Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05THEHAGUE3380
2005-12-22 07:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH VIEWS ON TURKEY, ENERGY

Tags:  PREL PBTS EUN TU NL 
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VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #3380/01 3560740
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220740Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4420
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0517
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 003380 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS EUN TU NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH VIEWS ON TURKEY, ENERGY
SECURITY, AND THE "NEIGHBORHOOD"


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CHAT BLAKEMAN,
REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 003380

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS EUN TU NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH VIEWS ON TURKEY, ENERGY
SECURITY, AND THE "NEIGHBORHOOD"


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CHAT BLAKEMAN,
REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 13, EUR DAS Matthew Bryza
discussed Turkey, Energy Security, and the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in meetings with Marnix Krop
(Director General for European Cooperation, MFA),Pieter de
Gooijer (Deputy Director General for Political Affairs, MFA)
and Kees van Rij (Director, Office of European Integration).
Dutch interlocutors expressed appreciation for the low-key
but influential role played by the U.S. in the lead-up to
starting accession talk with Turkey, and agreed that the EU
and U.S. should work together to keep the process on track.
Securing long-term and diversified energy supplies for Europe
is a high-priority issue for the Dutch, and the MFA hopes to
have high-level USG participation at a seminar on the subject
in The Hague next February. The Dutch and U.S. share similar
goals in the regions covered by the "European Neighborhood
Policy," including encouraging Russia to play a more
productive role in building stable societies. END SUMMARY.

TURKEY: HELP KEEP TURKEY ON TRACK
--------------


2. (C) During his meeting with Marnix Krop (Director General
for European Cooperation),Bryza thanked the Dutch for their
efforts to help the EU and Turkey reach agreement on
beginning EU accession talks on December 17, 2004 (during the
Dutch Presidency) and on October 3, 2005. While the U.S. was
"thrilled" with the outcome of the discussions, Bryza added,
it was not seeking to pressure the EU into accepting Turkey
as a member prematurely. Turkey had to undergo some major
internal changes before joining the EU, and the U.S. and the
EU should work together to help this process along.
Ultimately, Bryza stressed, the question of actual EU
membership was less important to the U.S. than "anchoring"
Turkey in Europe politically and socially by virtue of Turkey
advancing its modernizing reforms. Turkey could eventually
decide to drop its bid for EU membership, but it was
important not to make Turkey feel that it was being excluded
unfairly. In addition to the geopolitical arguments for

keeping Turkey in the Western Camp, Bryza added, Turkish
traditions of secular democracy and tolerant Islamic faith
could provide useful examples (but not models) both for the
Middle East and for Muslim communities inside Europe.


3. (C) Krop agreed that U.S.-EU collaboration in the lead-up
to October 3 had been fruitful, noting that much of the
heavy-lifting had taken place during the 2004 Dutch EU
presidency. He acknowledged that worries about heavy-handed
U.S. pressure had proven groundless, largely because of
excellent behind-the-scenes communication and coordination.
That said, Krop stressed that European -- including Dutch --
"sensitivities" about Turkey must be taken into account. He
noted with satisfaction that Dutch opinion polls taken after
October 3rd indicated that a majority now favored Turkish
accession to the EU, but with significant reservations.
European concerns about human rights, the role of the
military in political life, and Islam could not be wished
away; Turkey needed to change significantly before it truly
be integrated into Europe.


4. (C) Bryza stressed that the U.S. would continue to work
with Turkey to keep the reform process on track. At the same
time, the EU could help make certain necessary steps "more
palatable" for Turkey by providing an appropriate political
or administrative context. For example, Bryza argued that
the EU might be able to "soften the blow" of Turkey opening
its ports to Cypriot ships by providing a structure within
which Turkey and Turkish Cypriot ports might open up
incrementally and simultaneously. Krop took this idea on
board, but noted that the EU had long maintained that the UN
was the appropriate body for dealing with the Cyprus issue.
Bryza agreed, suggesting that perhaps the UN could be in
charge of security of Cypriot ports, while the EU might issue
documentation, as it currently does along Cyprus' "Green
Line." In hindsight, Krop added, bringing Cyprus into the EU
before a settlement might have been a mistake -- but it also
had paved the way for the EU to begin accession talks with
Turkey.


5. (C) Kees van Rij (Director, Office of European
Integration) subsequently also thanked the U.S. for its
"quiet cooperation" on Turkey. He observed that Cyprus posed
some difficult problems issues for Turkey and the EU, and
agreed that the U.S. and EU should continue to coordinate
closely on ways to help all sides take necessary but
difficult next steps.

