Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05TELAVIV1898
2005-03-29 05:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY EILAND PRESENTS

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

290517Z Mar 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001898 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015
TAGS: KWBG OREP PGOV PREL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY EILAND PRESENTS
BALANCED VIEW OF FUTURE TO CODEL PELOSI


Classified By: Amb. Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001898

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015
TAGS: KWBG OREP PGOV PREL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY EILAND PRESENTS
BALANCED VIEW OF FUTURE TO CODEL PELOSI


Classified By: Amb. Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting on March 23, Director of
National Security Giora Eiland presented Codel Pelosi with
his view of the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and the political and security situations in the region.
Attempting to balance what he surmised was Vice Prime
Minister Peres's more optimistic view of Israel's prospects
after disengagement, Eiland discussed his assessment of what
Israel should expect in the next four months leading up to
and through disengagements, his analysis of the current
upheaval in Lebanon, and Iran's nuclear capabilities. The
CoDel consisted of House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and
Representatives Henry Waxman, Darrell Issa, Linda Sanchez,
Edward Markey, George Miller, Anna Eshoo, and James McGovern.
End Summary.

--------------
The Two Positions
--------------


2. (C) Eiland said that he considers the present
Israeli-Palestinian situation promising, but he has very real
concerns regarding the future. He sees a large gap between
the two sides, coming not from differences in substance, but
in their perceptions of what the process of peace should be.
He predicted that the real difference would become exposed in
the next few months. He contrasted Israel's current position
with that of the Oslo years. During that time, he said,
Israel's focus was on the peace process, building on the idea
that through it the two sides could achieve security. With
the collapse of Oslo, he said, Israel's faith in that
position died. Currently, Israel's hope for the future lies
with the roadmap. While the final goals are the same as at
Oslo, the sequence for achieving these goals is different;
security must come first, leading to peace. From this
position, it is impossible to move forward on achieving peace
until not just terror, but also the terrorist infrastructure
are dismantled.


3. (C) The Palestinian position differs considerably from
the Israeli, said Eiland. Palestinians focus on their
impressive achievements since the death of Yasir Arafat in

November 2004. They point to democratization, noting the
presidential elections that took place just two months after
Arafat's death; economic reforms, such as the new reliable
Minister of Defence; the reorganization of security forces;
and the improved security situation, what he termed a
significant and stable trend. Eiland noted, however, that
many of these accomplishments were designed to satisfy the
international community, and with the idea that Palestinian
leaders through dialogue would persuade the Palestinian
people to support peace over Hamas.



4. (C) In a note of optimism, Eiland said that for the first
time there is real trust and a reliable dialogue between the
Israeli and Palestinian leaders, giving him a basis for hope
that they can bridge the gap between the Israeli and
Palestinian perspectives. In answering a question regarding
whether or not Israel should present an idea of what final
status might look like to the Palestinians, Eiland admitted
that this question is debated within Israel. Prime Minister
Sharon, he noted, believes that talking about final status
issues would start unwanted momentum to start final status
negotiations, even if security needs had not yet been met.


--------------
President Abbas Appeases Hamas
--------------


5. (C) Eiland contended that upon election, Palestinian
President Mahmoud Abbas had assumed that he would have time
to create a new political atmosphere under which he could
persuade Hamas and other militant groups to abandon violence
against Israelis. The lead-up to the historic summit at
Sharm-el-Sheikh in February 2005 required Abbas to come to an
urgent understanding with these groups regarding the
cessation of violence to meet Israeli and American demands.
In doing so, however, Abbas paid a high price to Hamas,
making them three commitments that will ultimately weaken his
position. He promised that he would never force Hamas to
dismantle its military capacity and that Hamas would be
integrated into the Palestinian political establishment. In
addition, Hamas forced Abbas to declare Palestinian strategic
goals regarding final status that he will never be capable of
delivering. In essence, Eiland said, Abbas sacrificed the
long term in favor of the short term.


6. (C) Eiland emphasized the role that Hamas will play in
the July elections, predicting that if Hamas gains strength
in the elections it will serve as a basis for power sharing
in the PLC and other institutions. Hamas will thus succeed
in its quest to gain the legitimacy of a true political party
without losing its military capacity. If Hamas gains
political legitimacy, Eiland warned, the $30 million that
Hamas receives from Saudi Arabia, the weapons it receives
from Egypt, and the political decisions made in Damascus will
also be legitimized.

