NNSA ADMINISTRATOR BROOKS' DECEMBER 6-9 VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 007030

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T (U/S JOSEPH),NP/RA (ODLUM) AND NEA/IPA (MAHER)
USDOE FOR NNSA ADMINISTRATOR AMB. LINTON BROOKS, NA-20,
NA-24

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2015
TAGS: PREL OTRA ENRG KNNP PARM PINR PGOV PTER EAID TRGY TSPL IR IS ISRAEL RELATIONS GOI EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBJECT: NNSA ADMINISTRATOR BROOKS' DECEMBER 6-9 VISIT TO
ISRAEL FOCUSES ON CURRENT AND FUTURE COOPERATION, IRAN

REF: A. TEL AVIV 6765

B. TEL AVIV 6751

C. STATE 216108

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear
Security/Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) Linton Brooks visited Israel December
6-9 for a series of discussions of ongoing cooperation
between NNSA and the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).
IAEC Director General Gideon Frank hosted the visit. In
addition to a review of on-going cooperation in
nonproliferation, the two sides discussed Iran, Advanced Fuel
Cycles, recent changes in leadership of the Russian Federal
Atomic Energy Agency, the new IAEA Committee on Safeguards
and Verification, and general scientific cooperation. The
visit included a courtesy call on Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon. End Summary.

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ONGOING COOPERATION REVIEW
--------------


2. (SBU) Brooks and Frank reviewed the status of U.S.-Israeli
cooperation under the September 16, 2004, Letter of Intent
(LOI) on Cooperation in the Fields of Nonproliferation, Arms
Control, Regional Security, and Combating Terrorism. They
covered the following:


A. Both sides agreed that in principle it would be desirable
to convert the SOREQ Reactor to use low enriched uranium,
although the exact legal mechanism remains unclear. Brooks
and Frank agreed that the next step was a technical study to
verify that conversion was feasible. Frank noted that there
had been press interest on this in Israel and proposed the
two sides agree on a common press line (for use only if
asked) saying that the sides thought conversion was a good
idea and were discussing it but that there were no immediate
security concerns. Brooks agreed.


B. The Israelis proposed to expand Megaports cooperation
beyond the Port of Haifa to the Port of Ashdod. Of greater
urgency, however, the Israelis would like Second Line of
Defense equipment installed at Ben Gurion Airport. Brooks
said he would consider this last suggestion and respond as
soon as possible.


C. The sides agreed on three next steps in their ongoing
seismic cooperation: regional array procedures for data
processing, using the Israel Seismic Network as an array, and
computing travel time profiles and earth structure. Frank
noted that Jordan "was on board" with this cooperation.
Brooks promised to provide Frank with a new NNSA point of
contact in this area.


D. Frank reviewed progress in Israel on improving export
control, said the Israelis were looking forward to
forthcoming Commodity Identification Training to be provided
by NNSA, acknowledged that the United States was waiting for
a proposed date, but did not provide such a date.


E. Responding to informal staff discussions, Frank proposed
expanding the LOI to include technical exchanges on the new
IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification and on
Generation IV Reactors Proliferation Resistance. He offered
to provide a draft document documenting such an expansion.


F. Frank noted that the recent emergency management
discussion team headed by retired Rear Admiral Joe Krol had
been among the most valuable interchanges the Israelis have
had with the United States. He said he looked forward to
additional steps, possibly to include modeling and a larger
tabletop exercise. Brooks agreed on the value of the
exchange.

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IAEA COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND VERIFICATION
--------------


3. (C) Frank recalled his suggestion from a previous meeting
that the new IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification
receive field reports directly and without editing. Brooks
said that the United States would be willing to discuss this
topic at the forthcoming U.S.- Israel nonproliferation
discussions in Washington, but that there was reluctance to
embrace the idea because (a) the committee would not be
properly staffed to manage such reports and (b) discussion of
these specifics was premature since the basic structure and
procedures of the committee had yet to be determined. Frank
noted that the real issue was finding a way to insure that
the committee had access to unfiltered information. Frank
feared that the IAEA staff would filter or otherwise distort
field reports in order to preserve a particular IAEA policy
position. Brooks agreed that such an outcome would be
undesirable and should be prevented. Frank noted that his
suggestion on unfiltered access to field reports was only one
approach. It would not be necessary for the committee
actually to receive field reports in all cases. The
knowledge that they could do so would reduce the chance of
distortion -- whether deliberate or inadvertent -- on the
part of the IAEA staff.


4. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting, Frank discussed the
importance of having specific criteria for which states
should be referred to the Committee on Safeguards and
Verification and what additional requirements should be
imposed on such states. Frank suggested that the special
requirements should apply "until the IAEA Board of Governors
determines otherwise." He provided a brief paper entitled
"Additional Transparency and Safeguards Measures."

BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER:

After a state is found in breach of its commitments or in
non-compliance (and as long as the Agency cannot conclude
that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and
activities),special requirements should apply: better
detection capabilities (more comprehensive access to sites,
people and documents with no advance notice, provision of
additional information with shorter defined response time,
more effective use of technological means -- on line remote
sensing, etc.) and special reporting requirements (inspection
field reports to the BOG (chairman plus...); full, immediate
and factual reports to every BOG meeting (any denial of
access, all unanswered questions) in addition to the
comprehensive format used in September 2005; special BOG
meeting in case of anomaly (Chair,s call, not the
secretariat)).

SIPDIS

END TEXT OF PAPER.

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INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION
--------------


5. (SBU) Frank noted that security conditions had heretofore
limited Israel's interest in commercial nuclear power. If,
as Frank hoped, the peace process prevailed, then within five
to ten years it would clearly be in Israel's interest to move
to develop commercial nuclear power in order to reduce
dependence on energy imports. In view of this, Frank
wondered whether it would be possible for the United States
to structure the changes in legal regimes that would be
needed for civil nuclear cooperation with India in a way that
would subsequently allow them to apply to Israel. Brooks
responded that it would be extremely unhelpful for Israel to
pursue this issue at this time. The U.S. strategy is to
carve out a specific exemption for India rather than create a
new regime. The United States distinguishes India from
Pakistan on the basis of nonproliferation performance and
India from Israel on the basis of an immediate need for
growth of civil nuclear power.


6. (SBU) In a subsequent separate conversation, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Director General Ron Prosor raised the issue
of providing criteria that could ultimately apply to Israel.
Prosor assured Brooks that the Government of Israel
understood the message previously conveyed by Under Secretary
of State Joseph that now was not the time to raise the issue
formally. Still, he hoped that the United States would
consider specific criteria, especially in domestic
legislation, which would make it easier to approve similar
cooperation with Israel in the future.


7. (SBU) Frank returned to this subject a third time at a
subsequent meeting at which he provided a paper entitled
"Generic Eligibility Criteria for Peaceful Nuclear Technology
Cooperation with the U.S.," containing what he characterized
as personal suggestions of what appropriate criteria might be.

BEGIN TEXT OF ISRAELI PAPER:

General orientation. The country:
a. Is a U.S. ally.
b. Is generally willing to accommodate U.S. foreign policy
interests.
c. Has a stable democratic regime.
d. Recognizes the existence of its neighbors, and does not
threaten to destroy any other country.
e. Has a credible energy requirement for nuclear generation
of electricity, and for civilian nuclear applications such as
radio-pharmaceutical.

Non-Proliferation. The country:
a. Has a solid non-proliferation record (it is neither
suspected nor was it caught in violation of its IAEA
safeguards obligations),it does not constitute a
proliferation risk and it could be a useful ally of the U.S.
in the non-proliferation domain.
b. Has advanced nuclear technology (it has both nuclear
reactors and the scientific-technological infrastructure to
support them),which it handles in a responsible and
accountable manner.
c. Is willing to apply full safeguards on all nuclear power
plants for electricity production, as well as on the
scientific-technological infrastructure that supports them.
d. Is an adherent to the NSG and MTCR.
e. Has an effective system of nuclear and dual-use export
controls that includes an enforcement mechanism, including on
the export of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and
is supporting international efforts to limit their spread.
f. Is committed to a moratorium on nuclear testing.
g. Implements physical security, as well as accountancy and
control measures based on the highest international standards
on any fissile material and sensitive nuclear facilities in
its territory (including being a party to the CPPNM) and
endorses relevant IAEA codes of conduct on the safety and
security of research reactors and radioactive sources.
h. Has taken steps to implement UNSC resolution 1540.
i. Has endorsed the PSI.

END TEXT OF ISRAELI PAPER.

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RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENTS
--------------


8. (C) Brooks and Frank exchanged impressions of the new head
of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom),Sergei
Kiriyenko. Brooks noted that the Secretary of Energy had
spoken to him and that Kiriyenko said the right things about
nonproliferation cooperation. Nonetheless, both agreed that
his appointment signaled a desire to focus on improving
Rosatom's commercial business and that this could make it
more difficult to gain cooperation on Iran, where Rosatom had
been somewhat helpful in the past. Frank was particularly
concerned by this because of the importance he attached to
referring Iran to the UN Security Council and imposing
sanctions as soon as possible. Frank said he had been
directed by the Prime Minister to visit Russia as soon as
possible. Brooks said he also hoped to visit Moscow shortly.
They agreed to keep each other informed of any new insights.


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ADVANCED FUEL CYCLES
--------------


9. (U) Brooks noted the growing U.S. belief that the global
economy would require significant growth in commercial
nuclear power. The waste disposal aspects of that growth
might well require some form of reprocessing that did not
entail separating plutonium but permitted greater extraction
of energy content (probably in fast burner reactors) and
significant reduction in waste requiring disposal. Frank
agreed with the importance of this area and said the Israelis
had discussed the topic with the French (no details were
provided). He suggested that the United States consider
packaging the approach differently. Instead of
"reprocessing" we should speak of waste recycling and
separation. Instead of advanced burners, we should speak of
waste burners. Frank felt that this terminology would help
defuse the (erroneous) implication that the expansion of
nuclear power presented nonproliferation issues.


