Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV6628
2005-11-23 12:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

ISRAELI NSA EILAND ON HAMAS IN ELECTIONS, PEACE

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 006628 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV PINS PREF PTER ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSA EILAND ON HAMAS IN ELECTIONS, PEACE
WITH THE PALESTINIANS

Classified By: Political Counselor Norm Olsen. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

-------
SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 006628

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV PINS PREF PTER ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSA EILAND ON HAMAS IN ELECTIONS, PEACE
WITH THE PALESTINIANS

Classified By: Political Counselor Norm Olsen. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Israeli National Security Adviser Giora Eiland told
NEA DAS Robert Danin November 18 that Hamas will continue to
honor the tadiyah ("calm") as long as it believes it serves
its interests. Eiland said the calm could be extended
through Israeli general elections scheduled for March 2006,
or could be disregarded after Palestinian elections in
January. Eiland assessed the Labor Party's new leader, Amir
Peretz, as representing the very left of his party, and
suggested that Peretz might push for a final settlement with
the Palestinians. He suggested that another "unilateral
disengagement" is unlikely due to the short time before
Israel's general elections, but admitted that the current or
future GOI could make some bold moves if it calculated that
Israel would get a better deal for being cooperative from the
current U.S. administration in comparison to a future one.
Eiland suggested that the Palestinians could be encouraged to
take more moderate, constructive positions on peace if
neighboring Arab countries were pulled into the process and
forced to take positions on issues. Eiland said that Israel
is not overly concerned about the power of Hamas as a result
of its participation in January 2006 Palestinian general
elections because it believes that the Palestinian Authority
cannot accomplish anything of importance, regardless of
whether it is strengthened or weakened by Hamas's
performance. Eiland suggested that PA President Abbas has no
interest in taking on Hamas and other terrorist
organizations, attributing this to weakness in his character.
End Summary.

-------------- --------------
ELECTIONS CERTAIN TO INFLUENCE ATTITUDES TOWARDS PEACE
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Asked by Danin about the tadiyah, Eiland mused that
it might be extended until the Palestinian elections
scheduled for January, and the Israeli elections scheduled

for March. He suggested that Hamas has good reason to
maintain the tadiyah until the results of the elections and
their consequences are known. After that, he supposed
Hamas's approach might change. In this respect, Eiland
thought the current situation might last for the next two
months. If Hamas decides that the tadiyah serves their
interest, then the "relative calm" will continue. Eiland
stressed that the current calm is relative because Israel
does not count every time the Palestinians launch a Qassam
rocket or mortar shell into Israel from the Gaza Strip. "We
ignore them now, even though there have been dozens of
launches since disengagement."


3. (C) Eiland suggested that the Labor Party's new leader,
Amir Peretz, might try to push for jumping ahead to final
status negotiations with the Palestinians. He noted that in
recent public statements, Peretz has said that, in contrast
to Sharon, the time had come to resume a political dialogue
with the Palestinians with a view towards reaching a final
settlement. In this respect, Eiland said that Peretz is not
very different from Yossi Bielin and his Meretz party: "He's
very left-wing, to the left of the left wing, while Ehud
Barak would, in comparison, be characterized as representing
the right of the left wing."

-------------- --------------
EILAND: HAMAS PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS OF LITTLE CONCERN
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Eiland said that he is "not really concerned" about
Hamas's participation in the January Palestinian elections.
Eiland explained that Israel's policy on this issue is very
simple -- Israel is not concerned about Hamas increasing its
power, because Israel does not believe that there is a
"legitimate, accountable and practical" Palestinian Authority
that may be either strengthened or weakened as a result of
elections in the first place. Eiland stressed, "We don't
believe that this existing Palestinian Authority is capable
of doing important things. Whether Hamas is strong or not is
not important in this situation." Eiland continued: "If
Hamas takes control of Gaza, I am not sure that it will be so
terrible for Israel. We cannot see change in the performance
of the Palestinian Authority even if Hamas is not
strengthened."

-------------- --------------
EILAND ON ABBAS AND TERRORIST GROUPS, PEACE PROCESS
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Making it clear that he could not know for sure,
Eiland suggested that Abbas's inability to deal with Hamas
reflects his desire not to take on the terrorist
organization. Eiland observed: "When I was in the military,
our platoon leader used to tell us, 'I can't' is the cousin
of 'I don't want to.' In other words, when people say they
cannot do something, it is usually because they do not want
to do something." Eiland said that the Palestinians need to
make an important strategic decision to give up terrorism for
political gain. He said he does not believe this will happen
for the foreseeable future, and attributed this to something
lacking in Abbas's character, or his "lack of understanding
of the Palestinian people and what they need."


6. (C) Eiland admitted that Abbas has spoken out against
terrorism, but stressed that he has not followed through with
action. He said the Israeli and Palestinian positions on the
way ahead do not differ much on substance, but diverge on
process. He explained that the GOI position is that the
Palestinians first have to dismantle the terrorist
organizations before the two sides can discuss political
issues, while the Palestinians need to see a clear political
solution with a timetable for implementation and
international guarantees before they will disband Hamas and
other terrorist groups. Eiland said, "They do not say this
to you, but this is what they mean. I do not blame them, and
can understand them. They do not see it as a smart move to
confront Hamas and other militant groups before a guaranteed
political outcome. We will not be able to change our
position so long as they retain theirs as it is."


