NETHERLANDS/NATO: DUTCH THOUGHTS ON NATO INFORMAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002465

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL NL NATO EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NATO: DUTCH THOUGHTS ON NATO INFORMAL
DEFENSE MINISTERIAL

REF: USNATO 529

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Polmiloff met with Sebastian Reyn (Deputy
Director, Department of General Policy Affairs, MOD)
September 9 to discuss Dutch thinking leading up to the
September 13-14 NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in Berlin.
Reyn handed over an 11-point paper (provided below) that
Dutch Defense Minister Kamp will deliver in Berlin. Reyn
explained that Kamp took NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer's request seriously to propose what NATO might look
like in the next 15 years. As such, Reyn suggested that some
of Kamp's proposals are controversial for some European
Allies and lie "outside the box".


2. (C) Cont. Summary: The paper advocates an expanded role
for the NATO Response Force (NRF),a greater NATO role in
maritime security, a major policy change in favor of missile
defense for Europe, and increased NATO coordination with the
UN, the EU, and the African Union (AU). Polmiloff also
discussed Washington's recent proposal for a mini-summit in
2006, followed by a major summit in 2008. Reyn noted that
the Dutch would examine the proposal, but added that a
mini-summit focusing entirely upon transformation and
capabilities "might not be enough". End summary.

NATO Response Force
--------------


3. (C) Reyn explained that the Dutch have come around on
using the NRF more frequently. Previously, the Dutch had
erred on the side of caution, siding on occasion with the
French to limit the use of the NRF. Now, the Dutch are more
willing to support NRF deployments. Reyn noted that there
are still some concerns regarding undermining force
generation efforts -- the NRF should not fill gaps that
should be filled through other mechanisms. Reyn added that
the Dutch see little distinction between the NRF and the
strategic reserve forces; this burdens the Alliance with
unnecessary financial costs. Reyn concluded with a pitch to
get the USG more involved with the NRF through force
contributions -- hopefully land-based. He added that many
Allies see USG participation in the NRF as an opportunity to
enhance interoperability by "working with the best".
Polmiloff suggested that USG land-based assets were actively
engaged in other efforts in the global war on terrorism.

Maritime Security and Terrorism
--------------


4. (C) Reyn stated that the Dutch will actively support NATO
Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer's recent paper regarding

SIPDIS
NATO's valued added contribution in the fight against
terrorism. Reyn suggested that NATO might play an active
role in enhancing maritime security and by fighting piracy.
He argued that current NATO maritime operations, such as
Operation Active Endeavour, were largely symbolic and limited
in scope -- NATO should focus on areas with high rates of
piracy, such as the Straits of Malacca or the coast of
Somalia.

Missile Defense
--------------


5. (C) Reyn noted that the Dutch are beginning to think about
a missile defense system to protect the European theater --
this reflects a major policy change for the Dutch government.
Previously, the Dutch considered missile defense too costly
and controversial. However, with uncertainty over the
missile programs of a number of countries -- most notably
Iran -- Reyn stated that a missile defense system was now
necessary. He added that Defense Minister Kamp is very
interested in missile defense, having first mentioned it
during a speech in April 2004. Kamp's speech at Berlin will
officially acknowledge that the Dutch are now in favor of
missile defense for Europe.

Coordination with UN, EU, and the African Union
-------------- --


6. (C) Reyn stated that NATO should be more forthcoming and
responsive to the UN; coordination between the two
organizations is lacking. As such, NATO should make clear
that it is willing to deploy in support of a UN operation
once the NRF is fully operational in October 2006. In the
same vein, NATO could also offer its services to assist
planning and logistics in support of a UN operation. Reyn
added that the Netherlands is finding it very difficult to
participate in inefficient and inadequately-planned UN
missions; NATO support to the UN would assist in this regard.
Reyn also suggested that NATO should become more actively
engaged in security sector reform, and increase ties with the
African Union to help it become a more effective regional
organization.

