(C) OTTE LAMENTS WEAK PA COORDINATION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 001844

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015
TAGS: PREL KWBG IS EU GAZA DISENGAGEMENT ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: (C) OTTE LAMENTS WEAK PA COORDINATION ON
DISENGAGEMENT IN MEETING WITH ABRAMS AND WELCH

REF: TEL AVIV 1729

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.

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Summary
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1. (C) In a March 23 meeting with Deputy APNSA Abrams, NEA
A/S Welch, and the Ambassador, EU Middle East envoy Marc Otte
recounted that President Abbas had been vague in describing
his next steps in discussions with EU officials at the Arab
League summit in Algiers. Otte said Solana pressed Abbas to
improve his organizational command over the PA. Otte also
lamented the PA failure to move ahead on disengagement
coordination, noting that PM Quraya had said to him that the
PA did not need to start planning before the Israeli
withdrawal from Gaza. Otte said Finance Minister Fayyad told
him in Algiers that he was making progress with Kuwait and
the UAE on fulfillment of assistance pledges, although no
money had arrived yet. The U.S. officials briefed Otte on
their discussions earlier in the day with PM Sharon and other
GOI officials about reported plans for new construction in
the E-1 zone between Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim. Otte
concurred on the advisability of deferring public comment
pending clarifications, while expressing concern about a
pattern of Israeli infrastructure construction in the West
Bank, particularly roads. Otte gave details about the EU
assistance program for the PA police, and concurred with the
U.S. side that coordination with Gen. Ward has been good.
Otte said that the EU continues to struggle with the question
of how to deal with Palestinian municipal officials and PLC
electoral candidates from Hamas. The issue, he noted,
includes how EU election monitors would respond to questions
and complaints from Hamas candidates. He said he shared U.S.
concerns about the timing of the PLC election right before
the start of disengagement. Welch urged the EU to refrain
from raising Palestinian expectations about moves beyond
Phase 1 of the roadmap after disengagement. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Amb. Marc Otte, the EU Special Representative for the
Middle East Peace Process, reviewed the Algiers Arab League
Summit, which he attended as an observer, and a range of
Israeli-Palestinian issues in a March 23 meeting with Deputy
National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, NEA Assistant
Secretary David Welch and the Ambassador. The meeting took

SIPDIS
place at the end of a day of meetings that Abrams, Welch and
the Ambassador had with Israeli officials, but before Abrams
and Welch began their program with PA officials.

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Arab League Summit
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3. (C) Otte recounted discussions with PA President Abbas,
Finance Minister Fayyad and other PA officials in Algiers at
the just-completed Arab League summit. He said Abbas was in
a good mood but not specific about what he will do next. (He
attributed Abbas' mood to the "star" treatment given Abbas in
Algiers.) EU foreign policy chief Solana, Otte said, pressed
Abbas to improve his organizational command over the entire
PA government. Sweden, Otte noted, is studying a possible
plan to help Abbas organize his own office; the UK has
expressed interest in such assistance as well. Abrams said
the Japanese are thinking about it, too. Fayyad, Otte said,
reported progress in getting Kuwait and the UAE to fulfill
their pledges of assistance to the PA, although Fayyad said
no money had yet been transferred.


4. (C) Otte characterized the overall atmosphere in Algiers
as chaotic and unfocused, while acknowledging that the EU, as
observers, could not attend the main working sessions. The
Lebanon/Syria issue was not raised at all in the public
session because, he said, Arab League rules preclude
discussions of any issue that a member state identifies as an
internal matter. The highest-profile issue of the summit,
Otte said, was building support for Egypt's candidacy for a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

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Disengagement Coordination
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5. (C) In its discussion with Fayyad at Algiers, the EU team,
Otte said, pressed for the PA to develop a specific strategy
for disengagement. Getting the PA to act has not been easy,
he said, noting that Prime Minister Quraya told him at their
last meeting that the PA could wait until after Israel is out
of Gaza before beginning to deal with the new reality.
Abrams said U.S. officials are concerned, as well, about the
lack of PA preparation for disengagement. The Ambassador
commented that the international community cannot force the
PA to organize for disengagement if the PA is not willing. A
tougher approach to Abbas, in which the international
community threatens to abandon its disengagement-related
efforts if the PA does not act to prevent chaos in Gaza,
might be in order, he said.


