SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR BROOKS' DECEMBER 6-9

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 006751

SIPDIS

DOE FOR NNSA ADMINISTRATOR AMBASSADOR LINTON BROOKS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IPA (MAHER) AND NP/RA (ODLUM)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV PTER EAID ENRG ETTC MASS OTRA PARM TRGY TSPL GOI INTERNAL GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS ISRAEL RELATIONS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR BROOKS' DECEMBER 6-9
VISIT TO ISRAEL

Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Mr. Ambassador: Your visit to Israel will be taking
place at a time when Israel's domestic political situation is
in flux and progress is being made on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Anxiety in Israel is high about Iran and its
nuclear weapons program, political instability in Syria and
Lebanon, and the terrorist threats that emanate from those
two countries, as well as from Palestinian controlled areas.
Amid all of this, the U.S.-Israel relationship remains
strong, based on our support for Israel since its formation
in 1948, our shared cultural and political values, and our
common strategic interests. Despite some turbulence in the
relationship over significant technology transfer scandals,
our cooperation in scientific research areas involving the
DOE, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, and Israel's Soreq
Nuclear Research Center has proceeded and is viewed
positively by the Israeli side.

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ISRAEL'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN FLUX
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2. (U) Since the withdrawal of Jewish settlers, and the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) protecting them, from the Gaza
Strip and four settlements in the northern West Bank in
August, Israel's political situation has been in flux, with
"rebels" from Prime Minister (PM) Ariel Sharon's own Likud
Party -- and former PM Binyamin Netanyahu -- challenging
Sharon's leadership. Then, on November 9, Labor Member of
the Knesset (MK) Amir Peretz successfully challenged former
PM Shimon Peres for the leadership of the Labor party,
securing for himself leadership of the second largest party
in PM Sharon's coalition government. Labor subsequently
withdrew from the government. In a bold response to the
rebels within his own party, PM Sharon then left Likud and
asked President Katsav to dissolve by decree Israel's
parliament, the Knesset. Labor's calls for early elections
led to an agreement by all parties to hold general elections
in March 2006 (instead of, as scheduled, in November),
kicking off the general election campaign. PM Sharon is now
building up his new "Go Forward" (Kadima) Party with MKs
defecting from Likud, Labor and other parties in the Knesset.
At the same time, he is reaching out to mayors across Israel
to garner support from Israel's political center.


3. (C) You are scheduled to meet with PM Sharon on December

8. Our GOI contacts caution, however, that the meeting could
be canceled as a result of fast-breaking political events.
Our contacts have assured us that the meeting -- organized by
the Israel Embassy in Washington, D.C. -- is essentially a
courtesy call, and that any substantive discussions would be
limited to a general, positive review of the DOE's
cooperation with its Israeli counterparts.

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PROGRESS IS BEING MADE ON PALESTINIAN ISSUES
--------------


4. (C) In a process the Israelis called "disengagement" and
the Palestinians called "withdrawal," Israel under PM Sharon
took the bold step in August of withdrawing from the Gaza
Strip and a portion of the northern West Bank Jewish settlers
and the IDF units protecting them. The withdrawal process
went very smoothly and was broadly hailed as a bold and
creative step. As a result of the execution of Sharon's
disengagement policy and implementation of the November 15
Agreement on Movement and Access, brokered by Secretary Rice,
the Palestinians now have a significant degree of control
over the Gaza Strip. The agreement brokered by the Secretary
opens the way to (a) opening the Rafah border crossing
between Gaza and Egypt; (b) resuming convoys between Gaza and
the West Bank; (c) increasing throughflow at crossing points
between Israel and the occupied territories; (d) decreasing
restrictions on movement within the West Bank, and (e) making
progress on a seaport and airport for Gaza.


