Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV1927
2005-03-29 15:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

REFERENDUM BILL FAILS, BUT VOTE LEAVES LIKUD BADLY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 001927 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREF KWBG IS GOI INTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: REFERENDUM BILL FAILS, BUT VOTE LEAVES LIKUD BADLY
SPLIT

REF: TEL AVIV 1896

Classified By: Political Counselor Norman Olsen for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 001927

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREF KWBG IS GOI INTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: REFERENDUM BILL FAILS, BUT VOTE LEAVES LIKUD BADLY
SPLIT

REF: TEL AVIV 1896

Classified By: Political Counselor Norman Olsen for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) The landslide defeat of the disengagement referendum
bill in a 72-39 Knesset vote March 28 was achieved mainly
with the help of opposition parties, whose votes countered
the 27 Likud MKs who broke with Prime Minister Sharon and
supported the bill. The split in Likud poses no threat to
Sharon's government before disengagement since those MKs who
want to topple Sharon and/or derail disengagement currently
lack a political vehicle to do so; the referendum bill was
defeated and, with Shinui's support guaranteed, the budget is
virtually assured passage in the March 29 or 30 vote
(reftel). In addition, with the pro-disengagement and
secular Shinui Party leading a diverse opposition composed of
the religious Shas party, the religious Zionist parties,
left-wing Yahad, and three Arab parties, no combination of
opposition parties is likely to emerge with a unifying issue
that could rally the necessary 61-MK majority to topple the
government via no-confidence votes.


2. (C) The next political challenge facing Sharon -- and one
he should easily overcome -- lies not in the Knesset, but in
the June-July Cabinet votes on implementation of each of the
four phases of the disengagement plan. Sharon has enough
votes to move disengagement through the Cabinet, but the
split among Likud ministers leaves Sharon dependent on the
votes of his eight Labor Party ministers. Currently, out of
the 14 Likud Ministers in the 23-seat Cabinet, only about
half support disengagement. Sharon has one vacant Cabinet
seat that he will likely fill with some Likud MK who has been
loyal to Sharon and who supports disengagement.


3. (C) The real ramifications of the Likud split will show
up in the run-up to the next elections, which are scheduled
to take place at the end of 2006. Polls indicate that Sharon
would easily win over his arch-rival, Finance Minister and
disengagement skeptic Binyamin Netanyahu, if party-wide
primaries to choose Likud's candidate for prime minister were
held today. The 12 MKs who voted with Sharon against the
referendum bill, including Sharon's son Omri, are much more
at risk because the right-of-Sharon Likud Central Committee,
which supported a disengagement referendum, draws up the
party list from which MKs are elected. Sharon's coattails
may not be long enough or strong enough to bring these MKs
along with him.


4. (C) Ironically, the 13-MK Likud group (including Sharon)
that voted against the referendum bill, is a numerical mirror
image of the 13-MK Likud group ("rebels") that has
persistently opposed disengagement and conditioned its
support for the budget on Sharon holding a disengagement
referendum. As Yedioth Ahronoth journalist Nahum Barnea
wrote March 29, "...the internal situation in the Likud has
been reversed (by the referendum vote): those who were
considered until yesterday to be a rebellious minority are
now the majority, and those who were thought of as the
majority are now the faction of rebels... They violated the
express decision made by the party institutions.... Sharon is
now the leader of a small and frightened camp."

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