Two Summit Approach
--------------


7. (C) Polmiloff pitched the two-summit outlined in reftel.
Reyn confirmed that the Dutch government is examining the
idea, and supports it in principle. He suggested, however,
that a mini-summit in 2006 focusing just on transformation
and capabilities may not "be enough". Polmiloff stressed the
importance of nailing down transformation at 26 prior to
enlargement considerations. Plus, a summit focusing on
transformation and capabilities should focus on a fully
operational NRF, success in Afghanistan, force generation
reform, and "recapitalizing" the Alliance. Reyn noted that
the Dutch have looked at possible ways to reform the NATO
cost-sharing mechanism, but had no new initiatives.

Kamp Paper for Berlin NATO Informal Defense Ministerial
-------------- --------------


8. Begin text:

- A Practical Vision for a Stronger NATO

- Henk Kamp, NL Minister of Defense

The Secretary General, in his letter of July 29th, expressed
justifiable concern about the slow progress on NATO's
transformation. He called for a discussion of the political
environment in which NATO will be operating in the future. I
will gladly take up his call by offering you my thoughts
about what the Alliance should accomplish in the next ten
years. By doing so, I hope to contribute to the
Comprehensive Political Guidance to be completed before the
end of this year.

NATO's "to do list" in the next ten years, as I see it, must
include the following:

- Maintain the military predominance of the alliance: NATO
should continue to be the world's most powerful military
coalition. Transatlantic cooperation within the NATO
framework provides the best guarantee for peace and security
in the NATO treaty area -- and in particular on the European
continent -- in the 21st century. It also continues to
provide an indispensable avenue for projecting stability in
other parts of the world and for supporting the international
rule of law.

- Provide a more relevant forum for security consultation
among allies: NATO's future depends on the willingness of all
allies -- North American and European -- to consult each
other in the world's important security issues and t build a
security consensus. There is room for improvement, both in
the context of discussing NATO's current operations (e.g.
Afghanistan) and beyond. If NATO is indeed based on shared
values and interests, is there not much to be gained from a
more active political discussion? Is this not the best way
to foster transatlantic unity? I support the efforts of the
SG and encourage him to come forward with further proposals.

- Strengthen NATO as an instrument for collective action: In
today's world, only effective multilateral action can provide
lasting solutions. Against this background, it is vital to
make the NATO Response Force (NRF) into a more effective and
useful tool. There must be a greater willingness to deploy
the NRF, of course without using the NRF to fill gaps that
should be filled otherwise. The sharp distinction between
the NRF and the Strategic Reserve Forces (SRF) makes little
sense in practice and burdens us with unnecessarily high
costs. We should reconsider the policy on this issue. In
addition, I encourage greater involvement of the US, not only
with critical enablers but also with US troops in the NRF to
underscore that it is NATO's pre-eminent tool for collective
action.

- Ensure the interoperability of our armed forces: One of
NATO's most important functions continues to be to ensure
that our armed forces can operate together. Stardardisation,
interoperability, and collective generation of military
capabilities remain at the core of NATO's work. There is,
however, still a lot to be gained in terms of efficiency as
well as interoperability from further standardisation and a
reduction of the diversity of weapon systems being developed
or used. We should make more substantial progress on
enhancing the usability of our forces, including by adapting
NATO's planning mechanisms.

- Deliver a more effective contribution in the fight against
terrorism: The scourge of terrorism will be with us for the
foreseeable future. The military plays an important role in
combating it. NATO's actual response to the terrorist threat
on the whole has been too haphazard. There is a need to
better define NATO's role and contribution in support of UNSG
Annan's comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy to be
welcomed at the UN Summit in September and adopted by the UN
General Assembly. NATO's contribution to combating terrorist
organisations and their infrastructure could be more robust,
both in the framework of its current operations (e.g. in
Afghanistan) and of protecting important sea lanes and
maritime assets against terrorist attacks and piracy.

- Protect NATO territory against the growing missile threat:
Given the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
missile technology, NATO cannot forever evade the question
whether the whole of its territory needs to be protected
against long-range missiles of countries of risk. We need to
further discuss the options and costs of such protection. An
effective missile defence system is only feasible within a
NATO framework (for military-operational, political and
financial reasons).