--------------
The Future of Hamas
--------------


7. (C) When asked whether Abbas is in a position to make
demands of Hamas to disarm, Eiland responded that Abbas does
not think he will ever be in such a position. Abbas believes
that the only way to reach a cessation of violence is the
full integration of Hamas into the Palestinian political
system, hoping that with enough political achievements, Hamas
will become more moderate with much to lose if it returns to
its old cycle of violence. Hamas's vision is that in gaining
political legitimacy, it will not need to give up its
philosophy (i.e. the destruction of Israel) and will be able
to maintain its military capabilities.


8. (C) Eiland stated, however, that Israel's expectations of
President Abbas are stricter than this agenda, and require
him to take actions against Hamas now. Eiland contended that
dismantling the terrorist infrastructure consists not only of
actions, but also of creating the right atmosphere. In the
past, Palestinians who committed acts of violence against
Israeli citizens were not adequately punished. Eiland posed
the question of how these people will be dealt with in the
future. He predicted that if Abbas adapts new values,
bringing such criminals to justice, it will lead to a true
dismantling of terrorist infrastructure.


9. (C) Eiland posited that there is indeed a chance that
Hamas, Hizbollah, and other militant groups can transform
themselves into purely political movements, especially if
Hamas understands that Palestinian popular support is given
only to real political movements. Palestinians are sick of
violence, he said, Palestinian citizens must force them to
change their ways. Unlike Al Qaeda, Eiland remarked, Hamas
is sensitive to the feelings of the "street." In responding
to a question on Israel's estimation of President Abbas,
Eiland challenged that Abbas had been too hasty in making
commitments to Hamas, and that Egypt had helped him make
these mistakes. Egypt has only one consideration, Eiland
said: the $1.3 billion that the United States gives Egypt in
military aid. Worrying that they might lose that money, the
Egyptians tried to present themselves as essential and as a
stabilizing force in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.

--------------
Prospects for Democracy in Lebanon
--------------


10. (C) Eiland viewed the current demonstrations against
Syria in Lebanon as an opportunity for Lebanese democracy,
but warned that there is more than one possible outcome of
these events. The most desirable would be that Lebanon
becomes an independent, democratic state. On the other hand,
the differences between groups in Lebanon that lead to the
country's long civil war could once again emerge. Syria's
influence would continue through its involvement in Lebanon's
economy. In Eiland's third scenario, Iranians would fill the
power vacuum left by Syria, fulfilling their interest in
exporting the principles of the Iranian revolution in
Lebanon, a country with a 35 percent Shia population. In
this case, Hizbollah might become even more powerful than
before, with the military capability to attack Israel.


11. (C) Eiland suggested that one way to ensure the most
desirable outcome is for the international community to send
a clear message to Lebanon's leaders, not to just those
elected after the May elections, but to all potential
leaders, demanding the dismantling of all militias in
Lebanon.

--------------
U.S. Involvement in Iraq
--------------


12. (C) In response to the CoDel's question, Eiland said that
Israel does not like to officially participate in discussions
of Iraq, but he was willing to comment that the United States
has "clearly made some mistakes there." Despite this, he
said was optimistic that Iraqis were beginning to question
the increased number of foreign terrorist elements in Iraq,
while at the same time continuing to strengthen their
democratic system.

--------------
Iran's Nuclear Future
--------------

13. (C) Eiland said that the stronger position the U.S. is
now taking on Iran is "bringing the world together in a
united voice" on the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions. In
its coordination with the United States, the European Union
is now able to be more blunt in its demands on Iran, while
also offering Iran a "carrot" and not just a "stick." He
warned that if China is not a part of this international
front, it will be difficult to take seriously the issue of
Iran's nuclear capability at the United Nations Security
Council. While Iran will not have nuclear weapons for
another two to three years, Eiland explained, it might be
completely technologically independent within the next six
months, meaning that it will no longer rely on foreign
assistance in pursuing nuclear technology.

14. (C) Asked about Israel's position on Iran if there is no
UN action in the next six months, Eiland said that Iran's
leaders are still sensitive about international legitimacy,
and are worried about the growing number of Iranians who are
against the regime and identify more closely with Western
values. He contended that it would be too dangerous for Iran
domestically if it were to become isolated. Iran is pursuing
both a civilian nuclear project and a military project
simultaneously, he added, and it should accept international
demands to inspect both, thereby slowing down the process.


15. (C) Codel Pelosi did not have an opportunity to clear
this cable.

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