Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV4110
2005-06-29 13:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

GILAD AND EILAND ON DISENGAGEMENT COORDINATION AND

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004110 

SIPDIS

NEA FOR WELCH, CHENEY/DIBBLE, E.
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2010
TAGS: PREL ECON PGOV KPAL KWBG GZ EG IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: GILAD AND EILAND ON DISENGAGEMENT COORDINATION AND
THE WEAKNESS OF THE PA

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004110

SIPDIS

NEA FOR WELCH, CHENEY/DIBBLE, E.
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2010
TAGS: PREL ECON PGOV KPAL KWBG GZ EG IS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: GILAD AND EILAND ON DISENGAGEMENT COORDINATION AND
THE WEAKNESS OF THE PA

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In separate June 17 meetings with NEA A/S
Welch, DNSA Abrams, and the Ambassador, Israeli NSC Director
Eiland and MoD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad both
blamed PA failure to act against rocket and mortar attacks on
Israel and Israeli settlements on the PA's overall weakness
and the weakness of Nasir Yusif in particular. Eiland said
that PA president Abbas does not take advantage of positive
developments, such as his successful visit to the White House
in May, in order to build momentum and support among
Palestinians. Eiland was skeptical of -- but did not rule
out -- possible U.S. involvement in an ongoing series of
regular meetings between Israelis and Palestinians to help
resolve security and disengagement-related issues. Gilad
painted a grim picture of betrayal by Preventive Security
Chief Rashid Abu Shbak at the partial instigation of former
PSO Chief and current PA Minister for Civil Affairs Muhammad
Dahlan, saying that Abu Shbak in particular is working to
undermine the authority of PA Minister of Interior Nasir
Yusif. Both Eiland and Gilad support continued GOI reliance
on Dahlan as an interlocutor in the short term to achieve
disengagement-related goals, despite the almost certain
negative effects this reliance will have on longer term
stability and reform goals. End Summary.


2. (C) In separate meetings with visiting NEA A/S David
Welch, Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, and
the Ambassador June 17, Israeli National Security Advisor
Giora Eiland and MoD Chief of Political-Military Affairs MG
(ret) Amos Gilad outlined the state of play on aspects of
disengagement and its coordination with what they termed a
weak Palestinian Authority. Gilad was accompanied by COGAT
Chief Yosef Mishlev; Eiland was accompanied by Einat Wilf,
Foreign Policy Advisor to Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres,

and NSC Legal Advisor Gaby Blum.

--------------
"The PA is Weak"
--------------


3. (C) When asked why President Abbas does not take action
against smaller militant organizations that, theoretically,
could be confronted, Israeli National Security Advisor Giora
Eiland stated flatly: "The PA is weak." Minister of Interior
Nasir Yusif was a compromise, Eiland said, and, as long as
Yusif is responsible for security, PA security forces will
not carry out even "simple activities, consistent with their
authority." Furthermore, unscrupulous types seeking personal
gain are constantly taking advantage of Yusif's weakness,
compounding the problem.


4. (C) Nothing will solve the Palestinians' problems if they
refuse to take advantage of opportunities, Eiland said,
referring to the (then) ongoing full closure of the Gaza
Strip due to PA security forces refusal to act on IDF
intelligence that an Islamic Jihad terrorist was planning to
attack imminently one of the crossing points (septel). "They
could have done something, but they didn't," Eiland said.
Citing another example, Eiland said that Hamas ultimately
accepted President Abbas' decision to postpone the
Legislative Council elections, proving that Abbas does indeed
have some room to maneuver. Eiland said that Abbas simply
does not use the room he has. Even if Israel becomes "much
more generous" to the Palestinians than in the past, Eiland
maintained that the impact on the PA will be small.

--------------
Building and Maintaining Momentum
--------------


5. (C) A/S Welch said that the Palestinians are optimistic
about the (then) upcoming summit meeting with PM Sharon,
noting that the GOI appears to have decided to be more openly
supportive of President Abbas. Eiland said that there was no
guarantee that President Abbas will take advantage of the
momentum offered by his upcoming summit meeting with Israeli
PM Sharon, especially since he failed to capitalize on the
positive developments resulting from his recent visit to the
U.S. Eiland said he thought that three to four days of more
substantive talks, including PA Minister for Civil Affairs
Muhammad Dahlan, would be more useful. "We are running out
of time," Eiland said, musing that more regular meetings
might be a way to keep up the momentum, rather than a one-off
meeting at the highest level.


6. (C) Asked if direct American involvement, such as
participation by General Ward in this type of meeting, would
help, Eiland was skeptical. Hearkening back to the Wolf
mission in 2003, Eiland said that then the GOI and
Palestinians spent so much time trying to explain and justify
their positions to Wolf that they made little actual headway
in resolving issues. "We thought in this new (post-Arafat)
era, that we would be able to negotiate things directly (with
the PA),if they were at all solvable," Eiland said. A/S
Welch said that having LTG Ward in the room, even for only a
part of the meeting, might give the Palestinians some
political cover by blaming "American pressure," making it
somewhat easier for them to agree to things they might
otherwise evade.