5. (C) Problems remain that could significantly affect future
progress on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The PA is
having difficulty asserting its authority in Gaza and the
West Bank as its ruling party, Fatah, is riven by internal
rivalries, and is being challenged by terrorist groups like
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),and other
armed militias and clans. Palestinian Authority (PA)
President Mahmud Abbas secured an agreement from Hamas in
March to stop attacks in order to allow disengagement to
proceed, but Hamas and PIJ have conducted some attacks since
this "Hudna" (calm) went into effect. The GOI continues to
press PA President Abbas to assert his authority and
dismantle the Palestinian terrorist groups as the first step
in implementing President Bush's road map. The PA prefers to
address the situation more gradually, fearful of provoking
widespread clashes. The GOI has also called on the PA not to
allow Hamas to run in January 2006 Palestinian Legislative
Council elections. Its argument is that terrorist groups
should not be allowed to participate in democratic elections.
The PA response has been that elections will empower the PA
to disarm militias subsequently. It is widely expected that
Hamas candidates will run in the election.


6. (U) U.S. policy remains firmly anchored in President
Bush's historic vision -- first enunciated in June 2002 -- of
two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in
peace and security. The USG remains committed to the
performance-based road map under the auspices of the Quartet
(the U.S., Russia, UN and EU) as the means for achieving the
President's vision. The Israeli and Palestinian sides have
endorsed the road map -- both with reservations -- but need
to take additional steps. Israel must continue to work with
Palestinian leaders to improve the daily lives of
Palestinians, while avoiding any activity that prejudices
final status negotiations. As the President has noted, this
means that Israel must remove unauthorized West Bank outposts
and stop settlement expansion. It also means that the
barrier now being built to protect Israelis from terrorist
attacks must be a security barrier, rather than a political
one, and take into account its impact on Palestinians who do
not threaten Israel's security. On the other side, the
Palestinians must stop terrorism, dismantle the terrorist
infrastructure within their society, and take steps to ensure
that a democratic society -- with open and transparent
governance -- takes root. The storming by armed militants of
polling stations in Gaza during the Fatah primaries on
November 28 shows that they still have a number of major
issues to address, just as continuing Israeli settlement
construction and planned barrier construction in sensitive
areas shows that progress remains to be made on the Israeli
side.


7. (U) Because of both ongoing negotiations to implement the
Secretary's November 15 agreement and political campaigning

SIPDIS
by Israeli officials in the run-up to the March elections, we
suggest that you avoid these topics to the extent possible,
and engage your hosts on the broad range of DOE issues.

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ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORHOOD PRESENTS CHALLENGES
--------------


8. (C) Israel maintains that the greatest existential threat
it faces is a nuclear-armed Iran. This issue of Iran's
nuclear weapons program and how we intend to confront it are
the subject of intense interest and concern on the part of
Israel's political and military leadership. Israel's
position is that the international community should press
Iran harder -- diplomatically and via the threat of sanctions
-- to get it to abandon its weapons program. They accept
that the USG continues to support the EU3 process, but Israel
is frustrated by what it believes is the EU3's record of
concessions to Iran (e.g., uranium conversion) for little in
return. Privately, GOI and IDF contacts have said that, at
best, we can slow down Iran's program, but probably cannot
stop it. Most Israeli officials also do not believe at this
stage that anyone could successfully confront Iran
militarily, noting that elements of Iran's nuclear program
are dispersed throughout Iran and, in some cases, probably
are hidden.


9. (C) Israel's northern border with Lebanon and Syria
remains tense, and flared up on November 21 with attempted
Hizballah incursions into Israel with the likely aim of
kidnapping Israeli soldiers. IDF units positioned along the
border -- operating under strict orders to show restraint in
responding to Hizballah challenges -- successfully repelled
the November 21 attacks, killing four Hizballah fighters.
Israel returned the bodies of the fighters to the Lebanese
government with the assistance of the Red Cross. The border
is currently calm. Since Israel's withdrawal in 2000 from
Southern Lebanon, the GOL has consistently resisted all
international pressure to move Lebanese Armed Forces into
areas along the border occupied by Hizballah. For the time
being, UN peacekeepers assigned to the UN Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL) try to maintain an uneasy calm on the
Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon border, often times
within eyeshot of Hizballah positions -- a situation that
causes consternation within the GOI and IDF.