6. (C) Otte highlighted the transfer of settlement assets as
a particularly difficult problem aggravated by insufficient
PA coordination on disengagement. He pointed out that the PA
has already demonstrated its capacity for missing valuable
real estate opportunities in Gaza. The upscale Sheikh Zayyad
apartment complex in Gaza remains empty, he said, because the
PA has insisted, against the wishes of the donors who
financed the project, on charging high rents for apartments.

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E-1/Settlement Growth
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7. (C) Saying he wanted the EU message on E-1 and other
settlement growth issues to be consistent with the U.S. line,
Otte asked how the U.S. team handled the E-1 issue (reftel)
in its meetings with PM Sharon and other Israeli officials.
Welch stressed that the USG has not yet finalized a position,
and would not do so before he and Abrams discuss the issue
with the PA on March 24. Otte indicated that he was inclined
to recommend that the EU withhold comment as well, pending
clarifications.


8. (C) The Ambassador noted that GOI officials had described,
in the meetings earlier in the day, the planning and approval
process for construction at E-1. They claimed that no
residential construction at E-1 is imminent given the
possibly lengthy planning and public review stages that must
still take place before final approval of the project. He
noted, though, that the GOI officials acknowledged that
DefMin Mofaz's authorization to refer E-1 plans to the Higher
Planning Council represented a step forward in the approval
process. Abrams underlined two points: A) Mofaz's decision
does not authorize construction, which is unlikely in the
near future, and B) The GOI clearly sees Ma'ale Adumim as
territory Israel will keep under a final status agreement.


9. (C) Otte asked how the U.S. is dealing with the argument
that E-1 development, by linking Jerusalem with Ma'ale
Adumim, would cut East Jerusalem Palestinians off from the
West Bank hinterland. The Ambassador pointed out that the
GOI is unlikely right now to discuss the boundary
implications of this week's E-1 news, given that any such
discussion would undercut the political gains that Sharon
accrues from the announcement in his battles with the
settlers.


10. (C) Otte noted that Abbas had mentioned the E-1 issue in
Algiers, but in a less emphatic manner than one might have
expected. He commented that the Palestinians nevertheless
see the E-1 news as consistent with a pattern of GOI activity
that expands impediments to Palestinian travel within the
West Bank. The focus of recent Israeli construction in the
West Bank, he said, appears to be more on infrastructure,
notably roads, than on residential units within the
settlements. He said the GOI is building more east-west
roads linking Israel to the settlements, and more roads
linking settlements outside the blocs to nearby hilltops,
thereby implying intentions to build on the hilltops. He
also charged that the GOI is excluding Palestinian traffic
from ever greater portions of main roads through the West
Bank.

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PA Security Performance
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11. (C) Otte called Abbas's recent agreement in Cairo with
the militant groups a step forward in extending the period of
calm, but potentially "dangerous" if Abbas does not
eventually try to dismantle the groups' terrorist
capabilities. The PA, he said, must be ready to crack down
on the groups if they do not respect the terms of their deal
with Abbas. The Ambassador pointed out that the GOI takes a
dim view of the Cairo agreement because it allows the groups
to break the calm if Israel commits any of dozens of poorly
defined "violations."


12. (C) Turning to reform of the PA security services, Otte
reported that PA Interior Minister Nasser Yusef is claiming
that he needs six months to restructure the PA security
forces. Welch and Abrams told Otte that Gen. Ward is
stressing to the PA that it must make certain that its
reforms are reflected in on-the-ground operations. Ward's
message to the GOI, they said, underlines the importance of
dealing with the PA security leadership in a manner that
reinforces the PA chain of command.


