TECHNICAL TALKS ON POSSIBLE RETURN OF U.S.-ORIGIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TEL AVIV 001424

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/NE KRASS AND NEA/IPA
DOE FOR DOE/NA-212 KASIA MENDELSOHN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015
TAGS: KNNP ENRG TRGY PREL IS ISRAEL RELATIONS COUNTERTERRORISM ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBJECT: TECHNICAL TALKS ON POSSIBLE RETURN OF U.S.-ORIGIN
SPENT FUEL FROM ISRAEL TO THE UNITED STATES

REF: A) 04 STATE 251040 B) 02 TEL AVIV 4869

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene Cretz; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and
(D).


1. (C) Summary: A joint DOE/State technical team led by Kasia
Mendelsohn from DOE's Office of Global Nuclear Material
Threat Reduction met with officials from the Israeli Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEC) on January 12-13 to discuss possible
Israeli participation in the Foreign Research Reactor (FRR)
Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Program. Both sides
agreed on a summary of discussions (text in paragraph six),
including a detailed fuel inventory for the Soreq nuclear
facility, a list of specific follow-on actions, and a
proposed implementation schedule for a possible Israeli SNF
shipment in September 2005. The Israelis raised a number of
issues that would require the USG to modify -- or make
exceptions to -- the current FNR-SNF program, including
continued operation of Soreq on high-enriched uranium (HEU)
fuel, financial concessions, and a closely-coordinated public
diplomacy strategy. The U.S. team took Israel's requests
back to Washington for discussion in the interagency process.
End summary.


2. (SBU) Mendelsohn noted that the FRR SNF Acceptance Program
requires participating reactors to terminate the use of HEU
(high-enriched uranium) fuel as soon as LEU (low-enriched
uranium) fuel is available within the program policy period
(i.e., by 2016). She also told IAEC officials that Israel,
as a high-income economy country as defined by the World
Bank, would be required to pay for transportation costs and a
DOE management fee in order to ship SNF under this program.
She added that transportation costs could be reduced if
Israel participated in a joint shipment with other nations,
such as the one planned for September 2005.


3. (C) IAEC Deputy Director for Policy Eli Levite stressed
that Israel does not contemplate closing Soreq in the
foreseeable future and is unable to convert to LEU due to a
lack of a guaranteed fuel source. He quoted from a USG
non-paper (reftel A) to back his contention that the USG had
already agreed that Soreq could continue to operate, saying
Soreq would not have to convert until "Israel can acquire
LEU." Mendelsohn noted that the FRR SNF program could only
accept fuel from a reactor that converts to LEU. Levite's
second major concern is that the cost of the SNF program,
which he noted is not included in the IAEC's budget for 2005.
On several occasions, IAEC officials suggested that the USG
could find a way to reduce the DOE management fee.


4. (C) Levite told the U.S. delegation that the extremely
sensitive nature of Israel's nuclear program would require a
coordinated public affairs strategy. He listed four elements
that Israel wants included in any press guidance or public
statement to be issued only after a possible shipment takes
place: 1) the shipment was made at the request of the USG,
but not under U.S. pressure; 2) Israel is not being
singled-out, but is part of a broader program; 3) the
shipment is part of a more general non-proliferation effort;
and 4) the shipment does not reflect any safety or security
concerns about Israeli storage procedures. Levite also
insisted that the summary of discussions be labeled
"confidential." The U.S. team undertook to take Israel's
requests for exceptions to FRR SNF guidelines back to
Washington and discuss them in the normal interagency
process. The two sides agreed that public release of
information on the potential shipment be strictly limited
until after any possible shipment takes place.


5. (C) Embassy comment and recommendation: Post sees no
reason to make the significant exceptions to the SNF program
rules requested by the IAEC. The GOI routinely pushes to the
limit during negotiations in order to get the best deal
possible, especially on financial matters. The IAEC is
certainly aware that the limited fiscal outlay required for
any spent fuel shipment would be more than offset by having
the USG permanently remove the dangerous material from
storage at Soreq. When considering whether to grant Israel's
requests for exceptions to the SNF program rules, it should
also be noted that the public relations benefits derived from
any Soreq shipment could possibly be overshadowed by
questions of why the USG is not addresing Israel's nuclear
program in Dimona. End Comment and recommendation.


6. (C) Begin text of agreed U.S.-Israeli summary of
discussions, marked "confidential" by Israeli officials:

Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC)
Soreq Research Reactor
Tel Aviv, Israel

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS
IRR-1
January 12 -13, 2005

IAEC and DOE agree that the contents of this document and
related communications are considered "confidential" unless
stated otherwise.

