EIVAL GILADY ON GAZA DISENGAGEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005105

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL ETRD EG IS KBTS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: EIVAL GILADY ON GAZA DISENGAGEMENT

REF: TEL AVIV 4417

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).



1. (C) Summary: Brigadier General (res) Eival Gilady, a
special advisor to PM Sharon on disengagement, met August 16
with Assistant Secretary (A/S) Welch and Ambassador Kurtzer
to discuss progress in Gaza disengagement. Gilady said that
the Prime Minister's disengagement plan was proceeding more
or less according to plan. He anticipated that the
evacuation of all settlements in Gaza would be complete in
less than ten days. More than 50 percent of the settler
families in Gaza had already departed. A/S Welch and
Ambassador Kurtzer pressed Gilady on the need for Israel to
make disengagement a success, including finding ways to
assist President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority. They
encouraged Gilady to pursue creative solutions for overcoming
differences on crossings and to consider a possible
third-party role at Rafah crossing. End Summary.

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Settler Evacuation Status
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2. (C) Gilady described the GOI strategy as a combination of
sensitivity in dealing with settlers in the run-up to August
17 and decisiveness thereafter. Much will depend on how
events unfold on August 16, but the GOI plan has been to tell
the IDF soldiers to respect the law and to treat the settlers
respectfully. West Bank infiltrators will be evacuated
"decisively" on August 17, Gilady predicted. Gilady said
that more than 50 percent of the Israeli settlers in Gaza had
already departed. He believed that 700-800 settler families
would have departed Gaza by midnight August 16, but cautioned
that figures cited are not always accurate. Gilady
anticipated that another 700-800 settler families would wait
until the last moment, and would only depart once it became
illegal for them to remain in Gaza on August 17. The
possibility of losing financial compensation would also
influence their decision-making. Gilady said the GOI had
made arrangements with a number of settler groups and
different leaders within these groups to facilitate the
departure of remaining settlers. "They will not pack, but
they will leave," Gilady clarified, adding that this group
might engage in some passive resistance. Gilady estimated
that 220 families constituted the hard-core of those settlers
who might actively resist evacuation. Another 200 families
would monitor this group closely.

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Coordination and Governance
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3. (C) Gilady commented that the level of coordination
between the GOI and PA has improved, but action on the ground
remains weak. Gilady said a strategic decision on the part
of the PA leadership needs to be taken to enforce PA
policies. For example, President Abbas must make it clear
that there are to be no more mortar attacks. In response,
A/S Welch recalled that President Abbas had made two
statements outlining the importance of a single authority and
a demand that there be no deviations. The PA, at U.S.
urging, had responded with force to Hamas in July. Even so,
Gilady responded, the challenge of helping the Palestinians
do what they (the PA) say should be done remains difficult.
Gilady said he is convinced that PA security forces refrained
from doing more for fear of not being backed up by the PA's
political leadership. The passage of time would make it
increasingly difficult for President Abbas to make headway on
security matters.


4. (C) After recognizing Israel's support for the provision
of non-lethal equipment to the PA, A/S Welch asked Gilady
what else Israel would do on key issues, such as crossings,
to help President Abbas strengthen his credibility with the
Palestinian people. Gilady concurred that Israel has an
interest in a disengagement process that leads to greater
freedom of movement, trade and improvement in the quality of
life of Palestinians. He agreed that the GOI should do
whatever would help the PA govern more effectively. The PA
has an interest, independent of U.S. or Israeli concerns, in
demonstrating good governance, and Gilady added that if the
provision of ammunition would serve that end he would support
it. However, Gilady came back to his preoccupation with good
governance. He cited the absence of PA control to minimize
bottlenecks at Erez crossing as just one example of how the
PA has failed to focus on easy steps it could take to improve
the lot of its people.

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Post-Disengagement Planning, Symbolic Importance of Rafah
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5. (C) A/S Welch focused on the importance of helping the PA
present Gaza as "more open, more free, more prosperous and
more secure" on the day after disengagement. For instance,
Israel could assist on crossings, particularly Rafah. Gilady
replied that Israel's agreement with Egypt on the deployment
of Egyptian forces along the Gaza border would be concluded
within 24 to 48 hours. "It will be done," Gilady emphasized.
On the question of crossings, Gilady said he believes the
Palestinians will ultimately come to accept that goods will
need to pass through the Kerem Shalom crossing. Speaking
personally, he said that people could continue to cross at
Rafah, but stressed that the GOI security establishment would
not trust anyone but Israelis on security matters. Probed on
this point, he accepted A/S Welch's idea that there might be
a role for a third party in control and inspections at that
crossing -- provided there was an agreement between the
parties on what a third party was to monitor. Gilady
acknowledged that the Rafah question needs more study, but
ventured that "we could make it happen" with a combination of
trust, technology (he mentioned UAVs),Egyptian border
control, PA agreement and the involvement of a third party.

6. (C) A/S Welch noted that the Europeans are prepared to
play a third party role in Rafah, and stressed that for
disengagement to be perceived as a success, Gaza has to be
more open. Ambassador Kurtzer added that if Israel wants to
demonstrate that the day after disengagement is different, it
needs to act now on issues such as Rafah rather than in six
months. A/S Welch encouraged the GOI to build an image of
successful disengagement by mid-September so as to prevent
others from seizing control of the agenda or second-guessing
the wisdom of disengagement or the roadmap. Gilady predicted
that Israel would withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor
within this timeframe, but A/S Welch again stressed the
importance of resolving the issue of Rafah crossing.


7. (C) Ambassador Kurtzer asked why Gilady assumed that the
Palestinians will accept a goods crossing at Kerem Shalom.
Gilady said the customs union provided some leverage in
Israel's dealings with the PA, as maintaining the union is in
the Palestinians' economic interest, particularly in the
short term. "They have a lot to lose," Gilady concluded,
acknowledging that this fact does not mean that the PA will
be open to compromise on matters that concern issues of
national pride. A/S Welch agreed that Israeli leverage was
potentially useful, provided it leads to the right outcome.
Ambassador Kurtzer noted that the GOI is demanding a
third-party (EU) role in rubble removal from Gaza, but has
opposed, to date, an EU role in Rafah. A/S Welch and
Ambassador Kurtzer urged Gilady to explore new approaches --
including a third-party role -- to resolving the Rafah issue,
given the shared Israeli-Palestinian interests in opening
Gaza and maintaining security. Gilady reiterated his
insistence that there could be no third party on security
matters, but acknowledged the importance of creating an
atmosphere to do more.


8. (C) On Gaza crossings into Israel, Gilady said he believes
that the situation at Karni and Erez will improve
post-disengagement. The goal is to facilitate trade, while
maintaining security. On the seaport, Gilady stressed the
importance of agreeing on the protocol of how it will operate
before it is built. Israel and the PA must come to a basic
understanding. A/S Welch agreed.

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