U.S.-JAPAN INFORMAL POLICY PLANNING BILATERAL:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001351

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STATE FOR EAP/J AND IO A/S HOLMES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2030
TAGS: PREL JA UNSC
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN INFORMAL POLICY PLANNING BILATERAL:
PART II EVENING SESSION, MARCH 2, 2005

REF: TOKYO 001349

Classified By: POLMIN David B. Shear. Reasons:1.4(b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Nishida and
Foreign Policy Bureau Deputy Director General Tsuruoka made
an impassioned case for Japanese permanent UNSC membership
during a March 2 dinner with visiting S/P Director Krasner.
They outlined Japan's strategy as hinging on a three-stage
UNGA process in which members would first be asked to vote
for or against increasing UNSC membership by "up to" nine
members. The UNGA would vote on individual countries for up
to six permanent seats, then vote on an amendment to the
charter. They explained that this would minimize opposition
to expanding the council and maximize Japan's chances of
being elected to a new permanent seat despite UNGA opposition
to other possible candidates since they believed Japan to be
the only country likely to garner the requisite two-thirds in
a sequential vote on individual aspirants. Tsuruoka said
that this strategy was based on the assumption that the U.S.
is not interested in Security Council expansion despite its
frequent expressions of support for Japan and that Japan thus
will have to generate its own momentum for change. They
urged U.S. support for this strategy and pledged that the GOJ
would keep us informed of progress. End Summary.

Why Japan Wants a Permanent UNSC Seat
--------------


2. (C) Nishida claimed that obtaining a permanent Japanese
UNSC seat is Prime Minister Koizumi's highest priority. The
Japanese people want to be recognized as a fully fledged
great power, he added, calling UN reform an historic task.
He said that the post-war world has passed, the UN structure
is outdated, and the global community needs a UN that can
effectively address current realities, not those of 1945.
Japan faces three big unresolved issues, Nishida continued:
its quest for a permanent UNSC seat; the Northern
Territories; and normalization with of relations with North
Korea. The Japanese people have experienced a dramatic
economic and social restructuring, and they want to be
recognized by the United States and the international
community. No future Japanese prime minister can avoid
supporting the UN reform issue, Nishida averred, adding that
the Prime Minister had made a strong pitch on this issue to
outgoing Ambassador Baker during a farewell dinner. Indeed,
Nishida added, popular sentiment w
as that Japan had supported the United States for fifty years
and yet the U.S. was now failing to stand up for Japan in its
efforts in the UNSC.

The GOJ Strategy
--------------


3. (C) Nishida volunteered that the GOJ was pursuing a
three-stage process in the General Assembly through which the
GOJ would first table a resolution proposing a "framework"
for a UNSC with up to nine new seats, six of which would be
for new permanent members without veto power. He hoped the
GOJ could table the resolution during May/June. The GOJ had
discussed this within the G-4 and believed it could secure
their support, according to Nishida. The proposal for up to
six permanent members rather than four would be based on the
assumption that African states would be included. He went on
to explain that the GOJ then hoped to table a second
resolution calling for separate, secret ballots on individual
aspirants to the new seats. This could be done by the end of
this year, he thought. Nishida was confident that Japan
could get the two-thirds majority necessary to join the
council as a permanent member but was doubtful that the other
possible candidates could secure enough votes. Nishida and
Tsuruoka said that the GOJ's goal in this process is to

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establish a credible Japanese candidacy. There would then be
a third vote on a proposal to amend the charter. They
indicated that the first stage is designed to secure G-4 and
others' support for a subsequent vote on individual members.
The second stage is designed to maximize support for Japan
and winnow out possible members other than Japan, thus
minimizing the size of the new council. A single vote on a
new set of members would fail, Tsuruoka argued, because
countries would vote against the entire group based on
hostility to one of its members.


