Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV5082
2005-08-17 04:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

NSA EILAND SAYS DISENGAGEMENT GOING WELL, BUT

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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005082 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015
TAGS: KPAL KWBG PGOV PREL EG IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ECONOMY AND FINANCE
SUBJECT: NSA EILAND SAYS DISENGAGEMENT GOING WELL, BUT
DISAGREEMENT PERSISTS OVER CUSTOMS ENVELOPE


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005082

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015
TAGS: KPAL KWBG PGOV PREL EG IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ECONOMY AND FINANCE
SUBJECT: NSA EILAND SAYS DISENGAGEMENT GOING WELL, BUT
DISAGREEMENT PERSISTS OVER CUSTOMS ENVELOPE


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: In an August 15 meeting with NEA A/S Welch
and the Ambassador, Israeli NSC Director Giora Eiland and
Deputy Director Eran Etzion assessed that it seems
disengagement "is going to be easier than expected." The
majority of the discussion centered on what would happen
after disengagement, particularly on the customs envelope.
Israel's preferred option is to move the customs point to
Kerem Shalom; if Palestinians do not agree, the GOI will move
the customs envelope to the border between Gaza and Israel.
A/S Welch countered that this option could leave Gaza worse
off, and suggested that other options were viable. A/S Welch
cautioned that the Israeli proposals could make Gaza "a
prison," and urged that Israel make Gaza "more open, more
prosperous, more free, more secure." Eiland objected that
the world expects Israel to continue to be responsible for
Gaza and its economy, while the point of disengagement is to
abdicate that responsibility. End summary.

--------------
Disengagement "Easier Than Expected"
--------------


2. (C) NSC Director Giora Eiland seemed optimistic about the
disengagement process, saying it "seems it is going to be
easier than expected." He estimated that half of the
settlements in Gaza are almost empty, and that "most people
understand that it is more or less over." The only real
problem Eiland identified is the approximately 4,000 people
who infiltrated Gaza and are potentially violent.


3. (C) The behavior of the Palestinians has also been
"better than expected," according to Eiland. He was quick to
point out, however, that this behavior did not result from PA
determination and effectiveness, but from the clear decision
by Hamas to not "undermine the evacuation." Eiland said the
ongoing restraint in Palestinian violence during
disengagement depends on Hamas maintaining this policy.

--------------
Difficulties After Disengagement
--------------


4. (C) Eiland highlighted four main difficulties after

disengagement. Israel's domestic problem, in particular the
deep division within Israeli society over disengagement, is
serious. A second difficulty stems from Hamas. Eiland said
that Hamas has announced that it will return to violence
after the withdrawal is complete. Hamas wants to
differentiate itself from the PA, particularly before the
Palestinian Legislative Council elections. Hamas leaders do
not want Palestinians to perceive the PA as successful after
disengagement, and, therefore, Eiland claimed, have no
incentive to refrain from attacking Israel after the
withdrawal.


5. (C) A third difficulty comes in the area of the
Philadelphi strip. Eiland said that there has been a
"semi-formal decision" to evacuate Philadelphi, and that an
arrangement was finalized with the GOE August 14 that
Egyptian border guards would be deployed along the border.
Eiland clarified that while all GOI ministers support the
decision to evacuate Philadelphi, many are uncomfortable with
the idea of the deployment of Egyptian border guards. Eiland
and Etzion disagreed about how important the upcoming Knesset
vote on this issue will be. Eiland maintained that, while
Israel will withdraw from Philadelphi, there will be no real
evacuation until the Egyptians are deployed. Etzion
predicted that Israel will be out of Philadelphi before the
end of 2005.

--------------
Customs Envelope
--------------


6. (C) Eiland identified the customs envelope as the fourth
difficulty. He argued that the more open the border between
Gaza and Egypt, the more strict the customs and security
measures between Gaza and Israel and Gaza and the West Bank
will have to be. He acknowledged that the Palestinians want
more openness along both borders, but said "we cannot allow
both simultaneously." He maintained that dangerous people
and goods could freely move into Gaza from Egypt, and then
into Israel from Gaza. Eiland outlined four possible options:


A. Israel's proposal: move the customs border to the
Gaza/Israel border at Erez and Karni.


B. The PA proposal: maintain the customs point at
Rafah (on the border with Egypt),with third country
nationals monitoring customs.


C. Israeli compromise proposal: move the Egypt/Gaza
crossing southeast to Kerem Shalom on the Gaza/Egypt/Israel
border. There, the amount of Israeli involvement could be
negotiable, with gradual transfer of responsibility to
Palestinians.


D. Other compromise proposal: that Rafah be controlled
by Palestinians, but only used for people. Goods could cross
through Nitzana and then into Gaza with full Israeli
inspection. The Israelis do not like this option, according
to Eiland, because people carry baggage, and, therefore,
dangerous or suspect goods would end up passing through Rafah.

--------------
Customs Options
--------------


7. (C) Eiland asserted that Prime Minister Sharon wants to
pursue option A, believing that it most completely rids
Israel of responsibility for what happens in Gaza. A/S Welch
responded that option A would effectively turn Gaza into a
"big prison," cutting it off economically from Israel and the
West Bank, and making it even less economically viable and
less open than it currently is. The Ambassador suggested
that the GOI focus on a performance-based arrangement, easing
their own customs check when and if the Palestinians prove
they are controlling their border with Egypt. A/S Welch
suggested that the customs point be at Rafah with the help of
third country nationals, and that Israel only become more
strict if the GOI discovers that the PA is not doing its part
on the Egyptian border.


8. (C) Eiland and Etzion objected to both of these
suggestions. Eiland said that once Israel is out of Gaza, it
can exercise the right of any government - that of
controlling access to its country. He also objected to the
idea of other nations helping to monitor customs. "We cannot
trust any third party" to certify that goods meet Israeli
standards. Eiland complained, "Everyone treats us as the
only ones to be responsible for the economy of the
Palestinians. Everything can flow out through Egypt. Why
should we be responsible for anything else?"


9. (C) In response to A/S Welch's question about what would
happen if the two sides do not reach agreement, Eiland said
the GOI would go back to option A. A/S Welch cautioned that
this option would "set up the worst possible situation for
yourselves in terms of the image of what you created," by, in
effect, cutting off Gaza from Israel and the West Bank, and
weakening the PA. Etzion requested clarification on the USG
position on the customs options. A/S Welch replied that
there is an emerging American position, that Gaza should be
"more open, more prosperous, more free and more secure" the
day after. Eiland appeared eager to find agreement with A/S
Welch and the Ambassador on this point, and, when none was
reached, expressed disappointment that the meeting had not
been "more pleasant."

--------------
The New Status of Territories
--------------


10. (C) After disengagement from the northern West Bank, the
GOI plans to transfer control of civil responsibilities to
the PA, but maintain security responsibilities. Eiland
claims that the GOI intends to eventually transfer those as
well; "sooner or later we will have to transfer security to
Palestinians, but we would like to negotiate that -- not just
give it away."


11. (C) Etzion raised the issue of the status of Gaza after
Israeli withdrawal. Eiland commented that the GOI would
rather not have a UN resolution, but that they would
appreciate a USG announcement defining the status of Gaza,
suggesting something along the lines of, "Once Israel does a,
b and c, Gaza is no longer occupied." Eiland asked for USG
views.

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