Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV4149
2005-07-01 12:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

ISRAELI LEFT-WING LEADERS UNCERTAIN OF WHAT WILL

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011241Z Jul 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004149 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KWBG KPAL IS GOI INTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: ISRAELI LEFT-WING LEADERS UNCERTAIN OF WHAT WILL
FOLLOW DISENGAGEMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004149

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KWBG KPAL IS GOI INTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: ISRAELI LEFT-WING LEADERS UNCERTAIN OF WHAT WILL
FOLLOW DISENGAGEMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.


1. (C) Summary and Comment: In a June 29 dinner hosted by
the Ambassador, leaders of the Labor and Yahad-Meretz parties
could not agree on what steps the GOI will -- or even should
-- take following disengagement. The group had divergent
views on whether and to what degree Prime Minister Sharon
would continue the disengagement process, although all of
their scenarios included Sharon in a key decision-making
role. The group did agree that the government coalition is
likely to change by the end of the year. The significance of
the discussion was that it once again demonstrated the
difficulty in predicting post-disengagement scenarios, even
when the analysts are experienced Israeli politicians who
generally share similar views and party affiliations. Vice
Premier and Labor Chairman Shimon Peres, Minister and Labor
leader Haim Ramon, Yahad-Meretz Chairman Yossi Beilin,
Ambassador Avi Gil, Shimon Center Director Ron Pundak and
others participated in the discussion. End Summary and
Comment.

-------------- --------------
Lack of Agreement on GOI Steps Post-Disengagement
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The Ambassador asked what steps the GOI will take
following disengagement. Peres, who has told several CoDels
that "disengagement first cannot mean disengagement last,"
conjectured that Sharon may decide to announce the withdrawal
from additional West Bank settlements, but to retain all the
major settlement blocks. Peres believed this policy would
leave the Palestinians with control over 60-70 percent of the
West Bank. Gil claimed that Sharon will drag the process out
with a series of mini-disengagements, each one followed by a
lengthy "time-out" to adjust to the new situation.


3. (C) Ramon urged "a second disengagement to avoid a third
intifada," calling the occupation of Palestinian territory an
existential threat to the existence of Israel. He advocated
continued unilateral GOI steps coordinated -- when possible
--- with the Palestinians. His suggestion is to continue
disengagement from the West Bank, removing approximately
50,000 settlers while retaining the major settlement blocks,
including Ariel. He maintained that disengagement from
settlements outside the security fence would leave the
Palestinians with approximately 93 percent of the West Bank.
Ramon said that Sharon can pursue this course regardless of
what he tells his constituents, because the Prime Minister
can always claim that he was forced to act by international
pressure.

-------------- -
Disagreement on Addressing Final Status Issues
-------------- -


4. (C) The Israeli leaders could not agree on whether the GOI
should attempt to resolve final status issues following
disengagement. Gil said he thought Sharon would offer a
return to the road map in exchange for an end to terror
attacks, a condition he believed the Palestinians are
unlikely to be able to meet. Ramon rejected calls for a move
to final settlement issues for two reasons, the lack of a
Palestinian or Israeli partner capable of making tough
decisions and what he believes is a clear lack of Israeli
public support for addressing the Jerusalem and refugee
issues. Ramon added that President Abbas is too weak to
negotiate final status issues. Beilin, Gil and Pundak
countered with claims that the intifada had increased the
Israeli public's support for a move toward a final
settlement, but that GOI leaders have not had the courage to
take the necessary steps. They criticized Ramon's plan as
capitulation to Sharon's "go-slow" approach.

-------------- --------------
Agreement that the GOI will Change After Disengagement
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The left-wing politicians all agreed that the outcome
of the disengagement plan would influence the composition and
leadership of the next coalition government. Peres noted
that Sharon does not trust the Labor Party and is acutely
aware of the need to maintain two coalitions, one with the
right wing of Likud and one with the United States. Ramon
said that the Likud rebels are actively working to undermine
the PM's power base in the party and predicted that Sharon
will not be the Likud candidate in the next election. Ramon
conjectured that Sharon, Peres and Shinui leader Tommy Lapid
might agree to form a new coalition government after
disengagement is complete.

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