NETHERLANDS/HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: DUTCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000448

SIPDIS

IO FOR SWIGERT, LAGON; IO/SHA FOR LUCAS; DRL FOR SICADE,
MEHRA, MCKEE; USUN FOR ZACK; GENEVA FOR DANIES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2014
TAGS: PHUM PREL NL AORC EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: DUTCH
THOUGHTS ON COUNTRY RESOLUTIONS AND REFORM

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Nathaniel Dean for reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: At the upcoming Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) in Geneva, the Dutch want a resolution on Sudan
regardless of the status of UNSC action. They expect no AU
action on the DRC, which means the EU will likely have to
sponsor a resolution. They think an EU resolution on
Zimbabwe is unlikely. On Cuba, the Dutch expect the EU to
support a USG-tabled resolution, while anticipating a hard --
and perhaps successful -- challenge from Cuba. The Dutch do
not foresee Canada tabling a resolution on Iran. On
Uzbekistan, the Dutch expect the EU to support an Item 19
approach. On Belarus, the Dutch think the USG should lead.
The EU will discuss Chechnya with Russia at an upcoming
Ministerial, then decide how to proceed at Geneva. The Dutch
report that Portugal seems to favor having an East Timor
resolution. The Dutch remain undecided how to approach the
effort to scale back the numerous, bad Israel resolutions.
On CHR reform, the Dutch favor universal membership, prefer
keeping the UN Third Committee, and remain skeptical about
using a Democracy Caucus at the CHR. The Dutch hope to work
closely with USG counterparts this year and to avoid the
problems the USG had with the EU negotiations last year. End
Summary.


2. (C) Anneke Adema (MFA, Director of the Human Rights
office) and Guillaume Teerling of her office met Poloff
February 14 for a wide-ranging discussion of current Dutch
thinking regarding country resolutions at the upcoming UN
Commission on Human Rights. She reacted to USG proposals for
CHR reform now circulating.

SUDAN


3. (C) The Dutch feel strongly about taking action on Sudan
in Geneva regardless of the status of UNSC action. Adema
emphasized "the situation deserves attention and merits a
country resolution." Recalling the debacle at the end of
last year's CHR on the Sudan resolution, Adema revealed she
had been embarrassed by how the EU concluded the negotiations
and all but promised that she would do her best, within EU
councils, to ensure that the USG and EU stayed in sync this
year. "That was Spring last year," she said, referring to
the atmosphere in Geneva that produced the unwelcome result,
"and since then we've had the Summer and Fall," she added,
referring to the deterioration in the situation on the
ground. (Note: The MFA will augment their Mission during the
CHR by sending Sonja van der Meer for weeks one to three and
Guillaume Teerling for weeks four to six; both Adema
promised that both Teerling and van der Meer are prepared to
work closely with USG counterparts to help avoid last minute
problems in negotiations. End note.)


4. (C) Adema said the Dutch prefer that the AU "takes its
responsibility for Sudan, as well as for the DRC and
Zimbabwe" and, in this regard, she reported the EU is
demarching in Africa on all three cases for the AU to act.

DRC AND ZIMBABWE


5. (C) In addition to Sudan, the EU hopes African States
will take more responsibility for the human rights situation
in the DRC and Zimbabwe. However, the EU remains realistic,
Adema indicated, saying that the EU might sponsor a
resolution on the DRC should the AU not.


6. (C) Zimbabwe presents a complex situation for the EU;
the UK and Dutch are wary after recent setbacks, Adema said.
The fact that Zimbabwe has elections scheduled for the end of
March could support those in the EU who question the
propriety of criticizing them before they have taken place,
Adema noted. The EU thinking seems to be that tabling a
Zimbabwe resolution too soon could antagonize the AU and
negatively affect EU efforts on Sudan or DRC. Adema said one
strategy option under discussion would be to tell the AU that
they would forego a Zimbabwe resolution in exchange for the
AU's agreement to work with the EU on the DRC and Sudan.

CUBA


7. (C) Adema said that Cuba viewed its narrow defeat last
year, when the Cuba resolution passed by only three votes, as
an improved result from prior years and that Cuba would try
to build on a momentum they see going in their favor.
Recalling the no action motions that proliferated in the
recent UN Third Committee, she predicted they would become
more prominent in Geneva this year. Notwithstanding resent
EU changes to its Cuba policy, she said she expected the EU
to support a USG-sponsored Cuba resolution.
IRAN


8. (C) Adema expected no new Canadian action on Iran. She
said Canada seemed pleased with the outcome of the Iran
resolution in the Third Committee and was hesitant about
proceeding in Geneva. She was not sure if the EU could be
convinced to push that hard on a resolution should Canada
table one and it would be up to Luxembourg to organize
support. As an aside, Adema indicated she put little faith
in Luxembourg's ability to organize such an effort.

UZBEKISTAN


9. (C) Adema said the EU is still discussing what approach
to take on Uzbekistan. She anticipated the EU would support
an Item 19 approach, which she said "should of course be
contingent on a positive Uzbeki attitude, which she
personally doubted." Nevertheless, she expected the EU
consensus to form around the Item 19 option.

BELARUS


10. (C) Adema firmly suggested the USG should table a
Belarus resolution that the EU would then support. She
rebuffed Poloff's suggestion that the EU should show the flag
on an issue relating to its near neighbor. She noted the EU
team in Geneva would have enough to do with the resolutions
it plans to table and that it was her opinion that it would
be better for "others" (the USG) to lead on Belarus.

CHECHNYA/RUSSIA


11. (C) The EU has a "general dialogue" scheduled with
Russia soon, where Chechnya is on the agenda, Adema noted.
Thereafter, depending on the results, the EU will consider
whether they would support CHR action.

EAST TIMOR


12. (C) The Portuguese are handling East Timor for the EU
and they seem to want to have a resolution, Adema said. The
EU will not do anything more generally on Indonesia this
year, she added.

ISRAEL


13. (C) When urged by Poloff to support a reduction in
repetitive, one-sided resolutions against Israel, Adema said
the MFA's Director General was at this time considering how
the Dutch would address the question and she refused to be
drawn on specifics.

CHR REFORM


14. (C) Finally, Adema offered some thoughts on CHR reform.


a) Universal Membership: The Dutch do not oppose. In EU
councils, Adema reported that partners rate the idea rather
coolly -- as "an interesting thought"; however, no one has
said they oppose and it will prove difficult to have a
consensus EU opinion on it soon, she added. As for the
Dutch, they feel universal membership would raise the profile
of CHR action for all UN Member States, which would all have
the right to participate (and by inference, ignore at their
peril). Though incidents of no action motions might increase
in a universal membership setting, nothing would diminish the
large effect on public opinion of having a country resolution
actually tabled against a human rights violator, she
suggested. Moreover, universal membership would eliminate
all the problems now associated with elections.

b) Eliminating the Third Committee: Adema would not
support; she said it had not been discussed in EU councils as
far as she knew. She saw benefits to New York/UNGA and Third
Committee review of Geneva's work. Moreover, Third Committee
review of the CHR had the practical, positive effect of
holding two human rights discussions annually, thereby
raising the profile of the human rights agenda.

c) Democratic Caucus: Adema said the MFA remains hesitant
about the DC since the rules for selecting members remain
problematic; it would be easier to know who not to include,
she observed. She asked which countries the USG could
foresee participating in a Democratic Caucus at the CHR. She
added that it seemed the USG was trying to "upgrade the
purpose of the DC from what was originally intended for it.
She said it was her impression that the goals of the
Community of Democracies had not included working together in
a forum like the CHR.
SOBEL