Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV6578
2005-11-21 11:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

ISRAELI NSC CHIEF: GOI "ALONE" IN CONFRONTING

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 006578 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2015
TAGS: KPAL KWBG PGOV PREL PTER IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSC CHIEF: GOI "ALONE" IN CONFRONTING
HAMAS; WILL NEITHER HINDER NOR HELP PLC ELECTIONS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for Reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 006578

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2015
TAGS: KPAL KWBG PGOV PREL PTER IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSC CHIEF: GOI "ALONE" IN CONFRONTING
HAMAS; WILL NEITHER HINDER NOR HELP PLC ELECTIONS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for Reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: National Security Council (NSC) Chairman
Giora Eiland told Congressman Robert Wexler (D-FL) on
November 14 that the GOI feels "alone" in opposing any Hamas
participation in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative
Council (PLC) elections. The GOI felt obliged to state
publicly that it will neither help nor hinder the PLC
elections. The GOI, for example, will not work with the PA
on easing the movement of candidates and voters as it had
during the January 2005 presidential election. Eiland,
however, said no extraordinary measures will be imposed to
prevent the movement of Hamas candidates not suspected of
involvement in terrorist activity. Eiland said that PA
President Mahmud Abbas's refusal to move against Hamas and
other militant groups had actually set back the roadmap. He
said he doubted that Abbas is fully committed to a two-state
solution. Eiland said he has little hope of any progress
toward a final settlement as long as the PA continues to
tolerate the existence of Palestinian militant groups and
terror networks. Eiland recommended that the international
community take a tougher stance against militant groups and
insist on the disarming of militant groups as a condition for
further assistance to both the PA and the Lebanese
government. He suggested that the GOI may demonstrate
greater flexibility on some peace process issues as the Likud
reacts to the recent Labor Party leadership change. End
summary.

--------------
Hamas on the Rise
--------------


2. (C) Eiland began his meeting with Congressman Wexler by
recounting the events leading up to PA President Abbas (Abu
Mazen) securing an agreement with Hamas on a period of "calm"
(tahdi'a) in the security sphere. In exchange for that calm,
according to Eiland, Abbas agreed to fully integrate Hamas
into the political process, including membership in the PLO.

Eiland asserted that the GOI initially refrained from raising
its objections to this arrangement directly with Abbas.
Since that time, however, Hamas has increased its political
activities and gained in stature among Palestinians. Eiland
said that, in contrast to Western concepts of opposition
groups, Hamas sees itself as equal to the PA and capable of
independently determining what is in the Palestinians'
national interest regardless of the PA's position.


3. (C) Eiland asserted that Hamas is part of a larger
movement -- the Muslim Brothers -- and as such is committed
to an agenda broader than Palestinian aspirations.
Compromise is not in the spirit of this movement. The
existence of Hamas itself, Eiland continued, is based on two
principles: First, the rejection of the State of Israel and
any political system allowing Jews to govern Muslims; and
second, the only acceptable government for Palestinians is
one based on Islamic rule. Eiland suggested that Hamas may
see fit to compromise on minor issues in the short-term, but
will not change its strategic goals. As a result, the GOI
"can't live with a reality" where Hamas operates
simultaneously as a legitimate political organization and as
an armed movement.

--------------
No Help, No Hindrance
--------------


4. (C) Eiland advised that, given Hamas's ascendency, its
continued militancy and the PA's inability to disarm it, the
GOI announced that it would neither help nor hinder the
January 2006 PLC elections. He explained that the GOI will
do nothing to undermine the elections and will not undertake
any actions that could be construed as GOI meddling. By the
same token, unlike in January 2005 when the GOI and PA worked
together to facilitate movement of candidates and voters,
this time the GOI will not be proactive in helping the
process. The GOI will treat the election day as any other
ordinary day. In response to Wexler's question on how the
GOI would deal with Hamas candidates, Eiland said that Hamas
candidates with no known ties to terrorist activity would be
subject to the same regulations applied to other Palestinians.


5. (C) Eiland suggested that the GOI would be inclined to
adopt a more helpful policy towards the elections provided
that the PA agreed in advance to certain conditions. For
example, the PA could commit to implementing an election law
under which parties seeking to participate would have to
uphold the constitution. Also, a new political party law
should require the disbanding of military wings and a
commitment to a two-state solution. Eiland likened these
requirements to what had been put in place for elections in
Afghanistan. He said that international criteria as applied
elsewhere could prompt the GOI to develop an alternative
policy to the PLC elections.

--------------
Hollow Victory
--------------


6. (C) In response to Wexler's question about whether Abbas
needed to secure a working majority in the PLC as a result of
the upcoming elections, Eiland replied that Abbas will have
the numbers but not a true majority. He explained that Fatah
is not a unified party, but is fractured by disparate
interests and alliances, including some governed by a
generational divide. Abbas, therefore, has difficulties
controlling his own party, let alone Hamas.


