Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05THEHAGUE2705
2005-10-06 17:12:00
SECRET
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV SOCI ASEC KISL NL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002705 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2025
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV SOCI ASEC KISL NL
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

REF: A. SECSTATE 173666

B. THE HAGUE 2599

C. THE HAGUE 2651

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CHAT BLAKEMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (
D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002705

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2025
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV SOCI ASEC KISL NL
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

REF: A. SECSTATE 173666

B. THE HAGUE 2599

C. THE HAGUE 2651

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CHAT BLAKEMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (
D).


1. (S) This cable responds to ref a request for information
on Islamic Extremism in the Netherlands.


2. (S) SUMMARY: Within the relatively large Dutch Muslim
Community, Islamic Extremism represents a worrisome and
growing trend. Dutch security and intelligence services
estimate that about 5 percent of the total Dutch Muslim
population, or roughly 50,000 individuals, follow
"non-moderate" forms of Islam and may be sympathetic to
fundamentalist or radical views. Within this group, the GONL
believes there are 150-200 hard-core radicals who might be
prepared to use violence; approximately 20 individuals have
been arrested or will stand trial for terrorist offenses.
The Netherlands has both home-grown radical Islamists -- most
notably the Hofstad group, which has been associated with the
murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh -- and transnational
terrorist groups that maintain a presence in Holland or
transit through the country, as well as a few volunteers who
have gone to Iraq to fight against coalition forces. END
SUMMARY.

EXTREMISM RISING
--------------


3. (C) According to public sources, the Dutch General
Security and Intelligence Service (AIVD) believes that the
vast majority of Dutch Muslims -- 95 percent -- follow
"moderate" forms of Islam that do not call for radical social
or political change. Within the remaining 5 percent -- or
approximately 50,000 individuals -- the number of "radicals"
potentially prepared to use violence to pursue religious and
political objectives is estimated to be about 150-200. This
hard-core of activists is presumed to be supported by small
but tight social groups within the larger Muslim population.


4. (C) During 2004, Dutch security services reported that
Muslims, particularly those of Moroccan origin, between 15
and 25 years-old had become increasingly receptive to radical
interpretations of Islam. Religiously-conservative dress and

viewpoints, and public expressions of frustration and rage
regarding external events such as the war in Iraq and
developments in the Middle East have become increasingly
common on university campuses. Internet websites catering to
Muslim youth have also witnessed dramatic increases in
pro-al-Qaida and anti-U.S./anti-Israel sentiments, especially
since the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an
Islamic extremist in November 2004 (see below). Community
police similarly report a noticeable rise in pro-al-Qaida
graffiti in predominantly Muslim neighborhoods of large
cities like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague.

RADICAL MESSAGE/FOREIGN INFLUENCE
--------------


5. (S) The GONL has publicly stated that Saudi government
money and missionary groups have played a role in bringing a
radical message to Holland. It is widely reported that the
Dutch security services are monitoring six Salafi mosques and
foundations for their extremist bent and possible role in
radicalization and recruitment. They include al-Fourqaan
mosque in Eindhoven, al-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam,
as-Sunnah mosque in The Hague, al-Mouahidine in Helmond,
Foundation for Islamic Youth in Breda, and the Islamic
Foundation for Instruction and Transfer of Knowledge in
Tilburg. The GONL claims these mosques are supported by
missionary activity and, until relatively recently, funding
from Saudi Arabia. Imams who admonish the moral decadence of
Dutch society and proclaim all attempts at integration
undesirable have preached at these mosques for years. Some
of these imams also preach the need for Muslims to defend
themselves in the face of anti-Muslim sentiments. Al-Tawheed
was linked to the Saudi al Haramain organization, designated
under Executive Order 13224 in 2004. Three of the Salafi
mosques including al-Fourqaan, al-Mouahidine, and Foundation
for Islamic Youth have been linked to the Saudi mission Al
Waqf al Islami.


6. (SBU) Nearly all Dutch Imams are born and receive their
training overseas, primarily in Turkey, Morocco and the Gulf
States. The GONL recently declared two imams in Eindhoven
and one in Rotterdam personae non grata for allegedly
attempting to recruit for extremist groups. One has already
left the country; the other two are appealing their
expulsions in court. The controversial Minister for
Integration, Rita Verdonk, has recently called for barring
foreign imams from preaching in the Netherlands, but her
proposal has met strong resistance on religious and free
speech grounds. Other proposals to increase opportunities
for training Imams in the Netherlands have broader public
support, but are proving difficult to implement in practice.

RECRUITMENT
--------------

7. (SBU) Recruitment of individuals to extremist ideas in the
Netherlands is growing, especially among alienated Muslim
youth. According to the GONL, recruitment here follows three
well-established patterns. Most commonly, a foreign veteran
of jihad, well-versed in Islam, recruits young men and, to a
lesser extent, young women from the fringes of mosques,
schools or Islamic cultural centers. Groups seeking a
spiritual leader or connections to the international
extremist network represent a second more autonomous and
self-selecting recruitment, which tends to take place on
Internet websites or in chat rooms. The third form of
recruitment occurs in prison, where individuals jailed for
extremist or terrorist activity recruit followers from a
plethora of discontented prison inmates.


8. (SBU) The GONL produced a report in December 2004, "From
Dawa to Jihad" that reported an increase in recruitment for
both jihad and dawa in the Netherlands. Dawa, as the Dutch
define it, is the intensive propagation of radical Islamic
ideology through missionary work. The Dutch have been
monitoring Dawa-oriented radical Salafist organizations and
networks from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States
who are all working to "re-Islamize" Muslim minorities in the
west.

TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT
--------------


9. (S) There is solid evidence that both home grown and
transnational terrorist groups have planned to carry out
attacks in Holland in the past year. At the moment, 20
individuals are being held in Dutch prisons on
terrorism-related charges, including planning to carry out
attacks. So far, Dutch security forces have disrupted attack
plans in the preliminary stages, but there is a body of
reporting indicating that additional plans may be in the
works. On September 9, the Dutch government raised its
terrorist threat level claiming it had "sufficient cause for
taking additional security measures at railway and metro
stations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam."


10. (S) In addition to planning attacks against targets in
the Netherlands, transnational groups have also used the
Netherlands as a source of logistic support for international
terrorist networks. The Dutch security services are aware
that jihad veterans (including those who have fought in
Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, and Iraq),terrorist
facilitators, and recruits have all transited the Netherlands
in the past few years, and are watching such movements
closely.

GROUPS OPERATING IN THE NETHERLANDS
--------------


11. (S) Transnational Islamic Extremist organizations on
Dutch soil include the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
(GICM),the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC),
and Hizb ut Tahrir (HUT). Several al-Qaida-linked
individuals are also known to have transited and/or made
contact with individuals in the Netherlands. The most
prominent extremist group, however, is the home-grown
"Hofstad Group" -- at the moment, 14 of the approximately 20
individuals in detention or awaiting trial for
terrorist-related charges in the Netherlands are associated
with this group.

HOFSTAD GROUP
--------------


12. (S) The so-called "Hofstad Group" -- named after the
neighborhood in The Hague where several members lived -- is
an indigenous Islamist terrorist cell of approximately 20
young Dutch Muslims of mainly North African descent. The
group adheres to the radical "Takfir wal Hijra" version of
Salafi Islam, also shared by Al Qaida second-in-command Ayman
al-Zawahiri, under which the killing of perceived enemies of
Islam is considered justified. The Hofstad group first
attracted the attention of Dutch authorities in 2002 when one
member (Samir Azzouz) attempted to travel to Chechnya for
jihad. Several members, including Azzouz, were arrested in
the summer of 2004 in conjunction with apparent plans to
launch terrorist attacks against Schipol Airport, a nuclear
reactor, and other targets, but were later released for lack
of evidence.


13. (S) In November 2004, the group attracted international
attention when a member, Mohammed Bouyeri, murdered Dutch
filmmaker Theo van Gogh on an Amsterdam sidewalk in broad
daylight. After shooting van Gogh and slashing his throat,
Bouyeri pinned a note to his victim's chest espousing radical
Islamist views and threatening several other prominent Dutch
figures. When police attempted to search a house in The
Hague occupied by members of the Hofstad Group shortly after
the murder, the suspects threw several hand grenades, shot at
police, and seriously injured one officer before being
overwhelmed. The revelation in the Dutch press that Dutch
authorities had had Bouyeri and other Hofstad Group members
under surveillance for several months but were apparently
unaware of the group's plans or capabilities led to
wide-spread calls for a reevaluation of the terrorist threat
in the Netherlands and the GONL's plans for dealing with it.


14. (C) In July 2005, Mohammed Bouyeri was sentenced to life
in prison for murdering Van Gogh. Bouyeri, along with 13
others, will stand trial in December, 2005 for membership in
a terrorist organization that plotted to kill Dutch
politicians. (Note: Participation in a terrorist
organization only became illegal with the passage of a new
raft of counterterrorism laws in August 2004.) Some of the
13 standing trial for membership, will also face additional
charges. Nouredine el Fatimi, arrested in June, also faces
charges for illegal arms possession. He eluded capture for
nearly eight months and, according to press accounts, was
recruiting young men off the streets in The Hague to join a
terrorist group. Hofstad members Jason Walters and Ismail
Akhnikh will also be charged with illegal arms possession and
attempted murder as the result of their grenade and shooting
attack against police during their arrest. On September 22,
two of the marginal members arrested in November 2004 were
released from custody, but are still expected to stand trial.


DUTCH FIGHTERS TO IRAQ
--------------


15. (SBU) As in the rest of Europe, the GONL is concerned
about the possible return of a handful of its citizens or
other EU nationals who have traveled to Iraq to carry out
jihad against U.S. and coalition forces. The most
high-profile case of a Dutch citizen active in Iraq is Wesam
al Delaema, a former hairdresser in Amsterdam, whose
extradition is sought by the U.S. He has been charged with
conspiring to murder Americans in Iraq by placing explosives
in a road in Iraq. Delaema and others called themselves the
"Mujahideen from Fallujah" and videotaped their intentions to
kill Americans in Iraq using explosives. The extradition
request is currently working its way through the Dutch legal
system.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (S) Although only a very small minority of Dutch Muslims
can be considered dangerous radicals, virulent strains of
Islamic extremism are becoming disturbingly popular. The
extremist message is particularly attractive -- almost trendy
-- among Moroccan youth in segregated, relatively poor
neighborhoods in Dutch cities. Awareness of radical Islam in
the Netherlands is not a post-9/11 or post-Madrid phenomenon,
as the AIVD has reported on radical Islam for years. The
evolution of the Hofstad group focused the GONL on fact that
radicalization among home-grown Muslims was occurring, but it
is only since the murder of van Gogh, that the Dutch
government has started to take serious steps to stem the tide
of radicalization.
BLAKEMAN