YOUR MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER BOT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000451

SIPDIS

TO THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SOBEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2025
TAGS: PREL NL EUN NATO
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER BOT

REF: 04 THE HAGUE 3350

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL FOR REASONS 1
.4 (B) and (D)

Madam Secretary:


1. (C) Foreign Minister Bot requested this meeting to discuss
a wide range of U.S.-EU issues prior to the President's visit
to Europe, which he is prepared to help ensure is a success.
Although a longtime former Dutch PermRep to the EU with a
pro-European reputation, Bot demonstrated his support for
strong transatlantic links throughout the Dutch presidency.
On several key issues -- e.g., Iraq, Ukraine, China and
Turkey -- Bot leveraged his understanding of European
politics and institutions to advance a solidly transatlantic
agenda. His candid assessments of internal European
decision-making at critical moments also proved invaluable.
Bot very much wants to remain a player, and is seeking to
stake out a clear role for the Dutch (and for himself) in the
post-Presidency environment. Although we and Bot could not
secure a further extension of Dutch troops in AlMuthanna
province in Iraq, he is committed to supporting the
stabilization and reconstruction effort. This meeting
provides an excellent opportunity to take advantage of Bot's
credibility and experience to refine our message to Europe,
while encouraging Bot to assume a more active leadership role
in key areas. I believe Bot would welcome such a challenge.

IRAQ
--------------


2. (C) Bot personally made Iraq a high priority during the
Dutch EU Presidency. He should continue to press the EU from
within to assume greater responsibilities in Iraq, and to
move quickly to establish a physical presence on the ground
in particular. The decision -- which Bot fought vigorously
in cabinet -- to withdraw the Dutch bilateral military
presence from AlMuthanna next month is unfortunately
irreversible. This decision was largely a function of
domestic politics as opposed to ideological disagreement with
the Iraq engagement. Despite the pending withdrawal, the
Dutch were among the first to commit personnel (25) to the
first phase of the NATO Training Mission and have indicated a
willingness to provide up to 100 in later phases -- but want
to use this as leverage to get other allies to contribute.
It would be useful to remind Bot that while we appreciate
Dutch efforts to press allies to be more forthcoming, basing
Dutch contributions on strict definitions of
"proportionality" would be counterproductive.


3. (C) The Dutch have never ruled out additional missions in
Iraq, and Bot in particular may be receptive to ideas for how
the Dutch could fill important "niches." For example, the
Dutch could be asked to consider expanding bilateral support
to Iraqi institutions such as the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs (the Dutch are currently training one class of junior
Iraqi diplomats in The Hague) and Justice (the Dutch last
year hosted a successful conference of Iraqi jurists in The
Hague) or to sponsor specific reconstruction and development
projects in the AlMuthanna area to take advantage of existing
links to the local community.

COUNTER-TERRORISM
--------------


4. (C) In a recent meeting with former New Jersey governor
and 9/11 panel co-chair Tom Kean, Bot emphasized his interest
on improving transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation.
Bot considers this a key element of the Dutch EU presidency
in which they pushed hard for EU terrorist financing reforms
and greater information and intelligence exchanges between
the EU and the U.S. He may wish to raise this subject with
you. We also understand that PM Balkenende may want to
discuss counter-terrorism during the President's upcoming
meeting with EU leaders in Brussels. If he does, he will
likely draw attention to such U.S.-Dutch programs as the
Container Security Initiative (CSI),DOE's Megaport
Initiative (the first installation of radiological detection
gates in Europe at Rotterdam),the Immigration Advisory
Program (IAP) at Schiphol Airport and development of an
International Registered Travelers (IRT) pilot program
between Schiphol and JFK Airports.


EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO
--------------


5. (C) Bot started the Dutch presidency resigned to lifting
the EU China Arms Embargo, but ended it determined to prevent
a lift "on his watch." He can continue to provide useful
insights into how the issue is being handled within EU
circles, and should be pushed to keep the EU focused on its
commitment -- which the Dutch insisted on inserting into the
December 17 Council declaration -- not to increase sales to
China "in quantity or quality." The Dutch have made clear
that they will take their lead on this issue from the
British, and that they will not stand alone to prevent a
lift, but they may be able to help us find and exploit
potential cracks in the EU's consensus. Bot should also be
left with no illusions about the likely consequences of a
lift, including potential complications in U.S.-European
defense trade.

CUBA
--------------


6. (C) The Dutch continue to represent the EU Presidency in
Havana (since Luxembourg has no mission there) and have deep
concerns about the human rights situation there. The Dutch
have so far not been as active as the Czechs or Poles in
pressing the EU to maintain contacts with dissidents as it
improves relations with Havana; Bot could and should do more
in this area. For example, he could instruct the Dutch
Embassy in Havana to respond positively to our request that
U.S. representatives be invited to the monthly coordination
meetings on human rights held by EU missions in Havana.

