Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05THEHAGUE3054
2005-11-09 17:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: WHAT THE DUTCH WANT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR MARR MOPS AF NL EUN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003054 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR MOPS AF NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: WHAT THE DUTCH WANT

REF: A. THE HAGUE 3037

B. THE HAGUE 2988

C. HAGUE-STATE E-MAIL.11/8/05

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003054

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR MOPS AF NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: WHAT THE DUTCH WANT

REF: A. THE HAGUE 3037

B. THE HAGUE 2988

C. HAGUE-STATE E-MAIL.11/8/05

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Dutch officials have compiled a list of
conditions for deploying to Uruzghan province in Afghanistan
under ISAF Stage III which they shared with SACEUR on
November 8. A key Dutch request is that U.S. forces remain
at current levels in Zabol and two northern firebases in
Uruzghan. The Dutch will continue intense consultations with
partners, including the U.S., this week and hope to begin
Cabinet discussion of the deployment on November 18. End
SUMMARY.


2. (C) As noted reftels, Dutch Defense Minister Kamp, in
coordination with Foreign Minister Bot, has asked for a
thorough review of Dutch plans to deploy troops to Uruzghan
province under ISAF Stage III. This review was prompted by
recent Dutch intelligence analysis suggesting that the
security situation in the province was more dangerous than
anticipated. On November 8, Minister of Defense Kamp and
other senior Dutch officials briefed SACEUR Jones on the
results of their review, listing several new "conditions"
which the Dutch believe would facilitate a positive Dutch
decision to deploy. Charge was briefed on November 8 by CHOD
Dik Berlijn, and on November 9 by MOD Director of General
Policy Lo Castelijn, on the Dutch requirements, which will
also be contained in a letter to SACEUR.


3. (C) The Dutch anticipate an initial deployment of 1,100
Dutch troops, plus 340 Australians and 100 Canadians for
transport and force protection. Dutch conditions include:

- Commitments by the Afghan government and G-8 lead nations
to strengthen police, courts, and civil administration in the
province. This would also include a continuation of U.S.
training of police and military forces in the region.

- An effective development strategy in the province involving
USAID, its Dutch counterpart, and other development agencies.



- Agreement on acceptable arrangements/regime for handling
detainees. This would entail some infrastructure projects,
such as the construction of appropriate detention and
transfer centers. (Note: According to the MFA, a Dutch team
is traveling to Afghanistan this week to engage Afghan
authorities on this issue.)

- Clear understanding/agreement that the Dutch deployment
would be for two years. Castelijn and Berlijn both noted
that such an agreement need not preclude the possibility of
an extension, but they clearly wish to avoid any
"bad-mouthing" if the Dutch decide not to extend -- as
happened at the end of the Dutch deployment in Southern Iraq.

- A clear distinction between OEF and ISAF missions in the
region. Specifically, Berlijn and Castelijn stressed that
OEF should retain responsibility for "counter-terrorism"
operations, with ISAF taking on "counter-insurgency"
functions. Castelijn clarified that this would help the GONL
make its case to parliament -- where ISAF enjoys more support
than OEF -- while retaining enough flexibility on the ground
for OEF to conduct operations in ISAF areas if necessary. He
added that the Dutch would insist on coordination between OEF
and ISAF, maintaining the distinction between missions was a
political necessity.

- Full intelligence sharing on the ground. Castelijn
acknowledged that he was not sure how big a problem this was;
there was, in fact, more sharing taking place than some of
those making the complaint understood. He noted, however,
that the Dutch believed that establishing a "fusion cell" in
Kandahar would be a good way of ensuring maximum coordination
in the future.

- Cost sharing to repair and maintain Kandahar airport.
Castelijn stressed that this was essential.

- Additional assistance on helicopter transport and other
logistics issues; Castelijn indicated that this issue had
already largely been resolved through consultations with the
British, Canadians, and Australians.

- Continuation of U.S. presence in Zabol and the northern
firebases in Uruzghan province, as well as retention of an
OEF capability to mount counter-terrorism operations from the
firebases as necessary.


4. (C) With regard to the last point, Castelijn said that
this would require a significant U.S. commitment, and said he
intended to reach out to ASD Peter Flory in the next few days
to discuss it. He added that the Dutch were not requesting
an increase, but believed maintaining current force levels
and advisors was necessary to secure the Northern and Western
flanks of the territory in which the Dutch would be
operating. Castelijn stressed that the Dutch did not
anticipate dividing up Uruzghan geographically, but felt that
the situation demanded a distinction between areas in which
OEF counter-terrorism operations remained necessary and areas
more suitable for ISAF missions.


5. (C) Castelijn noted that the Dutch intended to engage in
intense consultations with NATO partners and the Afghan
government over the next week to resolve as many issues as
possible. Assuming discussion went well, the Ministers of
Defense and Foreign Affairs would then present their proposal
to Cabinet on November 18 for a preliminary discussion, with
a more formal discussion and possible decision on November 25
(and a referral to Parliament soon afterwards.) He
recognized that some of the more general requirements would
not be satisfied in a week, and noted that the Ministers of
Defense and Foreign Affairs would most review the situation
again in 2006 to determine how much progress had been made.


6. (C) Castelijn said the Dutch had been impressed by
SACEUR's willingness to consider the Dutch requirements in
the spirit in which they were intended -- i.e., the Dutch
want to go forward but need some help to do so. Castelijn
added that the Dutch fully understood that only some of their
requests fell into NATO's purview; others would have to be
worked out directly with the Afghan government and individual
partners. The key issue for the U.S. is whether it can
maintain a presence in Zabol and northern Uruzghan.
Castelijn noted that he and other senior Dutch officials had
canceled travel plans this week and next to concentrate on
the deployment issue.

BLAKEMAN