(S) ISRAELI VIEWS ON PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI SECURITY

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001455

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2015
TAGS: IS KPAL PREL XF ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: (S) ISRAELI VIEWS ON PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI SECURITY
NEGOTIATIONS


Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) On instructions from Defense Minister Mofaz, BG
Eitan Dangott briefed the Ambassador March 11 on the status
of Israeli-Palestinian security negotiations and other issues
discussed in the Sharm el-Sheik summit. Dangott said that
Mofaz and the Israeli security establishment are becoming
increasingly frustrated with the Palestinians' negotiating
behavior.


2. (S) Dangott recalled Mofaz's meeting several weeks ago
with Mohammed Dahlan in which Dahlan had laid down two
principles that would be important for the Palestinians in
the transfer of security responsibilities in the West Bank:
Palestinians wanted not only the cities to be transferred,
but also the areas surrounding the cities; and the
Palestinians did not want the Israeli army to surround the
cities as it had done in the summer of 2003. Dangott said
that Mofaz and Dahlan had discussed this in some detail and
had agreed that these were achievable outcomes. Dahlan had
also understood from Mofaz that the focus was not going to be
on areas A, B or C, and that the outcome would not be defined
at this time as a return to the situation that existed before
September 2000.


3. (S) Since then, each time Israeli and Palestinian
security negotiators have sat to discuss the transfer of
security in Jericho and/or Tulkarm, they have approached
agreement only to have the situation reversed when the issue
was submitted to the Palestinian political level. Dangott
said the latest setback occurred this week when Hajj Ismail
told his Israeli counterpart that his new instructions were
to insist on Route 90 (in the Jordan Valley) being seen as a
"international road" on which travelers from the northern
West Bank would be free to move to the southern West Bank
without any hindrance by Israeli security elements. Hajj
Ismail further said that the objective he was asked to
achieve was to emphasize that the Jordan Valley belongs to
the Palestinians.


4. (S) Dangott said that Hajj Ismail's position is all the
more disturbing in that it followed the meeting early this
week between Mofaz and Palestinian President Abbas. During
that meeting, Abbas had emphasized the importance of
achieving a successful outcome in the cities and had
expressed confidence that agreements reached between military
commanders would be acceptable to the political echelons on
both sides. Dangott added that the role played by Interior
Minister Nasir Yousef in these meetings was less helpful, and
that Yousef appeared very unfamiliar with the details that
were under discussion between the military commanders.


5. (S) Dangott said that Mofaz is insistent on trying to
make this work, even though the Israelis are not persuaded
that Palestinian security forces are ready to assume their
responsibilities in the cities. New commanders have not been
appointed, and Palestinian forces have not started training
in the Jericho area, which Israel had told the Palestinians
would be permitted. This has led to a suspicion on the part
of Israeli analysts that Palestinians have become comfortable
with the failure of the negotiations in that they are able to
blame Israel for failure to implement the Sharm el-Sheik
understanding.


6. (S) The Ambassador suggested that Mofaz reach out to
Palestinian Interior Minister Yousef to try to break the
deadlock. He noted that all of us have been seeking an
empowered Palestinian security interlocutor, and we now have
one. Mofaz's insistence on meeting President Abbas earlier
in the week was positively motivated, but it may have been
seen by Yousef as undercutting his authority. Thus, there is
an opportunity now not only to help bolster Yousef's
authority, but perhaps also to yield progress in the security
negotiations. The Ambassador said that if Mofaz agreed that
the next step should be a meeting with Yousef, our Consul
General and General Ward would meet with Yousef in order to
frame the agenda and possible outcomes of the meeting in the
best manner possible. Dangott pushed back, saying that if
the negotiations were not succeeding with President Abbas as
an interlocutor, it was unlikely that Yousef's participation
would help. However, he undertook to raise with Mofaz the
Ambassador's strong suggestion that an early meeting be
sought with Nasir Yousef in order to give new impetus to the
negotiations.

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