13. (C) Otte said that the approach of the EU assistance
program for the Palestinian police is consistent with Gen.
Ward's approach. He and the Ambassador noted that both Gen.
Ward and EU COPPS program coordinator Jonathan McGyver say
they are satisfied with their cooperation. EU officials have
told the PA that EU material assistance for the police will
require that the PA demonstrate its seriousness about
building a professional police force. Otte said the EU is
organizing a mid-April conference with "stakeholders" to
reach understandings about the conditions for EU police
support. PA Interior Minister Nasser Yusef has agreed to
attend and lend his authority to any agreement reached.


14. (C) In addition to the British assistance that evolved
into the EU COPPS program, Otte said that Italy is offering
to conduct police training, and Spain is offering to provide
police equipment. Germany has also expressed interest in
providing assistance to the PA police. Otte said the EU will
insist on conducting all training in-country, and plans,
accordingly, to rebuild the police training facility at
Jericho. Abrams noted that Gen. Ward concurs with the value
of centralizing training in one place.

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Dealing with Hamas in the PLC Elections
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15. (C) Abbas's Cairo agreement with the militant groups
appears to have strengthened the standing of Hamas in the
polls for the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, Otte
commented. He asked how the presence of Hamas candidates in
the PLC elections, and of elected municipal officials from
Hamas, would affect U.S. assistance programs. Abrams said
the issue is under study, but poses big problems because
Hamas is on the U.S. terrorism list. The Ambassador
commented that the problem is not only a legal one. From a
policy perspective, he said, donors must ask whether they
want to provide assistance to institutions in which Hamas has
a role. U.S. interests might be better served by targeting
assistance to non-Hamas figures, such as Fatah mayors, who
are bolstering Abbas's reform agenda.


16. (C) Otte said the Hamas problem for the EU goes beyond
assistance programs. Any election observers the EU sends for
the PLC elections would almost certainly receive requests for
meetings, or election-related complaints, from Hamas
candidates. Whether to have observers interact with Hamas
candidates has important practical and political
implications, Otte said, pointing, for example, to the
likelihood that some members of the European Parliament would
threaten to cut off funding for any observation mission that
deals with Hamas.


17. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that PA plans to hold the
PLC elections in July present practical difficulties in light
of their proximity to Gaza disengagement, the run-up to which
will leave movement in Gaza severely restricted. Otte
offered his personal view that holding the elections as
Israel prepares for disengagement would present significant
operational problems. Abrams observed that the work of
observers would be easier after disengagement. Otte noted
that some in the PA have called for postponing the election
for policy reasons, arguing that the August 5 Fatah elections
should precede the PLC elections.

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After Disengagement/Return to Roadmap
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18. (C) The EU should not rush to judgment about where we
will be on the roadmap once disengagement is over, Welch told
Otte. Any discussion about holding this autumn the
international conference called for in Phase 2 of the roadmap
is premature and sends the wrong signals, he said.


19. (C) Otte offered his personal view that the role of the
Quartet now is to reconcile what he called mismatched Israeli
and Palestinian timetables. Whereas the Israelis need to
move slowly before the summer on steps extraneous to
disengagement, Abbas needs to demonstrate real progress on
the ground quickly. The Quartet, Otte said, should manage
the expectations of both sides.


20. (C) Welch underlined that the Palestinians are not ready
for a discussion of final status issues. He cautioned that
unfocused international expressions of support for such
discussions could raise expectations that are bound to be
disappointed, an outcome that could work to the benefit of
the extremists. Otte concurred. He called for a "crash
program" on Phase 1 commitments that would "flush out the
culture of violence" from Palestinian society, and insist
that Israel meet its obligations on settlements and outposts.
Steps must be taken at the same time, he said, to improve
Palestinian economic conditions.


21. (U) Abrams and Welch cleared this message.
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