Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV2125
2005-04-06 13:31:00
SECRET
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

(S) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO CODEL LEVIN:

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002125 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER OREP IS IZ GOI EXTERNAL MILITARY RELATIONS
SUBJECT: (S) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO CODEL LEVIN:
OUR PRE-WAR ESTIMATES OF IRAQI WMD WERE NEARLY AS WRONG AS
YOURS

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002125

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER OREP IS IZ GOI EXTERNAL MILITARY RELATIONS
SUBJECT: (S) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO CODEL LEVIN:
OUR PRE-WAR ESTIMATES OF IRAQI WMD WERE NEARLY AS WRONG AS
YOURS

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) A senior defense intelligence (DMI) officer told
Senator Levin March 31 that pre-OIF Israeli intelligence
estimates of Iraqi WMD were nearly as wrong as those of the
USG. GOI analysts, prior to the war, "knew" that Saddam's
regime would never support al-Qaeda or any other terrorist
organization fomenting "jihad." While the Israeli
intelligence community placed events in Iraq at the center of
their 2003 national security estimate for the region, it now
sees Iraq as just one of several influential factors. The
GOI sees no evidence of Iranian support for terrorism in
Iraq, and assesses that the top priority for the Iranian
regime in Iraq at present is stability, which Iranian leaders
understand is the surest path to a U.S. departure from the
region. Iran, meanwhile, with an eye toward long-term
influence in Iraq, is building its ties with all the Iraqi
ethnic groups. A DMI analyst assessed that the recent
decrease in terrorism in Iraq could be only cyclical,
although he thought that terrorism in Iraq could fade away
for good if Iraqi Shi'ites and Kurds allow the Sunnis to play
a meaningful role in national political life. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) Senator Carl Levin discussed Israel's pre-OIF
intelligence-gathering on Iraq, and current GOI assessments
of Iraq, in a March 31 meeting with Col. Itai Brun, the
deputy chief of Production for Israeli military intelligence
(DMI). LTC Avi Zaroni and LTC Aviad Sela of DMI's Gulf
States office also participated in the meeting. Senate
staff, Embassy Army Attache and poloff accompanied Sen. Levin.

--------------
Pre-War Israeli Intelligence on Iraq
--------------


3. (S) Pointing to findings in the just-released
Robb-Silberman report of what he called a "90 percent
failure" in U.S. pre-war assessments of Iraq's WMD
capabilities, Sen. Levin asked Brun whether pre-war Israeli

intelligence assessments were as wrong as those of the USG.
"We were very close" to the U.S. estimate, Brun acknowledged
in response. He said that DMI -- which compiles national
estimates from all-source GOI intelligence -- assessed prior
to OIF that Iraq had "residual" launchers and
surface-to-surface missiles, and chemical and biological
weapons that could be delivered either by missiles or bombs.


4. (S) DMI reached its assessment, Brun continued, fully
aware that it had no direct evidence of the existence of
Iraqi missiles or WMD. Its ultimate conclusion that Iraq
possessed missiles and WMD concealed underground came from
its "strategic assessment," based on Saddam's behavior
throughout the 1990s, that Saddam would never give up his
former missile or WMD capabilities. Brun noted that the only
major GOI decision related to the assessment was the order to
distribute gas masks to the Israeli population just prior to
OIF. The GOI, he commented, made the decision mainly for
political reasons, and not based on any judgment about the
certainty of the DMI estimate. The only aspect of the
estimate that mattered to the GOI in making the gas-mask
decision, he said, was that DMI could not rule out the
possibility that Iraq would launch WMD-bearing missiles
against Israel.


5. (S) Sen. Levin asked whether Israeli intelligence had
perceived, prior to OIF, any relationship between Saddam's
regime and al-Qaeda. Brun said Israeli assessments did not
address the issue. LTC Zaroni added that the GOI had
information about contacts between "second- and third-level"
al-Qaeda operatives and the Iraqi regime, but "knew" that the
secular Ba'athist regime in Iraq would not support "jihad."


6. (S) Sen. Levin asked whether the GOI had received any
information about purported Iraqi purchases of yellowcake
from Niger. Brun said Israeli intelligence had not looked at
the issue because it did not believe that Iraq had a nuclear
program of concern.

--------------
The Impact of OIF on the Region
--------------


7. (S) As background to his points on how the GOI sees the
impact of events in Iraq, Col. Brun summarized key trends
that the GOI has perceived throughout the region over the
past four years. The events of September 11, and the Bush
Administration reaction to them, have shaken up the region,
he said. The precedent of an Arab regime toppled, the
presence of U.S. forces in the center of region and on two
sides of Iran, and the message that WMD are illegitimate,
placed regional leaders on the defensive.