TURKEY/CYPRUS
--------------


7. (C) As a former Ambassador to Turkey, and the man under
whose watch the Turks finally got a date to begin accession
talks, Bot has a personal interest in facilitating Turkey's
bid to accede to the EU. The Dutch MFA plans to establish a
regular bilateral forum for discussing EU accession issues
with Turkey along the lines of their previous successful
"coaching" relationship with Poland; this relationship may
prove useful in identifying and resolving problems as October
3 approaches. The Dutch can also provide useful insights
into EU thinking regarding Cyprus, and are keenly aware that
a failure to resolve the current impasse over Berlin-plus has
serious implications for NATO.

ICC/SUDAN
--------------


8. (C) Bot has said that there is a firm EU consensus in
support of referring war crimes in Sudan to the ICC. As the
host of the ICC, the Dutch are uniquely committed to seeing
it succeed. (While the Dutch were willing to look seriously
at options for an Article 98 Agreement during their
presidency, in the end they judged it would not fly within
the EU.) Nevertheless, Bot believes we should quietly
explore ways to lower the temperature on the ICC and may be
open to brainstorming on how the Darfur case might help lead
to a compromise. At a minimum, we can ask Bot to be helpful
and tone down the rhetoric and activities of Dutch
representatives in New York, Brussels, and elsewhere opposing
alternatives to the ICC. As a pragmatist, Bot understands
that a public spat over this issue does nothing either to
promote the transatlantic agenda or to bring the perpetrators
to justice. The Dutch, and Bot personally, have been heavily
involved in Darfur (the Dutch, for example, paid over half of
the EU's contribution to the AU mission) and do not want to
jeopardize a potential resolution over technicalities.

AFGHANISTAN
--------------


9. (S) In the debate over the AlMuthanna withdrawal, the
Dutch government cited commitments in Afghanistan --
including a possible deployment of special forces to OEF and
heading up a new PRT in ISAF's Phase III -- as one reason for
leaving Iraq. These commitments are useful and appropriate,
but you may want to set down a marker that they should not be
seen as substitutes for contributions in Iraq -- both are
high priorities. The Dutch have made available a marine
battalion for SACEUR's SRF and have publicly indicated it may
be deployed to Afghanistan to support upcoming elections.
They have privately balked however, at the prospects of
deploying the more substantial current Dutch NRF contribution
(approximately 4,000 troops) in support of the elections,
arguing that the NRF is not intended for such a mission.
While NATO has not yet determined which force, if either,
should be deployed for this mission, Dutch efforts to
predetermine the outcome are not helpful.

MIDDLE EAST
--------------


10. (C) Last November, Bot was eager to transform his
successful hosting of the EUROMED conference in The Hague
into a prominent role in the Middle East Peace Process. So
far, however, he has been unable to carve out an appropriate
role for himself or the Netherlands either within the EU or
bilaterally. Bot correctly judges that there is broad public
support (including from the main opposition parties in
parliament) for increased engagement in the Middle East, but
he will not insert himself into the process without being
asked but plans to meet in Washington with NSC Senior
Director Abrams to explore whether he can be helpful at some
future point. He has expressed support for a possible NATO
peacekeeping role in the region, if it comes to that.

AFRICA
--------------


11. (C) Already heavily involved in Africa -- the Dutch are
the fourth largest donor of aid to the continent -- Bot is
under constant pressure from the Dutch parliament (and Dutch
Development Minister Agnes van Ardenne) to "do more." The
Dutch uniquely include a major focus on peace and security in
their African development policy, and have expressed interest
in greater coordination with the U.S., especially in the Horn
and Great Lakes Regions. In fleshing out possible areas of
increased cooperation in Africa, we should remain cognizant
of the fact that in the Netherlands, African initiatives have
sometimes been portrayed as alternatives to missions in Iraq
or Afghanistan; we will need to make clear in any discussion
where our top priorities lie.

BOTTOM LINE
--------------


12. (C) Bot's experience and credibility make him a useful
European interlocutor and an effective advocate for the
transatlantic agenda. During the Dutch presidency, he
repeatedly demonstrated a talent for translating
transatlantic objectives into the language of Europeanism,
and for discreetly managing difficult issues (such as Turkey
or China) to successful conclusions. It would be in our
interest to find creative ways to harness his skills as a
coalition builder and his newly-deepened transatlantic
orientation in the post-presidency environment as well.



13. (C) One final point you may want to stress in your
discussion is that the concept of "proportionality" creeping
into many Dutch debates (on Iraq and Afghanistan, for
example) is misguided. The value we place on our partnership
is not based on whether or not the Dutch contribute their
"fair share" to any given operation, but rather reflects the
trust developed over a long history in which each side
demonstrated its willingness to do whatever was needed to
achieve shared objectives.
SOBEL