NETHERLANDS: ASD FLORY'S VISIT TO THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002708

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: ASD FLORY'S VISIT TO THE HAGUE


Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman,
reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: During his September 30 visit to The Hague,
ASD Peter Flory met with Lo Casteleijn, MOD Director for
General Policy Affairs, and Pieter de Gooijer, MFA Deputy
Director General for Political Affairs, to discuss
Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, Kosovo, and
NATO reform. Dutch officials made clear that finding a
partner to team with in Uruzghan province was a pre-condition
necessary to obtain Dutch government and parliament approval
of Dutch participation in ISAF Stage III. They still hope to
team with Australia, and will send a high-level delegation to
Canberra in the coming weeks to make the case to the
Australian government. Dutch officials also were supportive
of the U.S. proposed "two summit" strategy, but pushed back
on the concept that the 2008 summit focus on enlargement.
While it was important to encourage aspirants such as Ukraine
to take the reforms necessary for NATO membership, the Dutch
expressed doubts that Ukraine and others would be ready by

2008. ASD Flory also visited the HMS Van Amstel, which
returned to the Netherlands following its deployment to
assist hurricane relief efforts in the Biloxi region. ASD
Flory thanked the Van Amstel's crew for their hard work, and
fielded questions from the press. End summary.

Australian Partnership a Must for Afghanistan
--------------


2. (C) De Gooijer and Casteleijn both stressed the strong
Dutch interest in partnering with Australia in a PRT for
Uruzghan province in ISAF Stage III. According to de
Gooijer, this was a "political requirement" that would allow
the Dutch government to present a convincing package to
parliament. While the Australian forces would provide useful
operational capabilities, he added, the forces driving the
Dutch to find a reliable partner were primarily political.
Asked by Flory whether the Dutch were considering any
alternatives to Australia, de Gooijer emphasized that they
were not. Noting that the Dutch cabinet hoped to be able to
make a decision on the deployment in early November, de
Gooijer asked the U.S. to weigh in with the Australians.
Horbach added that the Dutch were looking at providing
1,000-1,200 troops themselves and supplementing this force
with roughly 200 Australians. Horbach and de Gooijer
confirmed that the Dutch expected Uruzghan to be a tough
security environment and therefore supported robust ISAF
rules of engagement.


3. (C) In the meeting at MOD, Casteleijn reiterated that
partnering with Australia was a vital pre-condition to Stage
III participation. Even with 200 Australian troops,
Casteleijn said, the Dutch would still be working with far
fewer troops than the UK or Canada, who are working on
2,000-3,000 man PRTs. The Dutch parliament, however, had
explicitly limited the Dutch contribution to no more than
1,000-1,2000 troops. Casteleijn said the Dutch planned to
send a high level Dutch delegation to Canberra in the coming
weeks to make the case to the Australian government. He
added that the Australians have questions regarding their
specific role in the PRT and the rules of engagement; the
delegation to Canberra will seek to explain Dutch plans for
an Australian contribution. It was important to explain to
the Australians that the rules of engagement question was a
NATO issue currently under discussion, and not a bilateral
issue, Casteleijn said.


4. (C) Casteleijn noted that the Afghan elections appeared to
have gone well; now it was important to revitalize the Bonn
Process. The security situation in the south, he added, was
particularly worrisome. ASD Flory took issue with
Casteleijn's negative security assessment, describing recent
incidents as negative spikes in an increasingly positive
security situation. The elections were a great success; the
Taliban chose not to disrupt the popular elections because
the Afghan people overwhelmingly supported the electoral
process. Of course, bad guys will continue to try and turn
up the heat, but they are losing the strategic battle, Flory
said. ASD Flory noted that the USG was aware that cost
sharing for the renovation at Kandahar airport remained an
issue for the Dutch. He asked if the Dutch required any
logistics assistance. Casteleijn said they had approached
Belgium regarding C-130 lift assistance, and have discussed
extending the Belgian F-16 presence in Kabul into 2006. He
added that intelligence sharing would be helpful.


5. (C) Casteleijn also reviewed plans to handover the Dutch
PRT in Baghlan to Hungary. He described the Hungarians as
"very eager" to take over, even before the planned transition
in October 2006 and have hinted at perhaps "going somewhere
else". Moreover, the Hungarians would like to make public
announcements regarding the transition, which strikes the
Dutch as "too early," Casteleijn said. He explained that
Dutch development agencies have finally received funding for
work in Baghlan; Hungarian announcements of a takeover would
raise questions in parliament why funds had been allocated if
the Dutch plan to leave.

Keeping ISAF and OEF Forces Separate
--------------


6. (C) Casteleijn said that the Dutch support a strict
separation of ISAF and OEF forces, but added that the Dutch
can support the recent U.S. proposal regarding interaction
between the two. He explained that the Dutch require the
separation for domestic political reasons. Any new
deployment in Afghanistan will carry over past the 2007
national elections. The opposition Labor Party (PvdA) had
opposed the deployment of Dutch special forces in support of
OEF, Casteleijn said. Recent polls suggest that the 2007
elections will lead to a new government, perhaps under Labor
leadership. A deployment under ISAF auspices, Caseteleijn
said, will not be contentious and therefore not subject to
review. De Gooijer confirmed that parliament was unlikely to
accept another Dutch OEF deployment "on the ground" (as
opposed to at sea); this would be, he said, "a bridge too
far" for the PvdA. On the other hand, he agreed that the
latest U.S. proposal for improving coordination between the
two missions was acceptable to the Dutch, as long as the two
operations remained distinguishable to some degree.