ENERGY SECURITY: HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION CRITICAL
-------------- --



6. (C) All three Dutch MFA interlocutors said the Dutch are
focused increasingly on the issue of securing long-term and
diversified energy supplies for Europe. Referring to the
latest Russian-German pipeline project, Marnix Krop observed
that the routes of individual pipelines were less important
than the question of whether or not they were connected to
the European grid. Having a large number of inter-connected
pipelines was the best guarantor of long-term energy
security. Referring to Central Asia and the Caucasus, van
Rij noted that Europe's efforts to secure energy supplies had
obvious implications for European relations with Russia and
other states in the "neighborhood." Both Krop and van Rij
stressed the importance of energy security as a
transatlantic, rather than European, issue. Bryza made clear
that the U.S. was thinking along similar lines and was eager
to engage. But he also stressed the importance of truly
diversified energy sources, which meant a multiplicity of
suppliers and transit companies, rather than multiple
pipelines to a single supplier.


7. (C) Pieter de Gooijer (Deputy Director General for
Political Affairs) told Bryza that the Dutch were moving
ahead with planning for a energy security seminar to be held
in The Hague on February 6-8 of 2006. Dutch Foreign Minister
Bot had discussed this proposed seminar with and extended an
invitation to Deputy Secretary Zoellick during Bot's recent
trip to the U.S., he added. In light of the upcoming
holidays and need to secure high-level participation, de
Gooijer pressed Bryza for an early U.S. commitment to
participate at a very senior level.


8. (C) According to de Gooijer, the proposed seminar would
bring together both government officials and top private
sector executives from the North Atlantic community for a
closed, off-the-record discussion of energy security issues
from a broad strategic point of view. De Gooijer proposed
that the seminar be co-sponsored by the Dutch MFA, the U.S.
Department of State, the Nixon Center, and the Atlantic
Commission of the Netherlands. Asked about possible U.S.
participants, de Gooijer stated that Deputy Secretary
Zoellick would be ideal in light of his experience in
senior-level positions dating back to the Reagan
administration. As an aside, de Gooijer noted that a U.S.
commitment to high-level participation would be helpful in
keeping Foreign Minister Bot actively involved in the
project. Bryza, noting his own involvement and personal
interest in energy security, welcomed the idea of the
conference and promised to try to get a firm answer as
quickly as possible.

ENP: WELCOME TO THE NEIGHBORHOOD
--------------


9. (C) In a wide-ranging discussion of the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP),van Rij explained European
objectives as "increasing stability in unstable areas" on the
frontiers of Europe. The recent "no" vote on the EU
Constitutional Treaty in the Netherlands, he noted, was due
in part to Dutch/European fears about an endlessly expanding
Europe. For that reason, the EU must use incentives other
than membership to encourage positive change in neighboring
areas. These ranged from the "association agreements"
negotiated with Middle Eastern states under the Barcelona
Process to the sort of quasi-membership enjoyed by Norway and
Switzerland.


10. (C) With regard to Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, and
Central Asia, van Rij stressed that relations with Russia had
to be part of the European calculus. The EU has put a lot of
effort into convincing Russia that it shares the European
interest in developing stable, prosperous neighbors, he said,
but with only limited success to date. Bryza acknowledged
that the Russian role remained problematic, but noted recent
positive signs on "frozen conflicts" in Georgia and Moldova.
Van Rij cited as particularly successful the recent Brussels
visit of Georgian Prime Minister Noghaideli to discuss
Georgia's South Ossetia action plan. Bryza agreed, stressing
the need for Europe and the U.S. to encourage Georgia to
remain on its current, constructive path toward a peaceful
settlement in South Ossetia. On Uzbekistan, Bryza said that
while the U.S. was not yet prepared to go as far as the EU in
imposing sanctions, the U.S. was indeed considering its own
mix of sanctions, and the Uzbeks should be under no illusions
about the depth of U.S. concerns.


11. (C) Van Rij asked about U.S. views of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO),noting that the EU had looked
into obtaining observer status and received an ambivalent
reply. Bryza said that the U.S. had also explored this
possibility, but had the distinct impression that it was not

welcome. He added that the U.S. stood ready to work with the
SCO to counter security threats in the region, but would
continue to work bilaterally with individual states as well.
Van Rij noted that he had had the opportunity recently to
visit SCO headquarters in Beijing and was struck by the
sophistication of its operations; while it was certainly "no
NATO," van Rij argued that it could not be dismissed either.


12. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.

BLAKEMAN