NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: MOD STRATEGY FOR MOVING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002565

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AF NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: MOD STRATEGY FOR MOVING
FORWARD WITH ISAF STAGE III DEPLOYMENT

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman;
reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: According to Lo Casteleijn (Director, General
Policy Affairs, MOD),the Dutch government is expected to
make a positive decision by the end of October to deploy
1,000 - 1,2000 troops to Uruzghan province in Afghanistan in
support of ISAF Stage III. Casteleijn hoped that
parliamentary approval of the decision would follow a few
weeks later, but noted that prior fulfillment of certain
"pre-conditions" would help obtain broad support in
parliament, especially given concerns recently raised by the
opposition Labor party. Such pre-conditions include securing
U.S. intelligence and logistics support, establishing a PRT
partnership with Australia, and cost-sharing to renovate
Kandahar airport. The Dutch also are considering an
intensive security review of security conditions in and
around Kandahar. Casteleijn suggested that a pitch by the
USG might help convince Australia to team with the
Netherlands in Uruzghan. End summary.

ISAF Stage III
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting with Charge on September 15, Casteleijn
outlined Dutch participation plans for ISAF Stage III in
Uruzghan province. He said the Dutch are well aware of the
challenges posed by the decision to deploy in Uruzghan, a
mountainous region "teeming with Taliban," and see the
deployment as a "true test" of Dutch forces. Casteleijn
added that the security situation to the south along the
border with Pakistan was worrisome, and the subject of
intensive review.


3. (C) Nevertheless, the Dutch government is leaning toward
deploying to Uruzghan by May 2006. Casteleijn expected a
Dutch government decision in favor of the deployment would be
announced by the end of October, followed by parliamentary
debate. He suggested parliamentary approval of the
deployment could follow after one or two weeks, but added
this was not an assured outcome. The recent surge in polls
by the opposition Labor Party (PvdA),he noted, might make it
more eager to engage in a contentious debate on this issue as
it looks to the national elections in 2007. As in every
military debate in parliament since the Srebrenica disaster,
he noted, a key question in parliament will be whether or not
the Dutch government has fully met the post-Srebrenica
"conditions" set to ensure that Dutch troops are properly
deployed and protected.

U.S. Support
--------------


4. (C) Anticipating a vigorous parliamentary debate,
Casteleijn said several factors should be considered
"pre-conditions" to Dutch deployment to Uruzghan in ISAF
Stage III. One of the pre-set list of conditions following
Srebrenica involves coordination with a greater power.
Casteleijn noted that a guarantee of U.S. support -- through
the provision of intelligence or logistics and transport --
would help meet this condition and could be useful in swaying
skeptical members of Parliament.

Partnering with Australia
--------------


5. (C) A second deployment "pre-condition" is finding an
operational partner for the Dutch in the field. Casteleijn
confirmed that the Dutch are still actively engaged with
Australia on this issue. He explained that Parliament will
limit the number of personnel for the PRT deployment to 1000,
ramping up to 1200 once the Dutch assume the rotating
regional command in Kandahar in November 2006. Casteleijn
said that this would not be sufficient to handle the Stage
III PRT. Australian provision of an additional 200-300
soldiers, he said, would bring the PRT manpower level up to
an acceptable number, and should also satisfy the concerns of
Dutch parliamentarians. An Australian partnership made sense
for a number of reasons; Australian special forces, for
example, are familiar with the region and have experience
working closely with the UK, Canada, and the United States.


6. (C) Casteleijn added that the Dutch will seek to continue
their discussions with the Australians on the margins of the
UNGA, and also have asked NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer to weigh
in in favor of a Dutch-Australian Uruzghan partnership.
Casteleijn suggested a USG pitch to the Australians would be
helpful.

Cost-Sharing for Kandahar Airport
--------------


7. (C) Casteleijn said that the cost of repairing the runway
at Kandahar airport has become a third "almost contentious"
issue influencing the Uruzghan deployment. Dutch F-16s out
of Kandahar will support all PRTs involved in Stage III. The
Dutch believe that the cost of renovating the airport should
not fall disproportionately upon themselves and the UK,
Casteleijn said. He suggested some form of cost-sharing or
use of NATO common funds be employed to renovate the airport.


8. (C) Casteleijn added that the Dutch were also looking into
the possibility of transport assistance (C-130s) from the
Canadians and Belgians. (Note: The MOD announced September
20 plans to buy two C-130s and five Chinook helicopters from
the USG. The first C-130 will be operational at the end of
2006; the second in 2007. End note.)

BLAKEMAN