NL/EU CONSTITUTION: DUTCH REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN OFF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000393

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SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NL PREL EUN
SUBJECT: NL/EU CONSTITUTION: DUTCH REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN OFF
TO SHAKY START

REF: "POLITICS IN THE NETHERLANDS" FOR 2/8/05 (E-MAIL)

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Dutch government is committed to
holding a referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty -- most
likely in late May or early June -- and also to obtaining a
positive outcome. Some members of parliament have criticized
the government for setting aside funds for a "yes" campaign
while it is also responsible for executing an impartial "get
out the vote" campaign. Recent polls suggest that 50 percent
of the Dutch public is undecided about how to vote in the
referendum, while an even larger percentage claims to have
little or no knowledge about the treaty. A "yes" vote is far
from certain, and a "no" could have serious domestic and
international political consequences for the Balkenende
government. END SUMMARY.

TWO STEPS FORWARD...AND A POSSIBLE FOUL.
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2. (SBU) On January 25, the First Chamber of the Dutch
Parliament approved the law establishing a one-time
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, overcoming
last-minute challenges from some members of the
(conservative) Liberal Party (VVD) which threatened to derail
the entire process. Subsequently, the Second Chamber of
Parliament on February 1 selected the five members of a
"neutral" independent committee tasked with framing the
question for the referendum and setting a date for it. With
these two hurdles successfully cleared, the Dutch are moving
forward with plans to hold a referendum this spring, most
likely at the end of May or beginning of June.


3. (SBU) Although the referendum law was initiated by the
parliament, rather than the Dutch government (two of the
three governing coalition parties oppose referenda on
principle),the government is now locked into holding the
referendum and committed to obtaining a "yes" vote. On
February 7, the Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the Second
Chamber spelling out the government's plans for supporting a
non-partisan "get out the vote" drive (for which 1.45 million
Euro has been allocated) and, separately, for convincing the
public to vote "yes." The letter notes that an additional
1.5 million Euro has been set aside for the government to
draw on, on a contingency basis, to counter the efforts of
those working for a "no" vote. News of this supposedly
secret "slush fund" had earlier been leaked to the press,

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embarrassing the government last week as members of
Parliament, including many who support ratification of the
treaty in principle, questioned the ethics of using taxpayer
money to influence the outcome of a referendum the government
is tasked to carry out impartially. The government's
response -- that the funds would only be used in a
transparent and proportional manner and only after the
emergence of a well-funded opposition campaign -- appears to
have satisfied most critics for now.

FLYING BLIND
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4. (SBU) The flap over the "slush fund" is almost certainly
just the first of many anticipated hazards on the road to a
"yes" vote. The government is operating in largely uncharted
territory; the last (and only previous) national referendum
held in the Netherlands took place in 1815, so it is
virtually impossible to predict how voters will act.
According to a recent survey conducted at the request of the
MFA, nearly 80 percent of those polled planned to vote in the
referendum -- even though two thirds of them did not know
that a referendum would be held until told so by the
pollster. According to the same poll, more than 80 percent
of those polled claimed to have little to no idea what the
treaty was about, with about a third believing the treaty
would replace the Dutch Constitution. Asked how they planned
to vote, 30 percent said "yes," 20 percent said "no," and --
most disturbingly for the government -- 50 percent "didn't
know."


5. (SBU) In a meeting with POLCOUNS on February 2, Thijs van
der Plas, who heads the MFA's internal task force on the
referendum (which tasked the poll),acknowledged that lack of
basic information about the EU Constitutional Treaty was
considered the most serious challenge to the "yes" campaign.
Opponents on both the left and the right, he noted, were
finding it easy to mount effective "no" campaigns based on a
handful of emotionally resonant themes not directly linked to
the treaty. For example, former VVD member Geert Wilders,
has already declared his intention to turn the referendum
into a vote on whether or not Turkey should be part of
Europe, while the Socialist Party has seized on public
frustration with the Euro economy and alleged militarization
of the union to rally opposition to the treaty. A solid
majority in parliament -- including all three coalition
parties and two major opposition parties -- supports the
treaty, he noted, but opponents see the referendum as an
opportunity to build popular support for their own separate
agendas. According to van der Plas, the government's
strategy (as outlined in the letter to parliament, which he
drafted) will be to focus on the new treaty's improvements
over previous EU agreements in the areas of "transparency,
democracy, and efficiency." Van der Plas noted, however,
that as most voters don't understand how this treaty differs
from the earlier agreements, this will be a hard sell. At
some point, he added, the government needs to develop a more
emotionally appealing pitch the lines of "vote yes to Europe"
or "vote yes for Holland in Europe."