7. (C) Eiland said that if Abbas is given the choice to make
the "correct, strategic decision" or to maneuver for
advantage between groups, he will choose the latter option,
regardless of the results from the upcoming elections.
Eiland mused that this is probably because Abbas is a
tactician. He observed that there are some Palestinians who
believe that time serves their interests, and suggested that
Abbas may be one of them.

-------------- --------------
ELECTION ISSUES: "WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY WAITING?
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Eiland said he believes that the question of whose
interests time serves will become a controversial issue in
upcoming Israeli general elections. He wondered aloud:
"Will Israelis insist on security provisions before political
dialogue? Or should we change our policy and try to reach an
agreement now, keeping in mind that the current U.S.
administration may be more friendly to Israel than future
administrations?" Eiland suggested that there are two
reasons for trying to reach a deal with the Palestinians now:


A. Even if Israel jumps to a final settlement based on
President Bush's letter to PM Sharon -- including on
substantive issues like territory and defensible borders --
some Israelis suggest that it will be easier for Israel to
obtain what it wants with the help of the current U.S.
administration; and


B. The current strategic environment is good for Israel:
"Iran does not yet possess nuclear weapons. Syria is weak.
There is more support in Arab states for the peace process
than there used to be. All of this equates to less external
pressure on Israel's borders."


9. (C) Eiland stressed that since Israel realizes that 90
percent of the final settlement is known to everyone,
including provisions on Israel's borders, the status of
Jerusalem, and security provisions, it raises the question,
"Why wait ten years to reach an agreement that can be reached
now?" Eiland predicted that the issue will be a defining one
for the political Left, based on Labor's principles and
Peretz's leadership.

-------------- --------------
EILAND ON POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER, UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Eiland said that the notion of another unilateral
disengagement could be eclipsed by new elections. He
explained that if the elections were to take place in
November 2006, PM Sharon would be forced to reveal his
political plan for carrying disengagement to the next step:
"In such a situation, saying that Israel will wait on the
Palestinians would not be enough." With elections on the
near horizon, however, Eiland said it is hard to imagine that
the PM will be able to come up with another initiative before
elections. Eiland suggested that if Sharon leaves Likud,
(NOTE: Which he has since done. END NOTE.),he may need a
new agenda, feeling that he needs to differentiate himself
from Netanyahu and the other Likud "rebels." Eiland observed
that PM adviser Dov Weisglass and others are thinking about
unilateral withdrawal, but Eiland said he does not believe
they will persuade Sharon. Eiland said that thoughts about
another unilateral withdrawal are based on the assumption
that Israel will get something more substantial from the
international community in return -- especially from the U.S.


11. (C) Eiland laid out three possible next steps, stressing
that the decision would depend on the response from the U.S.:


A. some sort of symbolic withdrawal from the West Bank;

B. a more significant withdrawal from the West Bank;

C. revert to the fence/barrier (an option Eiland said would
be the "most courageous") Eiland said that if it chose this
option, then Israel could claim that according to UN
Resolution 242, the land remaining on the Israeli side of the
security fence would remain Israeli. He said such an option
might be smart if one thinks far into the future. It would
not be worth it, he said, if one were thinking only about
reducing tensions with the Palestinians.


12. (C) Eiland said that until recently, Ehud Barak said
Israel should withdraw to the fenceline and then reach an
agreement with the U.S. and the international community that
this solves the problems of occupation until a final
settlement is found. Israel would then insist that until a
final settlement is reached, no further requirements could be
levied on Israel. Eiland characterized this line of thinking
as very far from the way PM Sharon thinks. He said that he
cannot imagine that Sharon would decide to execute an
additional withdrawal for nothing.

-------------- --------------
EILAND SUGGESTS AN ARAB ROLE IS NEEDED IN THE PEACE PROCESS
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Eiland said that if one recalls Aqaba, Sharm-el-Sheik
and Camp David, there needs to be an Arab role in supporting
Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts. He suggested that Israel
had not done a good job translating this view into policy,
mainly because it would "open up a can of worms." On the
other hand, he observed, Israel has already invited the Arabs
in by involving Egypt in disengagement. He wondered aloud
that there may be a role for Jordan or Saudi Arabia.


14. (C) Eiland observed that there are two different levels
of assistance that Israel's Arab neighbors could provide.


A. tactical assistance: Saudi Arabia has decreased funding
to Hamas, but has not completely stopped it, and could do
more. Egypt could do more to regulate the Egypt-Gaza border.


B. strategic assistance: Eiland said that if the parties
stay with a two-state solution, Israel and the Palestinians
will have to make concessions. Eiland maintained that it
will be easier for the Palestinians to make concessions on
issues like the final status of Jerusalem and refugees if
they are supported by the Arabs on these issues. Eiland said
that what is needed is for the Arabs to support the
Palestinians on other concessions, especially on religious
issues. He admitted that it may be premature to discuss such
issues now, but also suggested that the final status of
Jerusalem will not be as difficult to resolve as people
think. He said that you can divide Jerusalem into two parts:
1) all the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem; and 2) the Old
City (one kilometer squared),the mountain, and all the
important religious sites. The latter, he said, would be the
real problem. Eiland said that Abbas probably understands
well that the refugee problem cannot be solved with Israel.
Eiland said that Abbas needs partners to realize a solution
to the refugee problem. If the Lebanese government gives
full residence rights to the Palestinians living in Lebanon,
this would help Abbas to be more moderate. If the Saudis
recognize the two-state solution as meaning a Palestinian
state and a Jewish state, then this would be significant.
Eiland explained that the current problem is that there are
differing interpretations as to what the two-state solution
means.


15. (U) DAS Danin cleared on this cable.

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