MOSSAD CHIEF ON WEAKNESS OF SYRIA, PREDICTS NO

"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004107

SIPDIS

NEA FOR WELCH, CHENEY/DIBBLE, E.
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2010
TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV PTER MNUC IR SY IS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: MOSSAD CHIEF ON WEAKNESS OF SYRIA, PREDICTS NO
CHANGE IN IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Mossad Chief Meir Dagan told NEA A/S David
Welch, Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, and
the Ambassador June 17 that, despite the weakness of Syrian
president Bashar al-Assad, he is unlikely to be replaced any
time soon. Syria,s neighbors prefer to keep Assad in power
but weak, as Syria is then less likely to meddle in the
affairs of its neighbors. On Iran, Dagan predicted that
former president Rafsanjani will win the elections, but that
little will change in Iran regardless: Iran will continue to
seek even incremental escape from its suspension agreement
with the EU-3. Dagan said he thought a UN Security Council
resolution codifying the EU-3 agreement would provide a
better mechanism for taking action against constant low-level
Iranian violations. End Summary.

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Syria -- Bashar Is Weak
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2. (C) In a meeting with visiting NEA A/S David Welch,
Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, and the
Ambassador June 17, Mossad Chief Meir Dagan said that Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad is very weak. Despite having built
up an atmosphere of what Dagan called ""dramatic political
change,"" after the recent Ba'ath Party Congress, it became
clear that ""nothing in Syria is changing."" That being said,
Dagan continued, there are now liberal elements willing to
risk demonstrations against the government. Discussion of
the return of Rifat al-Assad, and graffiti in Syria
proclaiming his return, are both signs that Bashar is
becoming weaker. The process of removing the old guard in
Syria continues, Dagan said, but reiterated his initial point
that even that does not signify any genuine change.


3. (C) Despite Bashar's weakness, Dagan did not predict that
he would be driven from power any time soon. If a leadership
change were to occur at some future point, Dagan and his team
predicted that any successor would come from within the
elites: ""there are no dark horse candidates out there.""
Neighboring countries have a genuine fear that radicals could
replace Bashar in Syria; there is a widespread and strong
preference for a weak -- but present -- Bashar al-Assad. If
an acceptable alternative were to present himself, that
equation, however, might change. The most important thing to
the Syrian elites remains the continued control of the
Allawites on power.


4. (C) Asked how Syria views the United States, Dagan said
that the Syrians ""take your politeness as compromise.""
Syria, in Dagan's view, will be less inclined to meddle in
the affairs of its neighbors if a weakened Bashar al-Assad
remains in place. On the other hand, weakness in Syria means
that Syria will be unable to control the Syria-Iraq border.
Change in Syria will also have negative consequences in
Lebanon, Dagan predicted.

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Iran -- No Change
--------------


5. (C) Dagan and his team said they were assuming that
former president Rafsanjani would be re-elected in Iran, even
if the voting necessitated going to a second round. As
president, Dagan predicted that Rafsanjani would espouse the
same tough ideas as his predecessors, but with ""better
packaging."" Ayatollah Khamenei still remains very much on
the scene, Dagan pointed out, further evidence that the
presidential elections will not signify substantive policy
change.


6. (C) Dagan asserted that Iran will continue the same
policy regarding Iraq, hoping to see the Shi'a gain real
power there through elections. Dagan predicted that Iran's
nuclear policy would also remain the same, as would their
policies towards Hizballah. Mossad had at last discovered
how Iran Hizballah is moving money to Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ),Dagan said, having actually seen Iranian agents
hand over the cash to PIJ operatives. Iran has in the past
proven that it can rein in Hizballah when it suits them.


7. (C) Dagan said that Iran is very susceptible to, and
should ""always remain under, constant pressure."" As an
example, Dagan said that European pressure had actually
delayed work in the Kashan nuclear site, with a number of
workers having been transferred elsewhere. DNSA Abrams said
that the U.S. opposes any compromises on Iran's nuclear
program that might lead to Iran's development of the nuclear
fuel cycle, and will press the Europeans to maintain a tough
line. Dagan said that Iran wants ""more than anything"" to
break out of the suspension, and that even the ""tiniest
compromise"" that leaves the door open for later discussion is
sufficient. DNSA Abrams agreed, adding that even a 100%
suspension with the understanding that the suspension is
voluntary would do, given Iran's incremental negotiating
style.


8. (C) Dagan said that Israel would like more IAEA
safeguards imposed on Iran, using the safety checks as a
vehicle for more inspections and tighter IAEA control. A UN
Security Council resolution that requires cessation of all
prohibited activity would also be useful, as it would
translate the EU-3 demands into binding form. Dagan's staff
asserted that there had already been sufficient violations of
the EU-3 suspension agreement of IAEA requirements in the
last five months to pave the way for a UNSC resolution.

9. (U) A/S Welch and DNSA Abrams cleared this message.

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