Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TOKYO1415
2005-03-10 08:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR HILL DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA WITH CHIEF

Tags:  PGOV PREL KN KS JA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001415 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: END OF U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
TAGS: PGOV PREL KN KS JA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HILL DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA WITH CHIEF
CABINET SECRETARY HOSODA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael W. Michalak. Reasons 1.4 (b/d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001415

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: END OF U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
TAGS: PGOV PREL KN KS JA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HILL DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA WITH CHIEF
CABINET SECRETARY HOSODA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael W. Michalak. Reasons 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) Summary. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki
Hosoda opened a breakfast meeting with U.S. Ambassador to
South Korea and U.S. Representative to the Six-Party Talks
(6PT) Christopher Hill on March 10, 2005, by thanking him for
his efforts on the North Korea issue. Hosoda raised the
Takeshima/Dokdo Island dispute between South Korea and Japan
and asked the Ambassador to convince the South Koreans to
calm their emotions. Returning to North Korea, Hosoda
stressed the need to convince Pyongyang that we will never
allow it to develop into a nuclear power and that the
possibility exists of total destruction without any
compensation. He offered his assessment that North Korea
would be willing to allow inspections and dismantlement of
its plutonium program, in return for compensation, but that
it is trying to prevent interference in its uranium
development. Consequently, it is reluctant to return to the
6PT. In response to a question about Japan's probable
reaction to another DPRK missile test, Hosoda predicted that
the Japanese public would become even more anti-North Korean.
Already, the abduction issue has the public clamoring for
economic sanctions. Hosoda said the GOJ knows the United
States thinks sanctions are ineffective without international
cooperation but the GOJ believes the Japanese situation is
different. Ambassador Hill noted North Korea's engagement in
illegal activities and suggested that we further look into
this issue. Ambassador Hill concluded the meeting by
reiterating his hope that a solution to the beef issue could
be found soon. End Summary.


2. (C) During a breakfast meeting with Ambassador to South
Korea and U.S. Representative to the Six-Party Talks
Christopher Hill on March 10, 2005, Japanese Chief Cabinet
Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda thanked the Ambassador for his

SIPDIS
efforts on the North Korea issue and observed that the
President and Prime Minister Koizumi had discussed the
problem in a phone call the previous evening. Ambassador
Hill said he is cooperating well with DG Kenichiro Sasae, his

Japanese counterpart, but noted that they are negotiating
with an "empty (DPRK) chair." He added that we are also
working well with the South Koreans who have deep emotions
invested in the process.

Relations with South Korea
--------------


3. (C) Hosoda raised the Takeshima/Dokdo Island dispute
between South Korea and Japan. Takeshima is located in
Shimane prefecture-Hosoda's home district-and has been
registered as a Japanese territory for over 100 years, he
stated. Immediately after World War II, South Korean
President Rhee declared the island as part of South Korea
and, since then, it has been a source of conflict. Takeshima
has been treated as a "blank territory"--one that neither
side discusses--even during fishery negotiations and there
had been a tacit understanding that neither side should make
an issue of the island. However, following Japanese
Ambassador to South Korea Takano's statement in late February
that Takeshima is "historically and legally Japan's
territory," the South Koreans have become more emotional.
Hosoda asked whether the Ambassador could convince the South
Koreans to calm their emotions. Ambassador Hill responded
that he has publicly and privately urged the South Koreans to
work out such issues calmly.


4. (C) In contrast, cultural exchanges between South Korea
and Japan have been very successful, Hosoda observed. Kabuki
performances in South Korea have been well-attended and South
Korean actors are very popular in Japan. Ambassador Hill
agreed, saying that Japanese music is very popular in Seoul
and that he does not observe in Korea the kind of disturbing
nationalism that has emerged among some younger Chinese.
Hosoda likened President Roh to the popular "Winter Sonata"
star Bae Yong Joon and jokingly asked whether the South
Korean public preferred weak, "soft touch" men. Ambassador
Hill replied that Roh sometimes unintentionally makes news in
his speeches, but that he has three years left in his term
and Japan and the United States would have to find a way to
work with him.