10. (U) While agreeing with Frank, IEAC Chief Scientist Dov
Shvarts also noted that global expansion of nuclear power
would require many reactors in non-fuel cycle states. He
argued that these should be developed with lifetime cores (to
minimize the need for refueling and thus for potential
diversion of fuel) and that they should be fast reactors (so
that if a state attempted to use them for weapons purposes
the plutonium 239/plutonium 240 ration would be unfavorable).


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VISA PROBLEMS FOR SCIENTISTS
--------------


11. (U) Shvarts provided Brooks with a copy of a June 20,
2005 letter to the U.S. Embassy expressing concerns over U.S.
visa policy. He and Frank said that scientific cooperation
was being significantly hampered by new U.S. practices. The
greatest concerns were excessive delays in granting visas and
a new U.S. policy of invalidating long-term visas if a
short-term visa of another category was issued. Shvarts gave
personal example. He holds a two-year "B" visa allowing for
multiple trips to the United States for conferences. He is
shortly to take a three-month sabbatical and has been invited
to spend it at the University of Rochester. He has been
advised, however, that a pre-condition for issuing him a
three-month "J" visa would be the cancellation of his
existing "B" visa. As a result, he anticipates that he will
spend his sabbatical doing research within the European
Union. He asserted that this problem (and result) was
widespread. Brooks promised to pass on these concerns to the
Department (copy of letter provided separately).

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ADDITIONAL AREAS OF SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION
--------------


12. (U) Frank and Shvarts said they would be interested in
discussions of how the Department of Energy self-regulates
facilities, especially research reactors, and would like to
exchange best practices in this area. They also expressed
interest in technical exchange on wet fuel storage and
corrosion issues. Finally, the Israelis asked for assistance
with regard to access to Monte Carlo codes relevant to
safeguards that are maintained by the Radiation Safety
Information Computational Center at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory. Shvarts noted that they had access to earlier
versions of the codes but that after 9/11 they had been
denied access to updates. Brooks noted that all of these
areas were the responsibility of other officials within the
Department of Energy, but that he would see what could be
done.

-------------- --------------
COURTESY CALL ON PM SHARON - ISRAELI VIEWS ON IRAN
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Accompanied by Frank, Brooks met for 25 minutes with
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The meeting was an
Israeli initiative and was billed as a combination courtesy
call and indication of the importance of the strategic
relationship. After a brief discussion of the cooperation in
nonproliferation that had brought Brooks to Israel, Sharon
turned to Iran. He cited his long relationship with
President Bush extending back to the President's days as
Governor. He said throughout this period he had consistently
told the President that he was willing to take risks for
peace. He was not, however, willing to take risks with the
survival of the Jewish State. Iran posed a threat to that
survival. It was imperative that Iran be dealt with. The
Prime Minister did not believe that Israel needed to be the
"sharp end of the spear" in dealing with Iran, but the
problem could not be allowed to continue. It was imperative
that Iran be referred to the Security Council and that
sanctions be imposed. Sharon noted that he had tasked Frank
with preparing a recommended list of sanctions that would
have maximum effect on the Iranian weapons program and that
Frank was in the process of doing so. (Comment: Frank had
not mentioned this fact to Brooks previously despite some
earlier discussion between them on Iran and the importance of
sanctions.) Sharon did not mention military options, but
repeatedly characterized the existing situation as
unacceptable and stressed his unwillingness to take risks
with the survival of Israel.


14. (SBU) Frank made similar points to Brooks in earlier
discussions. In discussing the general political situation
Frank agreed that a secular Iranian government was equally
likely to pursue nuclear weapons but still felt a secular
government would be preferable because it would be more
susceptible to pressure from the application of sanctions.
Frank expressed frustration with the failure of the IAEA
process to lead to a referral to the Security Council. He
noted that while there were no technical problems with the
recent EU3/Russian proposal to allow uranium conversion in
Iran for enrichment in Russia, the effort was a perfect
example of Iran's thus-far-successful salami slice approach
to the negotiations.

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NON-SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS
--------------


15. (U) In addition to the substantive discussions noted
above, Under Secretary Brooks signed a memorandum of
understanding on Megaports with the Israel Ministry of
Transport, laid a wreath commemorating Holocaust Victims at
Yad Vashem, delivered a closed lecture at the Jaffee Center
at Tel Aviv University (interagency cleared text available on
both the Jaffee and NNSA web sites),visited the SOREQ
Nuclear Research Center for a series of briefings, primarily
focused on laser research, and embarked for four hours on the
Israeli submarine INS Dolphin, where he observed various
training exercises. The submarine ride, where Brooks was
accompanied by his Executive Staff Director, a Navy Submarine
Captain, was suggested by the Israelis based on Brooks' past
career as a U.S. submarine officer. Impressions of Dolphin
and her crew have been provided separately to the U.S. Naval
Attache.


16. (U) Under Secretary Brooks has cleared this cable.

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