NETHERLANDS/VENEZUELA: SEEKING ALLIES TO CONTAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001853

SIPDIS

ROME PLEASE PASS VATICAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET NL EUN VELS
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/VENEZUELA: SEEKING ALLIES TO CONTAIN
CHAVEZ

REF: A. SECSTATE 117165

B. THE HAGUE 1556(NOTAL)

C. ROME 2164

D. CARACAS 1865

E. BRUSSELS USEU 2481

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch remain concerned about Chavez's
intentions and are seeking allies to contain and moderate his
regional and domestic policies. The Dutch hope Venezuela's
social and political traditions will limit his ability to
become a "new Castro," but they are worried about his
interest in the Dutch Antilles. FM Bot plans to visit
Caracas at some point this fall to deliver a "strong message"
against Venezuelan meddling; at this point the Dutch are not
prepared to do much more, but are considering options
(including those outlined in ref d). The Venezuelan desk
officer said the MFA is also considering inviting Chavez to
visit The Hague at some point. END SUMMARY.

DUTCH SEEK ALLIES TO COUNTER CHAVEZ: U.S., BRAZIL, HOLY SEE


2. (C) Poloff discussed ref a demarche points with Dimitri
Vogelaar (MFA, Venezuela Deskoff) on June 24. Noting that
the Dutch enjoyed good relations with Venezuela before Chavez
came to power, Vogelaar regretted that the Dutch now share
the U.S. view that Chavez's influence must be contained,
especially with regard to the Netherlands Antilles (ref b).
In addition to the U.S., the Dutch believe the Holy See (with
whom they have already begun to engage through their missions
in Caracas and Brussels),Brazil, and others could play
useful roles in helping to moderate Chavez's behavior.

CHAVEZ A PROBLEM, BUT NO CASTRO NUEVO


2. (C) The Dutch have reluctantly concluded that Chavez is
here to stay, according to Vogelaar, but doubt he can become
"a new Castro" due to the "checks and balances" inherent in
the Venezuelan system. Vogelaar argued that NGO's, a free
media, and freedom of speech are all deeply embedded in
Venezuela society, and suggested that indigenous opposition
could be more effective "if it were more focused." The Dutch
Embassy in Caracas reports growing dissatisfaction, including
in Chavez's own party, resulting from the obvious failures of
his reform agenda.


3. (C) At the same time, the Dutch are "worried about the
internationalization of the Bolivarian revolution and the
unrest Chavez foments in the entire Andean region," Vogelaar
said. Through contacts with an umbrella organization for
indigenous people, the Dutch have learned of Venezuelan
meddling in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador. Closer to home,
the Dutch DCM in Caracas has reported increased presence of
the national guard in places where they have not been seen
before, especially in the Venezuelan country side. The Dutch
are concerned about harassment of the NGO Sumate. Finally,
the Dutch have protested to the Venezuelan Ambassador to The
Hague about comments that the Venezuelan Consul General made
recently in Curacao criticizing the U.S. and the GoNL.

BOT PLANNING FALL VISIT TO CARACAS


4. (C) Prompted by Dutch concerns over Venezuelan
intentions toward the Netherlands Antilles (ref b),Vogelaar
said his office was encouraging FM Bot to visit Venezuela
this fall to clear the air. (The 1992 visit of the Dutch
Minister of Defense was the last cabinet visit to Venezuela.)
Although a date has not been set, Vogelaar said Bot planned
to tell Chavez "in clear terms" that the Netherlands "will
not tolerate Venezuelan meddling in the Dutch Antilles."
"Chavez does not understand subtle," he noted pointedly.
Vogelaar said Bot would also deliver a strong message
concerning "EU Human Rights Norms" in their meeting.
Vogelaar was aware that Chavez planned to visit Rome in
August (ref c). After initially saying he could neither
confirm nor deny a Chavez visit to the Hague, Vogelaar called
June 29 to say the MFA was actively considering inviting
Chavez to the Hague but was still deciding how and when. At
the Embassy Fourth of July reception on June 28, however, the
Venezuelan DCM denied knowing any plans for Chavez to visit
here.


5. (C) Pressed on what exactly the Dutch were prepared to
do to prevent "Venezuelan meddling" in the Dutch Antilles.
Vogelaar suggested not much, at this point, beyond engaging
with Chavez. Referring to Dutch Ambassador den Haas' report
following his meeting with Ambassador Brownfield (ref d),
which outlined some concrete steps the Dutch and U.S. might
take, Vogelaar said it is now "going up the chain" at the
MFA. He noted that the Dutch already maintain a coast guard
and navy presence in the Dutch Antilles.

AT THE EU, SPAIN CANNOT EXPECT TO LEAD ALONE


6. (C) With regard to EU action, Vogelaar disputed the view
that Spain would dominate policy discussions (ref e). He
noted Dutch Ambassador den Haas had very actively represented
the current EU Presidency in Caracas and after July 1, when
the UK takes over that job, he expects the Ambassador to
continue defending the significant GoNL interests. Back in
Brussels, the GoNL has kept a relatively low profile in EU
councils relative to Spain, such as COLAT. That would
certainly change if Venezuela's threats to GoNL interests
sharpened, Vogelaar concluded.
SOBEL