GWOT ASSESSMENT: FIGHTING TERROR AND BUILDING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002135

SIPDIS

FOR A/S WELCH FROM AMBASSADOR KURTZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL IS COUNTERTERRORISM GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: FIGHTING TERROR AND BUILDING
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

REF: A) STATE 60749 B) JERUSALEM 1392

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Counterterrorism is central to Israel's
national security priorities and is a key component of
Embassy Tel Aviv's Mission Program Plan. It also plays a key
role in the progress -- or lack thereof -- of the peace
process. A main requirement for moving this agenda forward
is funding for the programming and operating costs of General
Ward's security coordination mission to reform the
Palestinian security services. Other areas to consider are
expansion of counterterrorism training programs for both
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, reconsideration of
whether the USG should fund the $1.5 million required to
exchange fingerprint data with Israeli security services, and
the status of public diplomacy and security projects in the
budget supplemental. On a broader policy level, we face a
difficult decision on whether to deal with Hamas as part of
the governing structure of Palestinian society. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) One of our major foreign policy objectives, and the
reason for General Ward's security coordination mission here,
is to strengthen the counterterrorism capacity of the
Palestinian Authority. As also noted by ConGen Jerusalem
(reftel B),a better organized, equipped and motivated PA
security force would be in a position to prevent terrorist
attacks, deny extremist groups support in Gaza and the West
Bank, and facilitate the secure environment the Palestinians
need to build strong, democratic institutions and Israel
needs to take further risks in the peace process. We need to
ensure that Ward's mission has a fully funded program budget
to reinforce the USG's weight at the table of donors and
convince the PA leadership they must dismantle the terror
networks. To date, neither the State Department nor the
General controls any program funding, and post has not
received sufficient resources to support the mission's
day-to-day expenses. Full funding for operating costs
(estimated at $2.3 million for the first six months of the
mission) and programming is vital if we are to see real
counterterrorism improvements from the PA.


3. (C) Counterterrorism training is an area where we have
done well, but could do more. Training those who uncover and
prosecute terrorism financing, both Israelis and
Palestinians, could help bank employees and government
officials better implement laws already on the books. With
Palestinians, a key training priority would be terrorism
finance. For more general law enforcement training in
pursuit of USG goals, we should examine whether existing
funding from the successful ATA (Antiterrorism Assistance)
Program could be used to train Palestinian personnel. In
other fields, we recommend replicating successful programs,
whether it be extending to other countries the research and
development cooperation established by the U.S.-Israeli
Technical Support Working Group or emulating the effective
model of Jordanian counterterrorism along its border with
Israel by providing training to Egyptian border police in the
Sinai.


4. (C) In evaluating our counterterrorism programs, we may
also want to reexamine projects that have been previously
rejected or put on hold. One of these, which would cost the
GOI $1.5 million to implement, is a program to exchange
terrorists' fingerprints. Despite support for the project
from the Minister of Internal Security, the Israelis have
consistently told us that they do not have the funding to
make the system upgrades required for an exchange to take
place. If our law enforcement community deems access to the
GOI's database of 20,000 fingerprints of known or suspected
terrorists to be a high priority, we may wish to consider USG
funding for the project.


5. (C) The elimination of the public diplomacy portion and
the reduction of the security portion of the budget
supplemental to $3 million will significantly impinge upon
our ability to implement counterterrorism programs. The PD
and security requests were carefully thought-out initiatives
with goals we will no longer be able to achieve without the
funding. The PA is already experiencing significant
difficulties in reining in terrorists. If they fail in the
security field, our reform efforts in other areas will be in
serious danger.


6. (S) In addition to decisions on specific programs, there
is a broader policy issue that will directly impact the
effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts. Over the next
two to three months, we must address how we would respond
should Hamas win a substantial number of seats in the
upcoming legislative elections, and how we will deal on the
local assistance level with municipal councils that contain
Hamas members or even Hamas majorities. The questions USAID
currently faces in distributing assistance to town councils
that have elected Hamas members will be magnified many fold
following the elections in June.
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