North Korea and the Six-Party Talks
-------------- ---


5. (C) The other countries in the Six-Party Talks (6PT) do
not support the North's nuclear development, Hosoda stated
and expressed hope for that the talks would restart soon.
Ambassador Hill shared his opinion that China may be ready to
put more pressure on Pyongyang because it knows its prestige
is being tested. Ambiguity can sometimes solve diplomatic
problems, but, Ambassador Hill emphasized, the issue of
nuclear weapons progress demands crystal clear results.
Hosoda believed that, after watching China, India and
Pakistan develop nuclear weapons, North Korea mistakenly
assumed that it, too, could test a weapon and eventually be
accepted as a de facto nuclear power. It is important,
Hosoda stressed, to convince North Korea that we will never
allow it to develop into a nuclear power and that the
possibility exists of total destruction without any
compensation. Ambassador Hill said, unfortunately, North
Korea regards every gesture as a sign of weakness.


6. (C) Japanese political parties and the public are finally
starting to understand why the United States invaded Iraq,
Hosoda observed. With the North Korean nuclear threat
looming, the "wind is changing in Japan," and many are
starting to call for economic sanctions. In October 2004,
Hosoda mentioned that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons
and was immediately criticized by the then-Democratic Party
of Japan (DPJ) Shadow Defense Minister. Since the North's
announcement, however, the DPJ does not know what to say or
do, and does not know what kind of policy to pursue.


7. (C) Hosoda offered his analysis that in contrast to the
past, when bombers carried atomic weapons, today nuclear
weapons must be mounted on missiles. North Korea needs to
further develop its missile technology and also requires more
time to perfect its plutonium-based weapons. Hosoda assessed
that North Korea would be willing to allow inspections and
dismantlement of its plutonium program, in return for
compensation. Regarding uranium development, however, North
Korea appears to be in an "intermediary stage." The North
does not want any interference in its uranium development
program and, consequently, is reluctant to return to the 6PT.
Ambassador Hill said that in any settlement, North Korea
would need to account for its equipment and show us what they
have been doing with it. He asked what the Japanese reaction
would be to another missile test.


8. (C) The Japanese government, Hosoda recalled, took less
than one month to decide to launch intelligence satellites
following the 1998 Taepodong launch. He predicted that the
Japanese public would become even more anti-North Korea if it
were to test another missile. Already, the abduction issue
has the Japanese public clamoring for economic sanctions.
Prime Minister Koizumi remains cautious and would like to
continue negotiations, but frustration is growing among the
public and a missile test would add fuel to the fire. Hosoda
said the GOJ knows the United States thinks sanctions are
ineffective without international cooperation but the GOJ
believes the Japanese situation is different. There are many
North Koreans living in Japan who are making a lot of money
and sending it back to the DPRK. These people feel that they
protect their relatives in North Korea when they send money,
and if Japan decides to apply sanctions and cut off this
flow, it could do a lot of damage domestically.
Consequently, the GOJ is taking a cautious approach, not
because it thinks sanctions would be ineffective, but
precisely because it thinks they would be effective.
Ambassador Hill observed that North Korea is engaged in many
illegal activities and we need to develop further information
on these activities to get them to stop.


9. (C) Turning to U.S.-Japan relations, the Ambassador
remarked that while the President and Koizumi had had a good
telephone discussion the previous evening, the Ambassador
wanted to reiterate his hope that a solution to the beef
issue could be found soon. He emphasized that there are many
important issues that require U.S. and Japanese cooperation,
and stressed that we cannot let an issue like beef stand in
the way. Hosoda thanked Ambassador Hill for his time and
said he thought their relationship was off to a good start.
He noted that South Korea, too, does not currently import
beef from the United States and urged the Ambassador to
convince South Korea to restart imports, as well. The
Ambassador assured him he was doing so.


10. (SBU) Ambassador Hill has cleared this cable.
MICHALAK