4. (C) S/P Director Krasner was skeptical that other G-4
members would support Japan's proposal for separate votes on
new members as it seemed to rely on the assumption that other
G-4 members had an imperfect knowledge of their chances of
election. They would only agree to discrete votes in the
second phase if they thought themselves likely to be elected.
Nishida responded that there was no real public support for
the UNSC effort among the Indian people; New Delhi is not
strongly interested in UNSC reform, and the GOI was happy
with the GOJ approach. Likewise for Germany, Nishida said.
Schroeder had only decided to pursue UNSC reform to bolster
his popularity, but support among the German public was weak,
and this would work in Japan's favor, Nishida argued.
According to Tsuruoka, the two-stage resolution is the least
divisive way of achieving UNSC expansion that secures Japan a
seat. S/P Director Krasner wondered why the the GOJ thought
the U.S. should support an initial resolution calling for a
UNSC expansion of up to nine new seats. He suggested it was
unrealistic to expect that the U.S. could support such a
resolution not knowing the outcome of the individual votes on
new members because it might put the U.S. in the awkward
position of having to veto a proposed charter amendment.
Nishida replied that if the U.S. wants the resolution to
propose five new members and not nine, the GOJ could be
flexible. Tsuruoka interjected that the GOJ cannot guarantee
that the end result will be that only Japan is elected.
Japan wants to establish a basis for a legitimate candidacy,
he repeated; after that, how we eliminate other candidates is
a matter for some real diplomacy, but if the United States
requires absolute assurance of the outcome it will kill the
entire process.

Where the U.S. Comes In
--------------


5. (C) Nishida framed the issue of U.S. support as a test
of loyalty to an ally. He said that the Japanese public
knows that the UK and others are inviting China to observe
the G-8. China is a member of the UNSC and the public may
sense that the United States wants to preserve a council
membership that excludes Japan and retains China. The GOJ is
not guided by a small set of interests in this effort,
Tsuruoka explained, and believes UN reform will serve the

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world community. "The U.S. can't continue to live in a dream
world in which it thinks it can do everything by itself," he
remarked. Tsuruoka added that the GOJ knows what's going on
among those countries that want reform and will keep the
United States informed, cautioning that if Washington takes a
wrong step "it could kill everything with consequences for
public opinion of the U.S. in Japan and, thus, for the
alliance, including Japanese support for activities like
overseas deployment of the SDF."


6. (C) Tsuruoka continued that the GOJ assumes that the
United States does not want UN Security Council reform but
will provide more than just moral support for a Japanese
candidacy when the circumstances are right. He recalled that
several years ago the GOJ launched an attempt to gain a UNSC
seat by trying to convince the United States of the need for
UN reform and relying on the U.S. to take it from there.
Then UN Ambassadors Albright and Pickering were reluctant to
consider the possibility of increasing the UNSC even by one
member. They nevertheless ended up supporting Japan publicly
while urging the GOJ to devise a strategy to achieve
agreement on an overall reform of the council. This was the
wrong approach, Tsuruoka concluded: the U.S. has no interest
in expanding the Security Council because having to visit
even one more capital on a campaign for UNSC votes is
unbearable to the U.S. Now, Tsuruoka explained, Japan was
going ahead on its own, and when it's clear to the U.S. that
it needs to be eng
aged, Washington will come around. He continued that the GOJ
needs to do two things: a) create momentum toward reform
within the UNGA, and b) demonstrate to the international
community that reform is a benefit.


7. (C) When asked what the consequences of failure might be
for the U.S.-Japan relationship, Tsuruoka replied that
resentment is possible, but the GOJ has been telling the
Japanese public that the U.S. supports Japanese UNSC
membership. If the U.S. and Japan coordinate on this effort,
we can say that we've done our best, even if the resolutions
fail, and it will not be due to a U.S. failure but to the
vagaries of the multilateral world. But, this would depend
on a U.S. decision to become engaged on Japan's behalf.



8. (SBU) Participants

U.S.:
--------------

S/P Director Stephen Krasner
S/P Member Evan Feigenbaum
A/DCM James Zumwalt
POLMIN David Shear

Japan:
--------------

DVFM Tsuneo Nishida
DDG Koji Tsuruoka


9. (U) S/P Krasner cleared this message.
MICHALAK