family. We also pray God to
forgive him and receive him with His abundant mercy. To God we
belong and to Him we return.

Your brother Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.


NNNN