7. (C) Eiland said that, in the wake of PLC election gains,
Hamas would likely demand much more practical participation
in the PA. Eiland noted that all GOI agreements on
Palestinian issues are with the PLO. If Hamas should join
the ranks of the PLO, he questioned whether the PLO would
remain a viable partner in final status negotiations.

--------------
GOI "Alone" Against Hamas
--------------


8. (C) Eiland asserted that there had been a marked silence
from the international community on the issue of Hamas
participation in the PLC elections. He added that recent USG
statements indicated a change in the U.S. position on the
subject. The GOI, according to Eiland, would have preferred
a discussion between the international community and the
Palestinians leading to an electoral process less favorable
to militant groups like Hamas. Wexler replied that the USG
clearly would prefer not to have Hamas involved in the
elections. The GOI, however, may have made a strategic error
in not having done more to encourage a broader based approach
prior to announcing its own position. Wexler suggested, for
example, that a coordinated Quartet position on Hamas
participation would have carried greater weight.


9. (C) The general lack of interest in fully implementing
UNSCR 1559 offered the GOI little encouragement regarding the
formulation of an international policy on Hamas, according to
Eiland. He asserted that the GOI was alone in caring about
Hizballah, despite the resolution's requirement that militias
in Lebanon be disarmed. As it was now up to the GOL to
complete the task, Eiland continued, the international
community, particularly the donor community, should make
disarming the militias a prerequisite to any economic and
military assistance. He suggested that a donor conference
scheduled to be held in Beirut in December would offer an
appropriate venue to establish conditionality in assistance
to the GOL. Eiland said that, until now, "no other voice"
has been raising this issue.

--------------
Peace Process Politics
--------------


10. (C) Eiland said that until a week ago the main political
threat to PM Sharon was from more conservative elements
within his own Likud party. As a consequence, the PM could
not afford to make compromises. Now, Eiland continued, with
the change in the Labor party leadership, the main political
threat is from the left. As a consequence, a Likud-led
government may be more open to compromise on some peace
process issues.


11. (C) Eiland said that, "in a very ironic way," the
differences between the GOI and Palestinians on a final
settlement are not great, with about 90 percent of the
details agreed. There is, however, "total dispute" over the
remaining issues. Eiland asserted that PM Sharon fully
supports a two-state solution and a revival of the roadmap
process but will not repeat the mistakes of previous
governments by engaging in political discussions with the
Palestinian leadership "while under fire" from militant
groups operating in areas under PA control. According to the
GOI's interpretation of the Road Map, the security problem
must be solved first. The Palestinians, however, continue to
believe that immediate talks on a final settlement will
significantly mitigate the security threat. Abbas insists on
having a clear timetable towards reaching a final resolution.
Eiland said he found it hard to see any formula that would
bridge this "gap" in respective GOI and PA views of the
roadmap.


12. (C) Wexler, referencing a recent meeting he had with
former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton, mentioned that some
observers believe that it is unrealistic to demand the
disarming of Palestinian militants in the absence of
political dialogue. It took decades of negotiations before
the IRA finally laid down its arms. Eiland's deputy, Eran
Etzion, replied that this argument used the wrong analogy
because, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it
was the PLO that filled the same role as the IRA, and had
already negotiated with the GOI and agreed to abandon the
armed struggle. The burden of responsibility for suppressing
Palestinian violence, therefore, now rests with the PLO as it
operates within the structure of the PA, according to Etzion.


--------------
Pessimistic on Peace Prospects
--------------


13. (C) Eiland said he doubted that the PA or even Abbas
believes in a two-state solution. The establishment of a
Palestinian state within the confines of the West Bank and
Gaza is viewed as a near term result and not a long-term
response to Palestinian aspirations. Until 1967, the Arab
world and the Palestinians did not even mention the
possibility of an Israeli state, according to Eiland. He
said he was not confident that Palestinians had given up the
vision of a Palestinian State stretching from the
Mediterranean to the Iraqi-Jordanian border. Politicians may
conclude agreements, but the average Palestinian holds to
this dream.


14. (C) Wexler suggested that, in the face of international,
PA and, eventually, Arab-state recognition of a two-state
settlement, the Palestinian populace would, by necessity,
have to accept a negotiated agreement. Eiland asserted that
this was a "false premise," particularly given the current
level of support for militant groups. Eiland, however,
volunteered that he probably had a much more pessimistic view
of Hamas and even some of the secular Palestinian movements
than most Israelis. Nevertheless, he said he doubted that
these groups would ever accept Israel and focus their
energies on building their own state.


15. (U) Congressman Wexler did not clear this message prior
to his departure.


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