10. (C) As the Mehlis investigation into the assassination of
former Lebanese PM Hariri gets closer to supporters of Syrian
President Al-Assad, there is concern within the GOI that
Syria will lash out at Israel to deflect international
attention away from the investigation. Indeed, the general
consensus within the GOI is that this was the reason for the
Hizballah attacks on November 21. GOI and IDF officials
maintain that Al-Assad needs to be pressured into behaving
according to international norms, but should not be pushed to
the point of collapse, as this would -- in their view --
likely result in his regime's replacement by the growing
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.


11. (C) Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1979, and
relations between the two countries have been peaceful, if
somewhat cold, since then, with marked progress made during
disengagement as a result of Egyptian-Israeli coordination
over the Egypt-Gaza border. Israeli defense planners
maintain that Egypt remains a serious potential military
threat, and note that President Mubarak could in the future
be replaced by a leader less friendly to Israel. As a
result, GOI officials frequently complain about U.S. military
sales to Egypt.


12. (C) Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994, and
relations between the two countries are good. Jordan has
control of its border with Israel and prevents infiltration
in either direction.


13. (U) We recommend that you avoid answering requests to
comment on Iran's nuclear program and how to deal with it.
If you are pressed, we suggest you answer as follows:

-- Iran's pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle makes no sense
considering the oil wealth of that country, and considering
the lack of domestic uranium reserves in Iran to support a
nuclear fuel cycle. It is unnecessarily provocative and
destabilizing to regional and international security.

-- The U.S. is pursuing a multilateral approach to dealing
with Iran's nuclear weapons program, supporting the efforts
of the EU3 and other like-minded nations that are rightly
concerned with Iran's program. We are committed to widening
the diplomatic consensus on the steps Iran must take to
resolve this issue -- including cooperating fully with the
IAEA and agreeing not to seek fissile material production
capability in Iran.

-- If Iran refuses to return to negotiations on that basis,
the next step should be an IAEA Board decision that reports
Iran to the UN Security Council.

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COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. IS EXCELLENT
--------------


14. (C) The U.S. enjoys a strategic partnership with Israel,
and overall relations between our two countries are
excellent, based on U.S. support for Israel since its
formation in 1948. The relationship recently suffered a
bumpy period, however, due to high-profile tech transfer
scandals -- the most noteworthy in recent times being
Israel's sale of Harpy UAVs to China, an act that the USG
maintains helped to put U.S. and allied forces in the Pacific
at risk. In response to our concern about these transfers,
Israel signed a Statement of Understanding (SOU) with the
Pentagon in August requiring coordination on future,
sensitive defense sales to third countries. GOI and IDF
officials go overboard to stress that the signing of the SOU
means that technology transfer scandals are "water under the
bridge." The USG position is that Israel still has much work
to do in order to restore the USG's trust in Israel's export
control system.


15. (C) Israel and the U.S. exchange information and
coordinate on policy through our annual Strategic Dialogue,
the Joint Political-Military Working Group (JPMG),and the
Defense Policy Advisory Group (DPAG). The last round of the
Strategic Dialogue took place in Washington, D.C. November
28-29. The next JPMG is scheduled for January 2006.


16. (C) The fallout over the technology transfer scandals has
not affected cooperation between the Department of Energy and
the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and Soreq Nuclear
Research Center (NRC) under the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) and the February 2000 Letter of Intent (LOI). Work
continues on the several projects covered by the MOU and LOI.
In August, a DOE delegation visited the Soreq NRC as part of
an effort to enhance U.S.-Israel cooperation on combating
radiological terrorism and mitigating the effects of
radiological device detonations. The Israeli side was very
pleased with that visit and looks forward to cooperation on
this and other issues. In March, we discussed with Israel
the idea of its participation in the Foreign Research Reactor
Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance program, but the Israelis
declined because (a) they claim that the DOE management fee
is too expensive for them; and (b) contrary to the program's
requirements, they wish to continue operating the Soreq NRC
on highly-enriched uranium fuel. The Megaports project has
been embraced as an integral part of Israeli border security
by a GOI interagency team that includes key members of
Israel's National Security Council, the IAEC, and customs
authorities.


17. (U) This cable has been cleared with State's NP/RA and
NEA/IPA.

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