8. (S) The "shock" that Brun said regional leaders
experienced in 2002-2003 turned into what he termed a
wait-and-see posture in 2004, as the leaders awaited the
outcome of U.S. difficulties in Iraq and the U.S.
presidential election. President Bush's reelection, Arafat's
death and other "dramatic events" have now shaken regional
leaders out of their waiting mode, he said. The GOI sees
these regional leaders now following one of three paths:

-- "Active resistance." Regimes and groups pursuing this
path are fighting against the influence of the United States,
Israel and the West. Examples: Iran, "Global Jihad,"
Hizballah, Zarqawi, Palestinian rejectionist groups.

-- "Change and Modification." States following this path
understand the need for change. Examples: Egypt, Jordan, PA
President Abbas and some other new PA leaders. Brun
commented that Abbas' electoral victory was a hopeful sign
because it implied popular endorsement of Abbas' opposition
to the use of violence throughout the Intifada.

-- "Indecision." This is the path of groups and regimes,
such as Hamas and Syria, that have traditional ties to
terrorism, but are considering shifts in behavior based on
changes in the region. Hamas, for example, has taken the
"historic strategic decision" to enter the PA political
system. Syria, whose support for terrorism has always been
based on "pragmatic" instead of ideological considerations,
is looking for ways to change, but has few "assets" with
which to work. President Assad, in fact, is about to lose
one of his major assets, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon,
with a possible impact on the ultimate survivability of his
regime.


9. (S) Iraq, Brun continued, was at the center of DMI's
annual national security estimate in 2004. DMI assessed then
that all actors in the region understood that Iraq was the
"decisive battlefield." Iraq remains important in DMI's 2005
assessment, Brun said, but less so from a regional
perspective. The key intervening event, in DMI's analysis,
was President Bush's reelection, which, he said, demonstrated
to the region that the United States would remain in the
region for the next several years. Iraq, moreover, is no
longer the only prospective model of democratization in the
region, given successful elections in the PA, Afghanistan,
and perhaps soon in Lebanon.

--------------
Iran's Influence on Iraq
--------------


10. (S) LTC Zaroni assessed Iranian designs on Iraq at Sen.
Levin's request. Iran, he said, appears to be reaching out
to all groups in Iraq, and not just to the Shi'ites, with
whom, in any case, its influence is limited by religious
differences and clerical rivalries. The GOI has seen no
clear evidence that Iran is supporting terrorism in Iraq, he
said. Iran's outreach appears motivated by an interest in
building connections for the long term. It wants to see Iraq
"oriented" toward Iran in the long-term. The issue is not
religion, but balance of power. Iran's top priority in the
interim is to see the United States leave the region, a goal
it understands will require a stable Iraq. Democratic change
in Iraq does not threaten Iran, he said, commenting that the
Iraqi political system appears to be evolving toward
something roughly similar to the Iranian system.


11. (S) Sen. Levin asked why Iran would not try to push the
U.S. out of Iraq by supporting the insurgency. Zaroni
replied that the Iranians are smarter than President Assad.
They realize that support for the insurgency could harden
U.S. positions against Iran, e.g., on Iran's nuclear program.

--------------
Stabilizing Iraq
--------------


12. (S) LTC Zaroni identified three main forces working more
or less together in the insurgency in Iraq: Sunni
ex-Ba'athists, the Zarqawi organization, and common
criminals. The use of terrorism could fade away, he said,
should the Shi'ites and Kurds allow the Sunnis to play a
meaningful role in the national political process. He
cautioned that a recent decrease in terrorism in Iraq could
be only cyclical, noting that attacks have tended to peak
around the time of significant events, such as religious
holidays and the U.S. elections.


13. (S) Zaroni personally assessed the chances for a
political solution in Iraq as "probable," but acknowledged
that no consensus exists on the point within DMI. Brun noted
that Israeli experts on Iraq tend to assert that the ethnic
rivalries inscribed in "Iraqi DNA" preclude the possibility
that Iraqis will ever establish a workable democratic
process. This view does not necessarily imply that Iraqis
are doomed to civil war, he said, although Zaroni then added
that a civil war, and ensuing national break-up, is a real
possibility given the conflicting interests of the three main
ethnic groups.


14. (S) Sen. Levin asked Zaroni to assess U.S. training of
the Iraqi security forces. Zaroni said the training appeared
unsuccessful until a few months ago, when a new U.S. attitude
emerged. LTC Sela described the perceived U.S. change as one
that allows for more self-reliance for the Iraqi security
forces. Zaroni pointed to concerns that some members of the
security forces are passing information to the insurgents.


15. (S) Sen. Levin asked whether GOI and U.S. assessments
about the future of Iraq differ in any significant ways.
Zaroni commented that differences exist within both analytic
communities, but allowed that members of both communities
generally concur that short-term prospects in Iraq are "very
complex." The debate within the GOI community, Brun added,
focuses on whether democracy can succeed in Iraq -- and
indeed anywhere in the region -- in the long term.


16. (S) Sen. Levin asked for an assessment of the impact of
the war in Iraq on the global struggle against terrorism.
Brun said GOI analysts see change only in Iraq, where
terrorism has clearly increased.


17. (U) Codel Levin did not clear this message, but requested
that H forward a copy.

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