NTM-I
--------------


7. (C) Casteleijn reviewed Dutch participation in the NATO
Training Mission in Iraq. The Dutch are willing in principle
to increase their contribution toward the mission up to 100
personnel assuming other nations make proportional increases.
He said that the Dutch are committed to working in Iraq, but
questioned whether a training mission outside Iraq -- such as
in Jordan -- might be more effective. ASD Flory briefed on
recent developments with the Iraqi constitution, and efforts
to combat foreign fighters, especially those crossing the
border from Syria. He described Iran and Syria as
particularly troublesome. On a potential training mission
outside Iraq, Flory said we should not discourage nations
from participating in Iraq and described NTM-I as critical.
He welcomed Dutch willingness to participate in any
additional training mission as long as it does not detract
from efforts in Iraq.


8. (C) De Gooijer similarly stressed the continuing Dutch
commitment to NTM-I. The fact that the Dutch no longer had
troops on the ground in Southern Iraq, he said, did not
lessen the Dutch political commitment to the Iraq mission.
He noted that, in addition to participating in NTM-I, the
Dutch were playing an active role in EU programs for Iraq,
including providing training to Iraqi jurists.

Kosovo/Bosnia
--------------


9. (C) In the meeting with Casteleijn, OSD Principal Director
for European and NATO Policy Jim Townsend related discussions
in London, noting a real sense of concern regarding where the
international community is heading on final status talks and
the impacts Kosovo independence might have on other efforts
in the region by break-away provinces to win independence.
Casteleijn agreed, adding that it was difficult to predict
where a "stuck" final status discussion will go. He said
there were difficult discussions going on in the MFA at
present, and suggested that the Dutch government was looking
to decrease troop levels in Bosnia. He explained that the
Dutch believe that their troops are being asked to perform
tasks that are better suited for police.

NATO Reform/Enlargement/Response Force
--------------


10. (C) Flory and Townsend briefly reviewed the USG two
summit strategy for NATO-- a 2006 mini-summit focusing on
transformation and capabilities, and a 2008 enlargement
summit -- for de Gooijer and Casteleijn. Both expressed
significant reservations about labeling the proposed 2008
NATO summit an "enlargement" summit. De Gooijer said the
Dutch were comfortable with two summits and agreed on the
need to make NATO more effective and efficient. But, he
said, Europe was already suffering from "enlargement"
fatigue, which was a significant factor in the Dutch "no"
vote on the EU's Constitutional Treaty. The Dutch public and
parliament, he stressed, were not psychologically prepared to
consider enlarging NATO at this time, especially with regard
to a large, problematic state like Ukraine.


11. (C) Flory asked de Gooijer to clarify what, exactly,
worried the Dutch about Ukraine. De Gooijer responded that,
while Ukrainian capabilities would be a welcome addition to
NATO in practical terms, there were many other factors
arguing against admission. These included the possible
impact on European relations with Russia, Ukraine's
underdeveloped political system and rampant corruption, and
the wide-spread perception -- right or wrong -- that
admission to NATO was somehow linked to accession to the EU.
The transatlantic alliance, he continued, should first
develop a clearer view of its identity and future before
enlarging further.


12. (C) Casteleijn said that the Dutch recognize Ukraine's
strategic importance. However, labeling the 2008 summit as
an enlargement summit will only raise expectations of
aspirant countries, and there are too many questions
regarding Ukraine's ability to take necessary reforms
required for NATO membership. On Georgia, Casteleijn said
that the Dutch were concerned about corruption and
military-to-military cooperation development. Casteleijn
suggested that the 2008 summit focus on defining or enhancing
relationships between Partners and NATO, instead of an
explicit commitment to enlargement.


13. (C) De Gooijer warned that it would be difficult to
achieve real transformation at a 2006 summit if people
believe the summit's real purpose is to pave the way for
enlargement in 2008; managing perceptions to avoid this
outcome should be a high priority, he said. Pressed to
identify a country which might be ready for admission to NATO
by 2008, de Gooijer offered that Croatia was probably the
most likely candidate, but stressed that any discussion of
enlargement, particularly with reference to a "package" of
aspirants, would be sensitive in the current political
climate.


14. (C) ASD Flory said that the 2008 summit could be better
defined to "take stock" of NATO's relations with aspirants.
While it was important not to create unwarranted
expectations, however, it was also important to use the
enlargement concept as a catalyst to create pressure to
undertake necessary reform, Flory said. He emphasized that
Ukraine has still a long way to go; much will depend on
reform progress. He also mentioned reform efforts in Georgia
and Turkish EU membership as contributing factors.


15. (C) Asked by de Gooijer to outline possible
"deliverables" for the 2006 transformation summit, Flory and
Townsend noted making the NRF operational and increasing its
capabilities (perhaps through enhanced participation of
Special Operations Forces) would be a high priority.
Townsend also made a pitch to think creatively about methods
to reform the NATO budget beyond "passing the tin cup". De
Gooijer agreed that the 2006 summit should focus on "doing
what we do now, but better" and exploring new financing and
operational concepts. Casteleijn briefly outlined Dutch
thinking on the NATO Response Force. Previously, the Dutch
were more inclined to agree with France on limited NRF use.
Now, the Dutch agree that the NRF should be used more
frequently. Casteleijn said Defense Minister Kamp hopefully
made this clear at the informal defense ministerial in
Berlin.


16. (U) ASD Flory did not have an opportunity to review this
message.


BLAKEMAN