- Reform NATO's mechanism for generating forces for
operations: The difficulty in generating troops and
capabilities for NATO's mission in Afghanistan has brought
the inadequacy of its current force generation system to
light. This is partly a political problem. In my view,
political consensus within NATO to start an operation
generally entails a commitment by all to participate
militarily, and share in the burdens and the risks of an
operation. Yet it is also a matter of reforming the force
generation system, to lower the threshold for nations to
participate. This reform will have to include the increasing
use of common funding mechanisms for critical enablers and
common infrastructure in theatre and for deployments such as
the NRF.

- Build more effective and cooperative relationships with the
UN, the EU, and the AU: With the UN, NATO's institutional
relationship is so far underdeveloped (even as NATO
cooperates closely with UN missions in the Balkans and
Afghanistan). When the NRF becomes operational in October
2006, NATO should make clear that it could be deployed
following a request by the UN. NATO could also be more
active in providing planning support for UN peacekeeping
operations. NATO and the UN should continue discussions on
how the military and civil aspects of crisis management and
peacekeeping operations could be coordinated better. With
the EU, there already exists a well-established system of
collaboration ('Berlin-plus'). Yet the relationship is too
often hampered by political and bureaucratic rivalry. We
should insist on developing the habit of cooperation and more
regular contacts at all levels of bureaucracy and at the
ministerial level. Our cooperation should cover the widest
possible range of issues, including terrorism. With the AU,
NATO should build on the Sudan experience to seek ways to
support it to become an increasingly effective regional
organisation.

- Make a more effective NATO contribution to solving the
problem of weak states: Weak states are a major source of
problems. In all its operations, NATO is heavily involved in
promoting good governance. It has a wealth of experience
with defence reform in the context of its Partnership for
Peace program. NATO is therefore well placed to provide
valuable support in security sector reform (SSR) and
demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR). Yet
NATO needs to become more active in supporting weak states
(coordinating its efforts with in particular the UN, the AU,
and the EU).

- Provide support to national authorities: There is a growing
interdependency between internal and external security. NATO
should respond to legitimate requests from member states for
assistance, such as during the Olympic games in Greece. In
such cases, deployments of NATO assets in support of national
authorities should be financed by the requesting country.
Armed forces clearly also have a role to play in response to
massive natural disasters such as the Asian tsunami or the
New Orleans floods. In such cases, NATO could act as a
coordinating agency, making use of the EADRCC.

- Last but not least, bring missions that NATO undertakes to
a successful conclusion: NATO's credibility depends on the
results of the missions it undertakes:

-- Afghanistan: NATO will extend operations over all of
Afghanistan in 2006. This will be a momentous moment on the
history of the Alliance. Military involvement through ISAF
will remain necessary in the coming years. The role of NATO
will gradually evolve into that of a security enabler:
increasing Afghan ownership and building up the Afghan
security forces. Coordination and cooperation between the
different SSR-components (military and civilian) should be
enhanced, for instance to promote the rule of law. For
security in the provinces, PRTs will remain the main vehicle.
The reconstruction and stabilisation processes are mutually
reinforcing. NATO's input into the post-Bonn strategy is an
important first step towards a responsible exit strategy.
When would it be safe to transfer full control to the Afghan
authorities? What can NATO usefully do in this regard?
Should NATO assume a bigger role in training Afghan forces?

-- Iraq: NATO's training mission is still hampered by
lingering divisions within the Alliance concerning Iraq as
well as by the security situation in Iraq. All member states
should nonetheless ensure that this mission makes an
effective contribution towards stabilising Iraq. A stable
Iraq is in the vital interest of all. If circumstances so
dictate, NATO should be prepared to train more Iraqi
personnel outside the country.

-- Kosovo: NATO continues to have a vital interest in
transforming the Balkans into a stable region. Its
operational focus will be on Kosovo. In the next few years,
NATO should focus on helping to create the conditions for
resolving the definitive status of Kosovo. This will be f
utmost importance to the future stability of the region.

End text.

BLAKEMAN