TIMING IS EVERYTHING
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6. (SBU) Van der Plas was cautiously optimistic that the
"yes" camp would ultimately prevail, but recognized that the
government has a long way to go with not much time. While
the "no" camp has yet to coalesce around a single leader or
issue, he said, the potential is clearly there for an
effective, grass-roots anti-treaty movement. Van der Plas
stressed that the government is also carefully considering
the issue of timing, preferring to hold the vote before the
EU discussion of its multi-year budget for 2007-2013, the
so-called Financial Perspectives, scheduled for June (as this
is a touchy issue for the Dutch as a net-contributor) and as
far from the October 3 start of Turkish accession talks as
possible. Finally, van der Plas said that the Dutch would
prefer to hold their vote after the anticipated French
referendum if possible, arguing that a "yes" vote in France
would have a positive ripple effect in the Netherlands, while
a "non" would at least spare the Dutch blame for scuttling
the treaty. (According to van der Plas, the French
referendum, while not the first, would have the greatest
impact on Dutch perceptions of the viability of the treaty.)


7. (SBU) Some of the treaty's strongest supporters are most
skeptical of the government campaign. Lousewies van der
Laan, a member of parliament for the liberal-progressive D66
party, told POLCOUNS on January 31 that she believed a public
campaign led by the government could do more harm than good.
The Balkenende government (of which D66 is a coalition
partner) is both unpopular and inept at public diplomacy, she
said -- as evidenced by the flap over the funding question.
Van der Laan hopes to establish a separate foundation, with
funding from the five political parties (three coalition
members and two opposition parties),labor groups, social
organizations, and individuals to mount a "yes" campaign
outside the government's efforts. Van der Laan said the next
step after establishing funding would be to identify a
high-profile public spokesman -- such as Dutch soccer hero
Johan Cruijff, who is currently playing a similar role in the
Spanish referendum -- to promote the treaty.

WHAT COMES AFTER "NO"?
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8. (SBU) Van der Laan and van der Plas agreed that a "no"
vote would be a major blow to the Balkenende government,
especially if there is a respectable turnout. While he
dismissed poll results showing nearly 80 percent
participation as ridiculous, van der Plas said that turnout
was now expected to be at least comparable to elections to
the European Parliament (roughly 30 percent, the lowest in
Europe). Under such circumstances, simply dismissing a
negative vote as non-representative would not be a realistic
option, he said. Although the referendum is legally
non-binding, both van der Laan and van der Plas predicted
that parliament would not ratify the treaty in the face of a
strong "no" vote. One option in that case would be to hold
new national elections to bring in a parliament and
government that could ratify the treaty without a referendum;
another would be for the parliament to pass new legislation
calling for a second referendum -- a politically risky
strategy considering the ambivalence of many parties towards
referenda in general. A third, more likely, possibility
would be for parliament to instruct the government to
negotiate some "concession" regarding the treaty (on
Financial Perspectives, for example) and then revisit the
issue. In any case, van der Laan stressed that the prestige
of the Netherlands as a founding member of the EU could be
seriously, perhaps irreversibly, damaged if it were seen to
be turning its back on Europe. On February 10, State
Secretary for Europe Atzo Nicolai, speaking to a group of

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resident diplomats, acknowledged openly that the Dutch "have
no plan B" for dealing with a negative vote.

COMMENT:
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9. (SBU) Last summer, at the start of the Dutch EU
presidency, many predicted that the Dutch would be the first
EU country to hold a referendum on the new treaty. PM
Balkenende was reportedly eager to translate the anticipated
goodwill generated during the Dutch EU presidency into a
positive "vote for Europe." Six sobering months later, the
Dutch government is starting to realize that convincing a
skeptical Dutch public to support the treaty will entail more
effort -- and potential political risk -- than it may have
anticipated.
SOBEL