Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05THEHAGUE74
2005-01-13 15:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/CUBA/EU: EU LIKELY TO CHANGE POLICY

Tags:  PREL PHUM NL CU EUN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000074 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM NL CU EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/CUBA/EU: EU LIKELY TO CHANGE POLICY
HOPING TO FORCE CUBA'S HAND

REF: A. THE HAGUE 48


B. STATE 4900

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000074

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM NL CU EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/CUBA/EU: EU LIKELY TO CHANGE POLICY
HOPING TO FORCE CUBA'S HAND

REF: A. THE HAGUE 48


B. STATE 4900

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) Following up reftels demarche, Poloff met January 13
with Jan Jap Groenemeyer (MFA, Cuba Desk),who confirmed the
January 31 GAERC would likely approve relaxing the EU's June
2003 measures to encourage more positive movement from the
Cubans; the EU Presidency is drafting "conclusions" for that
meeting now. Noting the Cubans are "stubborn and proud," he
was surprised they had already "defrozen" relations with the
all EU missions in Havana despite the fact that the June 2003
measures were still technically in place. Spain continued to
lead on the issue; impetus for a change in EU policy had come
from the GOS, which wanted to reverse the Aznar June 2003
measures and in doing so had attracted adherents to the
argument that the current EU strategy was not working, he
said. (They have not attracted the USG, Poloff countered.)
For the time being, consensus remains an important EU goal
vis-a-vis Cuba. Groenemeyer added that when the EU changes
the policy as expected, we should look for high level visits
to Havana, at the Commissioner/Minister/Director General
level, at which time the EU would raise human rights concerns
in detail. The first test for a new EU position related to
national days would be the March 25 commemoration of Greek
national day.


2. (C) Groenemeyer expected that the GAERC would call on
the Cuban government to release the rest of the 75 jailed
dissidents. "The Cubans know they have to do something," he
said. From experience, however, he expected them to respond
with half-measures, releasing some but not all, thereby
presenting the EU with a dilemma when they revisit the
situation in June. At that time, he could anticipate that
harder line EU members (like the Dutch) would want to say "I
told you so" and demand a return to a tougher EU stance. One
such response, Groenemeyer revealed, could be the publishing
of an EU "black list" of Cuban officials prohibited from
traveling to the EU, an idea he said the Dutch presented
earlier this year but that had been set aside as "before its
time."


3. (C) The dissidents should anticipate "greater access to
the EU" out of the a revised EU policy. Havana based Heads
of Mission (HOMs),chaired by the Dutch representing the EU
Presidency, would meet soon to devise strategies for
deepening dialogue, Groenemeyer said. When pressed for
reaction to the USG's ref B points, he would not comment
specifically on all of them but promised to fax them directly
to the Dutch rep in Havana for placement on the agenda of
discussions there. He thought it unlikely, however, that the
EU would agree to invite USINT reps to the monthly meetings
of the EU's human rights working group in Havana. It could
give the Cubans an excuse to continue arguing that "the EU is
just in the pocket of the USG." Poloff disagreed, saying
that appearances of a common USG/EU stance against Castro
could have obvious benefits. Groenemeyer suggested that a
"good cop" EU twinned with a "bad cop" USG might be more
effective.


4. (C) Turning to broader issies, Groenemeyer said the EU
continued to look beyond immediate sanctions. He observed
that the stricter USG controls (e.g., limits on remittances)
seemed to be having a negative impact on the Cuban economy
but not on Castro, "who does not give a damn about Cuba, sits
in his palace, and dreams about trips to North Korea." With
this in mind, the EU has in addition to the "June measures"
its Common Position on Cuba, and Groenemeyer hoped the USG
would keep the two EU tracks separate. The June measures were
short term, a reaction to a GOC outrage designed to show
support for the dissidents. Longer term, the "Common Policy"
aims to lay the groundwork for an eventual peaceful
transition post-Castro and strives to improve the economic
well-being of Cubans now. The EU will review its Common
Policy, also in June but separately from the review of the
short term measures. EU HOM's in Havana will report on the
conditions in the country, and these reports will form the
basis for the EU's review of the Common Policy, he said.
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