VISITING TEAM

Ms. Kasia Mendelsohn, Office of Global Nuclear Material
Threat Reduction, DOE/NNSA (Policy POC)
Tel: (202) 586-0275
Fax: (202) 586-6789
Email: kasia.mendelsohn"at"hq.doe.gov

Mr. Charles Messick, NA-212, DOE - Savannah River Site
(Technical POC)
Tel: 803-725-9494
Fax: 803-725-8856
Email: charles.messick"at"srs.gov

Dr. Allan Krass, Department of State, Bureau of
Nonproliferation, Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs
Tel: (202) 647-3272
Tel: (202) 647-0775
Email: KrassAS"at"state.gov

Mr. Michael Dunsmuir, Westinghouse-Savannah River Company
(WSRC)
Tel: (803) 557-6107
Fax: (803) 557-6133
Email: michael.dunsmuir"at"srs.gov

Mr. Randy Dunavant, WSRC
Tel: (803) 557-6146
Fax: (803) 557-6133
Email: randall.dunavant"at"srs.gov

U.S. EMBASSY

The U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv is supporting these activities.
The U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv POCs are:

Shawn Crowley, Political Officer
Tel: 972-3-519-7385
Fax: 972-3-519-1035
Email: crowleysp"at"state.gov

Robert Tansey, Science Officer
Tel: 972-3-519-7478
Fax: 972-3-519-1035
Email: tanseyrj"at"state.gov

KEY PERSONNEL IN ISRAEL:

Israel Atomic Energy Commission:

Dr. Ariel (Eli) Levite, Principal Deputy Director General
(Policy)
Tel: 972-3-6462913
Fax: 972-3-6462570
Email: alevite"at"iaec.gov.il

Dr. Chen Zak, External Relations Director IAEC (Policy POC)
Tel: 972-3-6462914
Fax: 972-3-6462570
Email: czak"at"iaec.gov.il

Dr. Jacob Gilat, Safety and Licensing Division
Tel: 972-3-6462958
Fax: 972-3-6462539
Email: gilat"at"soreq.gov.il

Mr. Ronen Lahav, Legal Advisor
Tel: 972-3-6462593
Fax: 972-3-6462974
Email: rlahav"at"iaec.gov.il

Ms. Nili Lifchitz, Spokesperson
Tel: 972-3-6462919
Fax: 972-3-6462570
Email: nlifchitz"at"iaec.gov.il

Soreq, NRC:
Mr. Hanoch Hirshfeld (Technical POC)
Tel: 972-8-943 4493
Fax: 972-8-943 4157
Email: hirshfel"at"soreq.gov.il

Mr. Michael Bettan, Reactor Director
Tel: 972-8-9434615
Fax: 972-8-9434133
Email: bettan"at"soreq.gov.il

PURPOSE OF THE VISIT

The purpose of this visit was: (1) to discuss U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation policy and program issues concerning the
Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF)
Acceptance Program; (2) discuss contractual requirements for
research reactors located in "countries with high income
economies"; (3) conduct a brief assessment of the IRR-1 SNF
condition; (4) evaluate the equipment and capabilities of the
facility to package and prepare the material for shipment;
and (5) determine shipment needs and requirements.

INTRODUCTION

The Israel Atomic Energy Commission was founded in 1952. The
Israel Research Reactor, IRR-1 (5 MW),was installed and
commenced operation in 1960. IRR-1 continues to operate and
has no plans to shut down in the foreseeable future. DOE
currently does not have a contract with IAEC. However, a
Letter of Intent (LOI) was signed September 2004 between IAEC
and DOE to include issues related to the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative (GTRI).

FUEL INVENTORY

The IRR-1 Research Reactor fuel assemblies are MTR-type
assemblies. Characteristics of IRR-1 fuel and control
assemblies that may be returned to the United States are
provided below.

SPENT HEU (111 SNF assemblies) (EMBASSY NOTE: THIS SHOULD
READ "116 SNF assemblies." END NOTE).


1. Standard MTR (196 gr): 75
Consisting of: (18 curved plates),
Enrichment: 90 - 93 percent
Fuel Meat: U-Al alloy
Clad: Al
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 196 gr
Burn-up: 45 percent average
Average decay time: 20-28 years
Note: Two standard assemblies are instrumented.


