Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV5155
2005-08-21 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

FM SHALOM TELLS A/S WELCH THAT ISRAELIS MUST SEE

pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005155 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG KPAL IS UNGA GAZA DISENGAGEMENT GOI INTERNAL
SUBJECT: FM SHALOM TELLS A/S WELCH THAT ISRAELIS MUST SEE
BENEFITS FROM DISENGAGEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005155

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG KPAL IS UNGA GAZA DISENGAGEMENT GOI INTERNAL
SUBJECT: FM SHALOM TELLS A/S WELCH THAT ISRAELIS MUST SEE
BENEFITS FROM DISENGAGEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 17 meeting, FM Silvan Shalom
told Assistant Secretary Welch and the Ambassador that
disengagement is proceeding better than expected, but still
carries a heavy price for Likud politicians. Shalom
expressed concern that Palestinian extremists could launch
attacks against Israel, necessitating severe Israeli
responses. He advocated a return to the roadmap, with the
caveat that Israel would first need to see "full
implementation" from the Palestinians. Shalom repeatedly
stressed the need for Israelis to see concrete benefits from
disengagement, and suggested the need for positive statements
by the USG, the Quartet, and the UN, as well as improvement
in Arab-Israeli relations. Turning to Iran, Shalom urged the
United States and EU-3 to address Tehran's nuclear program in
the UNSC during September. He also noted the importance that
Israel places on resuming a strategic dialogue with the USG.
END SUMMARY.

--------------
Disengagement, Security and the Roadmap
--------------


2. (C) Although he admitted that disengagement "looks much
better than I predicted," Shalom said that Likud ministers
and politicians who support disengagement are paying a heavy
price. He predicted that early general elections would
probably take place in March 2006, preceded by party
primaries. He cautioned that public disillusionment could
mean "another ten years" before someone with Sharon's ability
would emerge and move the peace process forward. A/S Welch
noted that the USG has strongly supported the disengagement
process and has worked to ensure that the GOI and President
Abbas get full credit for the positive developments.


3. (C) A/S Welch said the USG believes that a successful
disengagement policy can leave Gaza more open, more
prosperous, more free and more secure. He said that he and
General Ward stressed the importance of security --
describing it as "the beginning, the middle, and the end" --

during their August 16 meeting in Gaza with Interior Minister
Nasir Yusif and PA security chiefs. Shalom expressed concern
that President Mahmoud Abbas has failed to rein in militants
and that weapons could flow easily into Gaza from Egypt and
the future Gaza port. He said that Hamas, which he claimed
should be prohibited by the Oslo Accords from taking part in
PA elections, could win 35-40 percent of the vote in January.
If the extremists put their threats of violence into action,
for example, by launching rockets at Ashqelon, Shalom
predicted a quick swing in Israeli public opinion leading to
sweeping political changes in Israel. Such a "catastrophe"
would also result in "Defensive Shield III," i.e., the return
of Israeli troops to Gaza.


4. (C) Shalom reported to the Israeli Cabinet that the GOI
will face international pressure to move quickly on the peace
process once disengagement is complete. He told A/S Welch
that Israel's willingness to do so is dependent upon how
disengagement proceeds (i.e., if there are casualties) and on
what the Palestinians do on the day after. Pointing to large
gaps in the PA and GOI positions on refugees and Israel, he
cautioned against any attempt to address final status issues.
Instead, he advocated a return to the roadmap, with the
caveat that Israel would first need to see "full
implementation" from the Palestinians. He accused the
Palestinians of "doing nothing" to fulfill their obligation
to act against extremists. A/S Welch noted the importance of
the GOI's commitment to the roadmap, saying it protects
Israel's own interests. Shalom replied that many Likud
members do not believe this to be the case.

-------------- --------------
Israeli Public Must See Benefits from Disengagement
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Throughout the meeting Shalom emphasized the
importance of showing Israelis that there are benefits to
disengagement. He reiterated his request for USG assistance
in urging Arab countries to "embrace Israel." Shalom
suggested that there was "never a better time" for Arab
countries to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, or
-- in the case of Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar and Oman -- to
publicly reestablish their ties. He noted that several Arab
leaders have stated that they plan to visit Gaza. A/S Welch
responded that the USG actively encourages closer
Arab-Israeli ties.


6. (C) Shalom said the GOI is looking for international
support, adding "we deserve it ... we need it." He suggested
that the President's speech at the UNGA might be an
appropriate venue to make a positive statement and express
understanding of how difficult disengagement has been for
Israel. Chief of Staff Jacob Dayan asked if the Quartet
could issue positive language. Director General Ron Prosor
explained that the GOI believes it will be easier for others
to praise disengagement if they can refer to a Quartet
statement.

--------------
Shalom: Bring Iran to the UNSC in September
--------------


7. (C) Shalom stressed that September is the time to speak
with the Europeans and bring Iran's nuclear program to the
UNSC. He claimed that Israeli and American officials agree
that Iran could achieve independent research and development
for uranium enrichment within four to six months, even though
there is disagreement on how quickly Iran could use this
knowledge to construct nuclear weapons. A/S Welch noted the
importance of maintaining unity among the Europeans and on
including the IAEA in the process.

--------------
Request for a Strategic Dialogue
--------------


8. (C) Using Iran as an example, Shalom noted the importance
that Israel places on resuming a strategic dialogue with the
USG. A/S Welch acknowledged that Amb. Ayalon had raised the
issue in Washington and assured Shalom that the request was
being seriously considered by senior officials.


9. (U) NEA A/S Welch has cleared this message.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
KURTZER