-------------- --------------
Short-Term Needs Undermine Long-Term Goals: Part I
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Eiland said that the GOI has chosen to avoid engaging
the Palestinian political leadership of President Abbas and
Minister of Interior Nasir Yusif and has chosen instead to
coordinate essential security elements of disengagement with
local commanders, a policy he said is having some success.
Eiland agreed with the Ambassador that, while meeting the
immediate need, this might undermine the long-term reform
Yusif and the Ward Mission are trying to achieve, but
stressed that the GOI needs to solve issues now --
disengagement is only weeks away.

--------------
Speaking a Different Language at Sharm
--------------


8. (C) Eiland said that the GOI is frustrated by the
Palestinians' failure to fully control the list of wanted men
agreed upon at the Sharm al-Sheikh summit in February. The
GOI, Eiland maintained, is unable to hand over security
control of more West Bank cities until the PA delivers on the
list, although the GOI is anxious to do so, according to
Eiland. When pressed, Eiland admitted that the GOI could
interpret the Sharm language (which he called "sloppy" and
"prepared in haste") more liberally, but was adamant that
simply refraining from killing Israelis is insufficient --
the listed men had to cease all activities, including the
manufacture of weapons. When asked what could be done to
break the impasse, Eiland said it is important to "solve what
can be solved, and leave what can't alone."

--------------
MoD Takes Over Passages
--------------


9. (C) MoD Political-Military Director MG (ret) Amos Gilad
told A/S Welch, DNSA Abrams, and the Ambassador that MoD is
taking over responsibility for passages, including the
airport and ports. Gilad asserted that this would be more
organized and that the military better understands security
concerns. Technology will replace soldiers, Gilad said,
increasing speed and efficiency, as well as improving the
overall atmosphere at the crossing points. The fewer
soldiers the Palestinians see, the better.

-------------- --------------
Dahlan Agrees $60 Million Contract to Haul Rubble
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Gilad said that he had agreed with Civil Affairs
Minister and disengagement guru Muhammad Dahlan to an
arrangement whereby the GOI will destroy all private
dwellings in the Gaza settlements and the PA will cart away
the rubble based on a contract valued at $60 million that
Gilad had negotiated with Dahlan. Gilad had few details and
warned that the PA might ultimately reject the arrangement,
but stressed that Dahlan had given his approval of the scheme
directly to DefMin Mofaz.

--------------
Abu Shbak "A Big Disappointment"
--------------


11. (C) According to Gilad, Dahlan said that there are some
50,000-60,000 men under arms in the Gaza security forces and
that still PSO Chief Rashid Abu Shbak "is doing nothing."
The GOI, Gilad continued, only agreed to allow Abu Shbak's
appointment on the strength of his reputation for
effectiveness. Abu Shbak has "lots of weapons and money"
from smuggling, Gilad said, but claims, among other excuses,
that he is not getting orders from Nasir Yusif to take
definitive actions to control the militants. Abu Shbak could
stop the rocket and mortar fire, in Gilad's estimation, but
he chooses not to. Instead, Dahlan and Abu Shbak blame Nasir
Yusif for not acting, when the blame should in reality fall
on Abu Shbak alone. The GOI made a mistake with Abu Shbak,
Gilad concluded, with even Dahlan admitting that Abu Shbak is
undercutting Nasir Yusif, whose orders no one follows.

-------------- --------------
Short-Term Needs Undermine Long-Term Goals: Part II
-------------- --------------


12. (C) The Ambassador asked why the GOI is then working so
closely with Dahlan, when it is widely known that Abu Shbak
is loyal to Dahlan, and Dahlan is also loyal to Dahlan --
vice Nasir Yusif or the PA. The GOI continues to deny
weapons to Nasir Yusif to arm the security forces, the
Ambassador said, essentially sending him home empty handed,
and yet rewards Dahlan with access to a $60 million contract.
Gilad asserted that Abu Shbak was not completely under
Dahlan's control, but evaded the larger question.

--------------
Progress on Border Deployment
--------------


13. (C) Gilad said that he had succeeded in negotiating
language governing the deployment of 750 Egyptian border
police along the Gaza-Egyptian border, brokering the
difference between the Egyptian desire for a commitment to a
larger, staged deployment with Israel's insistence that the
750-man deployment be viewed as a pilot project, with further
border coverage remaining TBD. It was further agreed that
Mowafi (FNU) from Egyptian Military Intelligence would be the
Egyptian primary liaison. The GOE has identified the number,
units and equipment for the troops, and has also agreed with
the GOI that there will be no change in the MFO role, beyond
what is covered in their existing mission statement. The
terms of the existing peace treaty with Egypt will not
change, Gilad said, and the new agreement will be signed by
active duty military personnel. Gilad said that a letter
outlining the agreement would be sent to the GOE "in the next
few days," the GOE having indicated that they are "ready to
sign now."


14. (U) A/S Welch and DNSA Abrams have cleared this message.

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