2. Standard MTR (282 gr): 13
Consisting of: (23 flat plates)
Enrichment 93 percent
Fuel Meat: U-Alx- Al dispersion
Clad: Al
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 282 gr
Burn-up: 45 percent average
Average decay time: greater than one year minimum prior to a
shipment.


3. Partial MTR (192 gr): 1
Consisting of: (9 curved plates),
Enrichment: 90 percent
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion
Clad: Al
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 192 gr.


4. Control Assemblies: 26
Consisting of: (9 curved plates),
Enrichment: 90 - 93 percent
Fuel Meat: U-Al alloy
Clad: Al
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 98 gr
Burn-up: 45 percent average
Average decay time: 16 FAs - 20-28 yrs; 10 FAs - > than 28 yrs
Note: One control assembly is instrumented.


5. Control Assemblies: 1
Consisting of: (17 flat plates),
Enrichment: 93.3 percent
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion
Clad: Al
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 192 gr.

FRESH FUEL ASSEMBLIES (10 FAs)
(Not considered for inclusion in a current shipment)


6. Standard MTR (282 gr): 9
Consisting of: (23 flat plates),
Enrichment 93 percent
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion
Clad: Al
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 282 gr.


7. Partial MTR (192 gr) 1
Consisting of: (9 curved plates),
Enrichment: 90 percent
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion
Clad: Al
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 192 gr.

IN-CORE FUEL ASSEMBLIES (27 FAs)
(Not considered for inclusion in a current shipment)


8. Standard MTR (282 gr): 23
Consisting of: (23 flat plates),
Enrichment: 93 percent
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion
Clad: Al
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 282 gr.


9. Control Assemblies: 4
Consisting of: (17 flat plates),
Enrichment: 93.3 percent
Fuel Meat: U-Alx - Al dispersion
Clad: Al
Initial U-235(g)/assembly: 192 gr.

CONDITION OF FUEL

SNF fuel assemblies are stored in the IRR-1 storage section
of the reactor pool, except for 24 SNF fuel assemblies stored
in a storage facility located adjacent to the reactor pool.
Spent fuel is stored in stainless steel/aluminum racks in the
reactor pool and spent fuel stored in the storage facility is
stored in aluminum racks.

An evaluation of fuel was conducted by WSRC and a detailed
report will be issued by WSRC at a later date. However,
initial examination of the fuel indicated no significant
problems associated with transportation or storage of the
fuel at the Savannah River Site. The team saw no indication
of any significant corrosion or mechanical damage. The
facility noted that no fuel was removed due to indication of
a failure.

FACILITIES RELATED TO PACKAGING

The overhead bridge crane capacity is 12 metric tons.

The reactor building access doors are approximately 355cm
wide x 312cm high. The floor load is effectively unlimited.

The reactor pool is 10 meters deep and there is no capacity
to set a heavy cask in the reactor pool without design
modifications for a platform.

The facility has a demineralized water supply and has a high
capacity compressed air supply. Electrical power is 220
volts/50 Hz.

IAEC possesses an on-site transfer cask (capacity of 4 fuel
assemblies) for movement of fuel between the pool and the
storage facility, and IAEC would transfer all fuel from the
storage facility to the reactor pool prior to transport
package loading.

POTENTIAL TRANSPORTATION ROUTE FROM THE REACTOR TO THE PORT
OF EXPORT

Israel is a high-income economy and would be responsible for
any in-country transportation activities.

REGULATORY AUTHORITY

The IAEC is the regulatory agency for Israel.

POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS

No significant problems have been identified.

DISCUSSIONS

1. The following documents were provided by DOE:

-- Compilation of contract clauses for high-income economy
countries (electronic)

-- Appendix A and Appendix B (electronic)

-- FRR SNF Acceptance Program Environmental Impact Statement
Record of Decision with Changes 1 through 3 and Fee Policy
notices.


2. Kasia Mendelsohn, U.S. Department of Energy, made opening
remarks summarizing the Global Threat Reduction Initiative
(GTRI) and the FRR SNF Acceptance Program, emphasizing two
main points:

-- The program requires participating FRRs to terminate the
use of HEU fuel as soon as a suitable LEU fuel is available
within the program policy period; and

-- Israel, as a high-income economy country as defined by the
World Bank, is required to pay for transportation costs and a
DOE management fee in order to ship SNF under this program.
Ms. Mendelsohn noted the unique opportunity to participate in
a September 2005 joint shipment which could significantly
reduce transportation cost.


3. Ariel (Eli) Levite, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, made
opening remarks:

-- The general attitude of IAEC is positive toward shipping
SNF to the United States and participating in the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI);

-- Continued operation of IRR-1 is essential and there is no
intention to shut down in the foreseeable future;

-- The IAEC and DOE will work together to craft a positive
public affairs approach, including appropriate statements to
be made in the event of public inquiries in advance of the
shipment and an appropriate press release (includes public
statement) to be issued upon completion of the shipment.

-- IAEC stated that conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU)
fuel is based on Israel's ability to obtain LEU;

-- IAEC recognized that the FRR SNF Acceptance program
participation is connected to other GTRI and Letter of Intent
(LOI) activities such as improvements in export controls,
radioactive source control, etc;

-- Cost effectiveness of economies-of-scale will need to be
weighed against the cost of any management fee;

-- Detailed questions must be resolved regarding, for
example, lead time, personnel needs, security, etc.

-- IAEC concluded by noting that quick turnaround may be
possible when questions and concerns are resolved.

-- The IAEC has expressed the political and diplomatic
sensitivity of the issue of participating in this program.

-- IAEC identified eight U.S.-origin Pu-Be sources,
(approximately) 530 gms Pu, that it would like DOE to
consider removing during the shipment of SNF to the United
States. DOE has referred this request to the Office of
Global Radiological Threat Reduction for consideration and
has identified Robert Campbell in the Office of Global
Radiological Threat Reduction as the appropriate POC (Tel:
202-586-7544). Dr. Jacob Gilat was identified as the
appropriate IAEC POC.

Following opening remarks, the group departed for Soreq for a
tour of the facility and detailed discussions of a
compilation of clauses that may be used in a potential
contract for shipment of the IRR-1 material under the FRR SNF
program.

-- IAEC has been informed that the shipment of SNF from the
IRR-1 will likely be combined with other countries' shipments
and as such it is possible that when the vessel arrives in
Israel's port of export, it could have SNF from other
facilities or countries on board.

-- IAEC understands that because of possible competing
shipments, DOE can not guarantee acceptance of SNF containing
uranium enriched in the United States that is made available
for shipment late in the Acceptance Program, which expires on
May 12, 2019.
AGREEMENTS AND ACTIONS


1. DOE understands IAEC's concern regarding continued
operation of IRR-1 and will review potential options that may
alleviate such concerns.


2. IAEC and DOE agreed to handle public affairs aspects
cooperatively. IAEC and DOE agreed to exchange points
regarding a public affairs approach.


3. IAEC identified eight U.S.-origin Pu-Be sources,
(approximately) 530 gms Pu, that it would like DOE to
consider removing during the shipment of SNF to the United
States. DOE has referred this request to the Office of
Global Radiological Threat Reduction for consideration and
has identified Robert Campbell in the Office of Global
Radiological Threat Reduction as the appropriate POC (Tel:
202-586-7544). Dr. Jacob Gilat was identified as the
appropriate IAEC POC.


4. IAEC identified one fresh instrumented control assembly
located at CERCA in France. IAEC expressed interest in
finding a way to return the assembly to Israel. DOE agreed
to refer this question to the appropriate authorities in
Washington. Resolution of this issue has financial
implications for Israel's decision to participate.


5. IAEC noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) must be notified sufficiently far in advance in order
to apply appropriate safeguards. DOE noted that it is IAEC's
responsibility to notify IAEA of any intention to transfer
SNF. DOE understands its obligation under INFCIRC/84 to
report receipt of the transferred material to the IAEA.


6. DOE agreed to provide IAEC with a point-of-contact (POC)
for known qualified shippers and cask vendors.


7. DOE agreed to provide a POC regarding possible
availability of SNF cropping equipment.


8. DOE agreed to provide contractual points that might be
applicable to IAEC-selected shipper under this program.


9. DOE agreed to provide the non-proprietary portion of the
DOE-NAC contract used for other-than-high income economy
countries under this program.


10. IAEC requests consideration for a reduction in overall
costs for implementing a shipment in 2005.


11. DOE will identify potential third parties that have
participated in the program and would be willing to share
experiences.

PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE


1. February 2005 - Agreement in principal to implement a SNF
shipment in September 2005.

2. March 2005 - Finalize Appendix A data.
3 May 2005 - Approve IAEC-DOE contract.
4 June 2005 - DOE issue "Authorization to Ship" letter.

5. July 2005 - Transport packages arrive in Israel.

6. August 2005 - SNF departs Israel.

7. September 2005 - SNF arrives in the United States.

End text of summary of discussions.


7. (U) The DOE/State delegation has cleared this message.

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